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Abstract: 
This thesis reveals the potential pitfalls of relying on the Internet to 
communicate serious environmental issues. This exploratory research examines 
the consequences of aspects of the information society focusing on the effects of 
the Internet upon three reactions to climate communication: public 
understanding, perception of risk and support for climate change mitigation. It 
examines the implications of the rise of the information society on young people’s 
(18-25 year olds) consumption of media and climate science information. The 
information society literature emerged before the Internet, but predicted the 
increasing access to information that has arisen in the past two decades and its 
significant impacts on society and communication. An analytical framework is 
developed focusing on the sharing of information and the consequences of both 
misleading information and competition for the user’s attention. To explore the 
impact of the Internet upon public perception of risks posed by and their 
understanding of climate change, this research uses a mixed methodological 
approach. The qualitative approach of focus groups has been selected to 
establish how young people use the Internet and whether they share and actively 
engage with climate change information online. A quantitative approach of the 
experimental method has critically examined the impact of junk information 
(climate sceptic material) and information overload (competition for users’ 
attention) on reactions to climate science. The original contribution to knowledge 
of this thesis was the key finding that the lack of engagement with climate science 
online poses a more serious issue than the risk of climate sceptic information 
being virally shared. Simply having the information accessible is not enough when 
there is so much competition for users’ attention and the ease with which they 
can filter out climate change information.    
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is an exploratory study into young peoples’ (18-25) 
understanding, perception of risk, and support for mitigation of climate change in 
the context of the information society. In contemporary times, the information 
society is mostly hosted on the Internet. The concept of an information society 
emerged in the 1970s, before the development of the Internet, and predicted 
economic and social shifts in society as a result of the rise of information 
technology (See Bell, 1973, and Masuda, 1980). The information society theory 
(See Bell, 1973, Martin, 1995, Masuda, 1980) has been used to develop an 
analytical framework to assess the impact of the information technology upon 
public understanding, perception of risk, and support for climate change 
mitigation. This research draws on the broader definition of information society 
put forward by Martin (1995, p. 3) which incorporates the social impact of the rise 
of the Internet. It does this to shed light on the dark side of the information society 
because the information society theory that emerged in the 1970s was very 
utopian and optimistic of the benefits that increasing information would have on 
society which I refer to as the light side1. Instead the information society has had 
unexpected negative consequences, which I call the dark side and to the best of 
my knowledge I have coined the terminology of dark-side and light-side (See 
chapter 2). The information society theory by key theorists (See Bell, 1973, and 
Masuda, 1980) was visionary and has been used to generate an analytical 
framework despite the significant differences in consequences of the Internet 
predicted. The Internet is a key area of interest as it has had a range of impacts 
and consequences with how young people engage with information generally and 
potentially with climate science more specifically, so this research takes an 
exploratory approach. These are centred on the ease of the sharing of information 
through social networks, the potential consequences of information overload 
(information competition) and the risk of spreading junk information. Junk 
information refers here to false information created to mislead the public.     
                                            
1 The light side and dark side of the information are discussed in chapter 2.  
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The sharing of information has become increasingly easier with social 
media websites built around the idea of users sharing and creating content, 
allowing for the democratisation of information (Grignou and Patou, 2004, Kaplan 
and Haenlein, 2010). However, the development of an information rich 
environment has the potential consequence of information overload which is 
caused by unprecedented amounts of information competing for our attention 
(See Schumann, 2004). Alongside this there is also the problem of junk 
information that can be spread to deliberately mislead the public (See Kien, 
2013). In the case of climate change I consider junk information to be climate 
sceptic material which seeks to undermine public perception of scientific 
consensus by making climate science appear debated (See Boykoff, 2011, 
Nerlich, 2010). Information overload and junk information are not isolated 
aspects. They overlap since on the one hand of junk information is shared virally 
through social networks and on the other hand virally shared content distracts 
users from important issues.  
The emphasis is on public engagement with climate change in an era of 
high information consumption, and how this affects individuals’ understanding, 
perception of risk, and support for climate mitigation. Engagement with climate 
change can come in range of ways including changing consumer behaviour, 
participatory democracy, or decarbonising behaviour with the media being the 
main engagement with climate change the public has (O'Neill and Nicholson-
Cole, 2009, pp. 356-337). I take the approach of examining whether there is 
engagement with climate change media reporting rather than behaviour change, 
as the competition for attention of users means there is a risk that people will 
simply filter out coverage entirely (See Chapter 3) and the viral spread of 
information requires users to decide to share to other users (See chapter 2). In 
particular, engagement in this context refers to the reading/watching of climate 
change information and also whether young people are willing to share climate 
science over social networks. Public understanding is a concept debated among 
academics, as ‘understanding’ can be defined as a basic understanding of 
terminology or defined as an in depth understanding of concepts or events (Miller, 
2004). I take the former approach, conceptualising public understanding as a 
form of ‘scientific literacy’ (Miller, 1983). Scientific literacy is often argued to be 
the basic understanding considered necessary to comprehend debates in media 
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coverage, as the media is the key way the public engages with science (Miller, 
1983, Miller, 1998, Miller, 2004, Sturgis and Allum, 2004). In addition to public 
understanding there is also the issue of how the public perceive risk from climate 
change. The public are not rational and emotions shape how they engage with 
information and our perception of risk is informed through other means such as 
personal experience (Roeser, 2012, Marx et al., 2007, Weingart et al., 2000). 
Support for climate change mitigation relies upon both the public developing 
understanding climate science, such as the causes, and also viewing climate 
change as a threat to the extent that they are willing to alter their carbon intensive 
lifestyles (Semenza et al., 2008).     
 The rest of this introduction is structured into four sections. The following 
section focuses on the rationale for this research. This section will explain the 
rationale of the study focusing upon communication of climate change, as well as 
the significance of the emergence of the Internet, and the importance of effective 
public communication. It will also justify the focus of the study on young people’s 
engagement with climate change.  The second section introduces the 
overarching research questions and hypotheses for this thesis. This section also 
breaks down the overarching research questions into the supplementary 
research questions. The third section focuses on the contribution my research 
will make to existing literature. Finally, this introduction gives an outline of the 
thesis chapter structure. 
 
1.1: Rationale 
1.1.1: The importance of the media  
 The media has an important role in communicating and building the public 
perception of the complex issue of climate change as well as developing public 
understanding of the facets of the debate to enable engagement in policy debates 
(Boykoff, 2011, Carvalho and Burgress, 2005). There has been a range of 
previous research examining the portrayal of climate change and the impact that 
media framing has upon public perception. Media framing has been an important 
focus in previous research as the selection of information to portray climate 
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change is considered to influence public perception of the issue (Boykoff, 2011, 
Muschert, 2009).  
 
1.1.2: Why focus on the Internet?  
There has been a significant societal change with the rise of information 
technology. This has allowed for people to interact with the media entirely 
differently and has enabled users both the ability to select the information they 
receive and the capability they have to share information with other users through 
social networks. The active role the user has in engaging and sharing information 
has increased with the number of Internet users in the UK rapidly increasing from 
7.39 per 100 people in 1997 to 87.02 per 100 people in 2012 (The World Bank, 
n.d.). Previous research by Anderson (2009, p. 177) has shown that the Internet 
has become a key way that the public find out about climate change. Interestingly 
the Internet has also become the main source of journalists’ information on 
climate change (Anderson, 2009).  
The Internet is also increasingly absorbing all other forms of media 
including traditional media, as well as the emergence of new forms of media with 
user created content, essentially becoming the first meta-medium (See Agre, 
1998, Fortunati and Taipale, 2014, p. 318). The development of Web 2.02 meant 
that the Internet was not just an imitation of paper, but the new website design 
philosophy meant that users were creating content (Barassi and Trere, 2012, 
Kata, 2012, Ryan, 2010). This change has allowed for the emergence of huge 
quantities of user created content. For example the video hosting site Youtube 
has one hundred hours of video uploaded every minute onto its website (Youtube, 
n.d.-b). Alongside the ability to host user created content there has been the 
emergence of social media, such as Facebook, which has enabled the sharing of 
content and information to other users in a social network (Gruzd et al., 2011, 
Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010, Kata, 2012). The growing use of social media sites 
can be illustrated by Facebook, which has grown from 145 million monthly users 
                                            
2 Webb 2.0 is discussed later in chapter 2 
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in 2008 to 1.35 billion monthly active users by September, 2014 (Facebook 
Newsroom, n.d). 
There has not been simply the creation of new forms of media, but also 
the absorption of traditional media.  US newspapers, for example, had an online 
presence since the early 1990s but this was originally a basic introduction to the 
newspaper (Li, 2006, p. 1). However, from a basic web presence, online 
newspapers have evolved to be more than equivalent to their print counterparts. 
Even as far back as 2006, Li (2006, p. 2), highlighted that audiences rely more 
on the Internet versions of these newspapers “… because they are more 
accessible, updated more often, and richer in content than print newspapers”. 
Due to this accessibility they also reach a wider range of people with 
theguardian.com achieving an average daily unique browsers of 8,016,000 
accessing it in July 2015 - far greater than daily circulation of The Guardian 
(Ponsford, 2015).  
Another example of the absorption of traditional media can be seen 
through television with on demand services, such as 4oD [Channel 4 on 
Demand], that allow users to catch up on missed television programming, and 
Netflix which allows for people to view films and series online (4 Press, 2006, 
Netflix, n.d.). Research by Liebowitz and Zentner (2012) has shown that Internet 
users, particularly, young people, have reduced the amount of time they spend 
watching traditional television. The shift from traditional media to the Internet is 
argued by Gaskins and Jerit (2012, p. 206) to be due to the Internet offering a 
greater range of entertainment and information to the individual.  
The growing use of and dependency upon the Internet, along with the 
decline of traditional media, means that it is of great significance and importance 
to examine the impact the Internet has had upon reactions to climate change 
information. In particular, the Internet not only offers a greater range of 
information and entertainment from both traditional media sources and new 
media created by users. The Internet has enabled access to a wide range of 
information about science, but also risks the potential of the public being misled 
by inaccurate information as anyone can create content (Britt et al., 2014). It has 
also enabled greater potential for the self-selection of information, with the 
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freedom for users to completely disengage with news and science 
communication if they so wished (see Smith and Searles, 2014, p. 71).  
However, greater opportunity of self-selection is not the only manner in 
which the Internet differs from other forms of media. A key aspect of the Internet 
experience is personalised for the user based on previous browsing history and 
data received through trackers which track user activity providing a personalised 
web experience (Lee and Cranage, 2011, p. 987). Mass collection of personal 
data is used by marketers to attempt to increase sales through targeted 
advertising, for example attempting to predict a potential customer’s needs 
through location data (See Xu et al., 2011), and also used by websites to direct 
to what users are more likely to buy. The collection of user data is undertaken by 
most social media websites and search engines, such as Facebook and Google, 
to tailor results for items you are more likely to click on. Google stores data of 
what is searched for and clicked on for 180 days or forever if their user is logged 
in with a Google account (Sullivan, 2009). Google also has become dominate 
with increasing numbers of users with the number of searches being carried out 
exponentially increasing year upon year with 22,000,000 searches in 2000 to 
2,834,650,000,000 by 2015 (See Figure 1.1). Personalisation means that some 
users may not straight forwardly reach climate change information, as they have 
not engaged with it in the past.  
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Figure 1-1: Annual number of Google searches 
 
Note: Data taken from Statistic Brain (2016). There is missing data for 2001 
through to 2006 so a trend line has been added.  
There has been a lack of research on how the changing interaction with 
information has shifted towards the use of the Internet. Therefore, this thesis will 
explore how users perceive their Internet use and how they view their 
engagement with climate change material online. In particular, this thesis seeks 
to critically examine the consequences of information overload and junk 
information on the publics’ reactions to climate change and the implications the 
Internet has for science communication. 
 
1.1.3: Why focus on young people’s use of the Internet?  
This thesis focuses upon young people because previous research 
suggests that technological advancements and electronic communication have 
become normalised in their lives (Eynon and Malmberg, 2011). Therefore, an 
examination of young peoples’ engagement with climate change information and 
the impact that junk information has upon their reactions to climate change allows 
us to investigate how people absorb and react to information from the Internet. 
While the results will focus on young people, there is the potential that these 
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results can be generalised to broader society as the Internet and social media is 
increasingly adopted and normalised by a wider user base.  
The adoption of social media in the UK can be seen in Figure 1.2 where 
young people were the rapid adopters of social media with a sharp increase from 
54% of Internet users aged between 18 to 24 in 2007, to 90% by 2011 (Ofcom, 
2015, p. 32). The graph shows a slower increase of adoption by Internet users 
between 35 to 44 year olds from 12% in 2007 to 58% by 2009 (Ofcom, 2015, p. 
32). The adoption of social media continues to increase in society with the 
average age of users jumping “… from 33 in 2008 to 38 in 2010” as a wider range 
of people adopt the technology (Hampton et al., 2011a, p. 3). Social media has 
been growing in use with young people being early adopters and continuous 
users. Along with being early adopters this enables young people to be 
participants in the new forms of digital democracy (See chapter 2) with the 
potential of social media to inform others and in the potential produce rich 
discussion of issues in society or the potential to scrutinize and hold government 
and decision makers to account (Loader et al., 2016)3. Previous research on 
young people has found that there is awareness of climate change and young 
people are going to experience the consequences within their lifetimes (Ojala, 
2011). 
  
                                            
3 The new forms of participatory democracy are discussed in chapter 2 in the 
optimistic predictions of the information society. 
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Figure 1-2: Percentage of UK Internet users using social media by age 
groups 
 
Note: Data from Ofcom (2015, p. 32). 
By focusing on young people my work can reveal the potential 
consequences upon public reactions to climate change within the context of 
broader normalisation of social media and the Internet within society and the 
challenges that the Internet poses for communicating climate change to the 
public. It is important to explore whether young people access climate change 
information and how the Internet has shaped their engagement considering the 
Internet and social media is seen as a normalised aspect of their lives.  
 
1.1.4: Communication for action 
  It is important to study communication of climate change because 
effective communication of the issue is required to produce an informed public 
(Moser, 2010). An adequately informed public is argued by Moser (2010) to not 
simply produce pressure on politicians for political solutions, but can change 
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action and normative change is highlighted by Boykoff (2011, p. 2) as a potential 
outcome of an informed public it “…does not determine engagement…”.  
 However, effective communication that instils belief in anthropogenic 
climate change has proved difficult to achieve despite anthropogenic climate 
change reaching scientific consensus and being regarded as a scientific fact 
(Pidgeon, 2012, p. S85). This is illustrated by the UK Energy Research Centre 
[UKERC] face to face survey of the British public in which 91% answered that 
they thought the world’s climate was changing in 2005, but in 2013 the same 
question received a result of only 72% (Poortinga et al., 2013). The changing 
public perception of climate change is particularly interesting to examine. Why 
has public belief decreased while climate change has achieved scientific 
consensus?  Perhaps this is due to the fact that the Internet has become 
increasingly significant in peoples’ lives perhaps this distracts or misleads the 
public that the science is still contentious. This makes it prudent to explore 
contemporary youth engagement with climate change information and the impact 
that the Internet has had upon reactions to climate change.    
 
1.2: Contribution to the literature 
This research contributes to four key areas. I am using an interdisciplinary 
approach to analyse the impact of the Internet beyond simply public concern for 
the environment. Firstly, this research explores the information society and 
develops an analytical framework to allow for an analysis of the Internet upon 
young people.  Secondly, I am focusing on public understanding of climate 
science, perception of risk, and support for climate action, to develop an 
understanding of the consequences on the Internet on young people’s 
understanding of the causes and consequences of climate change. This draws 
upon the public understanding of science research that has emerged from the 
social sciences. In addition, it also draws from research into risk perception and 
public support for climate mitigation. The third contribution is to apply insights 
from the media effects literature to the case study of the Internet when previous 
research has predominately focused upon newspaper and television 
communication. In this endeavour, I use communication studies literature to 
examine engagement with online material and the consequences of the Internet. 
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I also apply information processing literature to examine how young people 
interact with climate change information. This draws from psychology and 
neuroscience research to explore the processing of information and the 
consequences of the Internet on reactions to climate change. Finally, I am 
extending the state of the art in studies of climate change communication on the 
Internet, by applying the experimental method. 
 Firstly, although the information society literature emerged before the 
Internet, significant claims were made about the impact of increasing information 
on society (See Bell, 1973, Masuda, 1980). These claims have been used to 
produce a analytical framework of the information society, which represents a 
significant social shift due to information technology (See Martin, 1995), used to 
analysis the impact of the Internet on young peoples’ reactions to the 
communication of climate change. However, the initial claims where inherently 
hopeful and utopian about the changes that information society would produce. 
While the work was visionary with regards to the ubiquity of information the 
consequences of information overload and junk information have been used to 
create an analytical framework for the ‘dark side’ of the information society (see 
chapter 2).      
 Secondly, the interdisciplinary approach enables my research to explore 
the impact of misleading climate sceptic information upon young peoples’ 
understanding of climate science. The Internet has dramatically changed the way 
we communicate significant issues in society (Koteyko et al., 2015). In particular, 
content can be created by anyone and spread through networks of users with 
traditional gatekeepers of information communicated to the public completely 
bypassed (Singer, 2014). Gatekeeping has been traditionally seen as the role of 
journalists to select what information is worth the public’s attention which Singer 
(2014) defines as essentially a regime of control that enables quality control of 
information the public received. However, with the loss of gatekeeping with 
Internet communication there is the potential for climate sceptic material and 
discourses to reach a wide public audience despite contradicting the scientific 
consensus of anthropogenic climate change. Therefore, while the traditional 
media has reduced coverage of climate sceptic discourses and arguments we 
24 
 
have seen new opportunities for climate sceptics to mislead the public with the 
increasing importance of the Internet in society.   
The third area in my thesis extends previous media effects literature, which 
predominately focuses on self-selection of newspaper and television content onto 
the use of the Internet. The Internet has changed our engagement with 
information with users able to generate content and share it across social media 
networks. The nature of information consumption had changed. The public once 
had limited outlets to receive news sources that provided similar messages but 
conflicting political viewpoints (Mutz and Martin, 2001, p. 97) . Instead, the rise of 
the Internet, has enabled consumption of news on demand from a range of 
sources from journalists “… to unfiltered news items delivered by search engines, 
and unvarnished rumour and speculation in blogs…” (Diddi and LaRose, 2006, 
p. 194). The pattern of the consumption of online news resulted in Ahlers (2006, 
p. 48) warning of a ‘media generational gap’ that had emerged with online news 
being adopted predominately by young adults between 18 and 29 years of age. 
Information processing research has shown that effective engagement with 
climate change requires users see the personal relevance of the information 
(Spence and Pidgeon, 2010, p. 658). Framing (sometimes referred to in literature 
as schemas) is argued by Lakoff (2010, p. 71) to be unconscious structures 
containing all our knowledge. Frames are used to process all information we 
receive. Essentially frames are “…mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide 
individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). These enable 
people to make decisions or opinions based upon limited information. In the 
context of elections Houghton (2009, p. 124) highlights that frames enable voters 
to make a decision on a candidate with the knowledge of their party allegiance 
alone.  
Finally, the fourth key contribution that I seek to make is apply the 
experimental method to Internet studies on climate change information on the 
Internet. Previous studies have sometimes used inappropriate methodology for 
answering their research questions when examining Internet content. Instead, my 
research uses a mixed method approach to provide a robust approach to Internet 
studies (See chapter 4). The focus groups examine the use of the Internet by 
young people and whether they engage with climate change information. Focus 
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groups have been conducted to remove my personalised experience of Internet 
use from biasing my experimental design and in particular to inform the 
experimental treatments and make them as valid as possible. The experimental 
design allows for direct examination of the consequences of information overload 
and junk information, and establishes direct causation of media stimuli upon 
participants’ reactions to climate science.    
 
1.3: Research questions  
 This thesis examines the impact of the Internet in an information society 
upon young peoples’ understanding of climate science, perception of risk, and 
attitudes to climate change mitigation. This research will seek to answer the 
following overarching research questions:  
How do Internet users engage with climate science and policy debates 
surrounding anthropogenic climate change?  
 
To what extent does online communication of climate change impact young 
peoples’ understanding, perception of risk, and support for mitigation of 
climate change? 
 Subsidiary are introduced in chapter 4 (See table 4.1) that explore the 
wider context of Internet use and the specific impact aspects of the information 
society have had to climate change communication.  
 
1.4: Thesis structure 
 This thesis is structured into seven further chapters. The second chapter 
explores the academic debates surrounding the concept of the information 
society and the changes to society that the information technology revolution has 
had. In particular, this chapter focuses on the rise of the Internet and the 
opportunities that it has brought for communicating climate change. However, this 
chapter also examines the consequences that the Internet has had for reactions 
to climate change with the risk of junk information being harder to distinguish from 
accurate sources and the impact that information overload has had upon user’s 
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reaction to climate change information. To successfully explore the literature of 
the information society and the impact of the Internet upon users, this chapter 
applies the analytical framework of the information society for explaining public 
understanding of climate change.  
The third chapter explores public understanding, risk perception, and 
support for climate action. This focuses on the debates surrounding how we 
define public ‘understanding’ and what level of understanding is necessary for the 
public to engage effectively in policy debates surrounding science issues in 
society. This includes an examination of the concept of scientific literacy and a 
critical examination of the methods used to measure scientific literacy. Along with 
the debates surrounding how to measure public understanding of science it also 
focuses on debates surround risk perception and support for action. Finally, this 
chapter explores the impact of the media in the reaction to climate change 
information and the processing of information received from the Internet. In 
particular, this will explore the effect of media exposure and factors that limit 
exposure to climate change information.  
 The fourth chapter will set out the research questions and the hypotheses 
this research will seek to test. It will justify the mixed methodological approach 
combining focus groups to explore online engagement with climate change 
information and experimental methodology to explore the impact of the Internet 
on young peoples’ reactions to climate science. The experimental methodological 
approach has been designed to examine the impact upon participants of 
reactions to junk information (climate sceptic material) and the consequences of 
information overload. Chapter four also explains how the experiment has been 
designed and how the control and dependent variables have been developed to 
examine the causal link between climate change information and reactions to 
climate science.   
The following chapters explore the results from the mixed methodological 
approach with the fifth chapter critically examining the results from the focus 
groups. The focus groups explore the use of the Internet and social media for 
general use for finding and sharing information, and whether there is active 
engagement with climate change information. The sixth chapter statistically 
analyses the results from the experimental groups and critically evaluates the 
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impact of junk information and information overload upon young peoples’ 
reactions to climate science. This chapter will examine the impact of differing 
media stimuli on three treatment groups that seeks to examine the impact of junk 
information and information overload in contrast to the results from the control 
group.  
 The seventh chapter of this thesis will provide an overall discussion of 
the results in relation to previous literature, which will critically address the 
research questions and hypotheses. This chapter will reflect back to the findings 
of this study to previous research and the difficulty that the Internet poses to 
climate change communication on the Internet. The final chapter is a conclusion 
will appraise the overall research design and address the limitations in the 
study. Additionally, this will set out a potential future research agenda. 
 Through this structure, the thesis seeks to understand the impact the 
Internet has had on young people’s reactions to climate change. It does this by 
building on previous research into public understanding, perception of risk, and 
attitudes to climate action to be applied to the Internet. It also exploring how the 
Internet has changed how young people engage with information and the 
difficulties this produces for climate change communication. In so doing, it makes 
a key contribution to four areas of study. Firstly, developing the information 
society into an analytical framework to examine online communication of climate 
change. Secondly, exploring the consequences the Internet to climate change 
reactions. Thirdly, applying previous research into media effects and 
communication literature on the case study of online climate change 
communication. Finally, applying the experimental method to Internet studies into 
climate change.      
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Chapter 2 – An analytical framework for the Information 
Society 
 This chapter explores and examines the information society literature and 
uses this to develop an analytical framework. This framework structures my 
assessment of the impact that a societal transition, brought about by the rapid 
changes in communication due to the Internet, has had upon public reactions to 
climate change. The information society is a highly contested concept, which 
focuses upon the influence of the information technology revolution upon multiple 
arenas of human society to varying degrees (Martin, 1995, Masuda, 2004, Britz, 
2008). This chapter will explore the debates surrounding the information society 
and use it to develop an analytical framework to address my research question. 
The analytical framework gives a structure to examine the consequences of the 
information society and communicate the core ideas of this research (See Sartori, 
1970, and Gerring, 1999). This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section examines the debates on defining the information society and seeks a 
workable definition for the purposes of my examination of its impact upon the 
consequences to public reactions to climate change information. The second 
section explores the sharing of information through social media, and the 
potential consequences with the risk of junk information4 (i.e. climate sceptic 
discourse) and information overload. The information society literature is 
important to this thesis because it helps understand the context of contemporary 
climate change material. The analytic framework, along with the focus groups, 
provides an appropriate set of treatments used as independent variables for 
predicting understanding, risk perception, and support for mitigation.   
 
2.1: Defining the information society 
The information society is a contested and complex concept that has been 
used by a range of academics since the 1970s. I reduce this contestation and 
complexity in two stages. First, I will define the concept of the information society 
                                            
4 This is referred to as junk information in this thesis and is discussed in detail 
later in this chapter with its impact on climate change communication. 
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that this research is using. Secondly, I will explore the emergence of information 
society theory and debates surrounding the impact to society.  
My thesis uses a broad definition of the information society which was 
proposed by Martin (1988, p. 179) to be:  
“… a society in which the quality of life, as well as prospects for social 
change and economic development, depend increasingly upon 
information and its exploitation. In such a society, living standards, 
patterns of work and leisure, the education system and the market place 
are all influenced markedly by advances in information and knowledge. 
This is evidenced by the increasing array of information-intensive products 
and services, communicated through a wide range of media, many 
electronic in nature.” (Martin, 1995, p. 3)  
The application of this definition has been chosen as it redefines the 
information society away from technological determinism and also focuses on the 
social impact compared to previous theorists5, which I explore later in this 
chapter. Technological determinism is a belief that technology is a solution to 
complex issues impacting society such as climate change (Pepper, 1993).  
My research builds upon the information society theory which originally 
emerged in the 1970s with the concept differing among academics in both 
application and development. However there are some common features with a 
shared belief that the information society represents a shift in the economic mode 
of production from industrial production to information production and a social 
transformation with information capital becoming increasingly important along 
with the spread of information technology and availability of information (Bell, 
1973, Bell, 2004, Martin, 1995, Masuda, 1980). There are key areas of dispute 
amongst scholars, particularly surrounding the consequences of the economic 
and social shifts in society.   
There are three aspects of the information society focused on in this 
research and each will be examined in turn. However, these are contentious with 
optimistic predictions, that I refer to as the light side of the information society, 
and the actual consequences, which I refer to as the dark side of the information 
                                            
5 See below for more detail on the development of the information society 
theory.  
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society6. To examine the social predictions and the impact has these have been 
approached in three key themes (See Figures 2.1). The light side of the 
information society believed that increased information would be shared and 
available in society with greater number of people contributing to knowledge and 
collective intelligence. Meanwhile there have been consequences that were not 
predicted by the light side of the information society which will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Figure 2-1:  The light side of the information society   
  
                                            
6 The dark side is discussed the following section of this chapter.  
Sharing
Collective 
processing/intelligence 
Production of new 
knowledge
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Firstly, there was the prediction of the sharing of information, including an 
increasing availability of information. The sharing of information is seen as a key 
aspect of the information society by Masuda (1980) who predicts citizens will 
have a key role with ‘autonomous information networks’. These networks of 
individuals were believed as essential in the Information Society for sharing 
information. Through the sharing of information Masuda (1985) argues that 
citizens will organise campaigns to resolve issues in society if awareness is 
created. Not all predictions of this rise of information were entirely positive with 
the emergence of groups working for common problems being seen as potentially 
problematic by Bell (1973) as socially networked groups of individuals can be in 
competition and potentially marginalise other groups in society potentially 
resulting in conflict (Bell, 2004). The sharing of information is seen as important 
and this prediction has come to pass with the emergence of social media and the 
ability to easily mass communicate information and organise with other users 
(See Mossberger et al., 2008). This is a key feature of both the light and dark side 
of the information society. However, consequences of online communication and 
communities do not match the idealised beliefs held by Bell (1973) and Masuda 
(1980)7.  
In contrast, the consequences of increased sharing and access to 
knowledge differ between the light and dark sides of the information society. The 
second aspect of the light side of the information society is the mass production 
of new knowledge with knowledge creation being open to everyone within society 
(Masuda, 1985). The shift towards intense information production and 
consumption in an information society was argued by Masuda (1980, p. 3) to 
result in “… highly intellectual creativity where people may draw future designs 
on an invisible canvas…” instead of society being based upon mass consumption 
of consumer goods. While this differs from the predictions in the post-industrial 
society approach argued by Bell (1973), which also claims the shift to an 
information economy and greater public participation in the political system, it 
does not make the same radical claims of societal change (Bell, 2004).  
                                            
7 The consequences of information sharing and online communities are 
explored later in this chapter. 
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The rise of knowledge creation has been claimed to be a shift in the mode 
of production akin to the industrial revolution with authors such as Masuda (1980) 
who predicted that the mode of production will shift from mass production of 
material goods to mass production of knowledge and information. This new 
economic mode of production is argued by Masuda (1980, p. 29) to be defined 
by an economic model where “… the production of information values and not 
material values will be the driving force behind the formation and development of 
society”. The impact from the economic shift is proposed to cause transformation 
across society with participatory democracy and citizen movements tackling 
social issues while economically moving to environmentally sustainable 
production (Masuda, 1980). This belief in the shift to the information society are 
idealised by Masuda (1980, p. 33) as:  
“The spirit of the information society will be the spirit of globalism, a 
symbiosis in which man and nature can live together in harmony, 
consisting of strict self-discipline and social contribution.”  
 The predictions are very utopian with a central belief that technological 
advancement will provide a solution to global environmental problems, economic 
issues, and social issues. The belief that information technology will solve global 
issues revolves around the idea that the technology will interconnect people to 
raise a collective intelligence to transcend the limitations of individual intelligence8 
(Fleissner and Hofkirchner, 1998). 
There are other advocates of the information society that shift focus onto 
the ‘post-industrial’ economy. Advocates include authors like Bell (2004), (1973), 
who focus upon the shift to an information driven economy and its impact on 
social life (Kumar, 1978, Kumar, 1995, Martin, 1995, Bell, 2004). In particular, the 
shift is characterised from material goods production to a service based economy 
with a social impact of producing “… a ‘communal’ society…” but he warns there 
will be societal conflict caused by this transformation between professionalism 
and the general population (Bell, 2004, p. 88). This predicted conflict is argued 
by Bell (2004, p. 88) to be caused by information becoming core to the economy 
with professionals gaining more power to make decisions which are in conflict 
                                            
8 These claims of collective intelligence are discussed in detail later in this 
chapter.  
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with the role of the general population in “… greater participation in the society”. 
However,  despite the potential conflict caused by the shift to the post-industrial 
economy, this shift is argued by Bell (2004, p. 87) to produce high quality of life 
as “… health, education, recreation, and the arts…” will become “… desirable 
and possible for everyone”. 
 Although society may not be developing in the manner that some authors 
imply, the predictions of Masuda (1980) and Bell (1973), that information 
technology will result in a shift in the mode of production can be evidenced in the 
changing distribution of the working population in industries within England and 
Wales (Figure 2.2) (Bell, 2004). The number of people in England and Wales 
working within the service industry has rapidly grown from 60.5% in 1981 to 
81.1% by 2011. The number of working people within the manufacturing industry 
has declined from 36.3% in 1961 to only 8.9% in 2011. The decline of the 
manufacturing sector and the rise of the service industry within England and 
Wales supports the argument made by Bell (1973) of a post-industrial society as 
the service industry becomes dominant within the economy with growth of service 
sectors such as finance having an increased demand for an educated workforce 
(Bell, 2004).   
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Figure 2-2: Employment by industry in England and Wales 
 
Note: This graph was produced with data from Office for National Statistics 
(2013). Important to note that Data for the year 1971 is not available so a trend 
line has been used.  
These approaches by Bell (1973) and Masuda (1980) to the concept of 
the information society point to technology as force equally significant to the 
Industrial Revolution in terms of organising society and as the dominant mode of 
production in society. This mass participation in knowledge creation is argued by 
Masuda (1985) to be a late stage of information society development to be 
comparable to consumerism in an industrial society. While their work was 
visionary with industry shifts in England and Wales supporting their predictions of 
economic reform and the increasingly networked society, their predictions might 
be accused of being economically determinist and utopian. There are three key 
issues with the creation of new knowledge being akin to the industrial revolution 
in the light side of the information society concept. 
Firstly, the claims of significance of an information revolution to the mode 
of production equal to the Industrial Revolution in the West is flawed as the 
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industrial mode of production continues with globalisation, which has rapidly sped 
up industrialisation in the developing countries, to move industrial production 
geographically (Stiglitz, 2002, Youngs, 2007). The movement of global 
production has occurred with the increasing pace of globalisation since the 1980s 
which has allowed for the “… networked global economy where production and 
consumption chains can be flexibly and speedily disaggregated and extended 
across physical space” (Youngs, 2007, p. 10, See also Giddens, 2002). The new 
mode of production and the ending of “… the struggle between capitalist and 
worker…” argued by Bell (2004, p. 88) has instead been a continuation of the 
capitalist mode of production with “… new avenues of exploitation and new 
technological means by which to pursue them” (Martin, 1995, p. 5).  
The second key issue with the approach to vision of the information society 
is a core belief that technology will solve significant problems in society (Bell, 
1973, Bell, 2004, Masuda, 1980). This approach to defining the information 
society is technologically deterministic, particularly the approach by Masuda 
(1980) which went so far as to argue that technological advancement would solve 
economic, social, and global environmental problems. Technological 
determinism holds a belief that technological development will provide us with 
solutions to complex issues such as climate change (Pepper, 1993). This belief 
is criticised by Bookchin (1982), Pepper (1993), and Porritt (1984) as 
technological determinism holds the concept of progress itself as inherently 
linked to technological development and asserts that effective technological 
solutions will be produced by the market as pressure from an issue grows.    
The belief in technology as the solution to pressing issues such as climate 
change is particularly worrying as the technological deterministic approach 
distracts from the necessary societal and behavioural changes required to solve 
issues in society (Bookchin, 1982, Pepper, 1993). Essentially, this belief in 
technology allows for the continuation of the status quo with no change in the 
mode of production, which holds onto the belief of unlimited growth, or significant 
changes in the organisation in society (Dobson, 1995, Pepper, 1993, 
Schumacher, 1974). The technologically deterministic discourse of the 
information society is criticised by Tokar (1994, p. 81) as failing to be an 
environmental solution as information technology has a high environmental cost 
but “… it better hides the consequences of their production” (Dobson, 1995, p. 
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99). For example data centres are quickly increasing their carbon emissions, as 
cloud storage9 grows in use, with an estimated 2% of global carbon emissions 
2008 and growing to 3% by 2020 (Cubitt, 2017, p. 16). The discourse of 
technological determinism protects the hegemony of the globalised capitalist 
mode of production and those in society who benefit (Pepper, 1993). It is argued 
by Pepper (1993) that technology is not fundamentally negative and can 
potentially be an aspect in solving environmental issues, however, the belief that 
technology is the singular solution undermines pressure for alternative solutions 
(See also Fleissner and Hofkirchner, 1998).  
 The final key issue with this prediction of the light side of the information 
is that the creation of new knowledge is seen as a positive aspect. There was a 
presumption that new knowledge is beneficial, but there is the problem of 
fake/false information being created and shared through information networks in 
society. This fake information can be any misleading information including news 
articles, edited videos and images, and users using other people’s identities 
(Blokhin and Ilchenko, 2015). The consequences of junk information can mislead 
and influence people. For example fake media reports have been shown to be 
able to convince people to believe events that never happened took place but 
this was dependent on pre-existing world views with events accepted that 
strengthen them (Frenda et al., 2013). There have even been examples where 
fake information has resulted in real world harm with a ridiculous online 
conspiracy theory called ‘Pizzagate’. This claimed high ranking US democrat 
party officials were involved in paedophile ring operating at a pizza restaurant 
that resulted in a gunman attacking the restaurant motivated by the online 
conspiracy (The Guardian, 2016b). There are other examples where 
advice/instructions are shared online with the aim to harm the person using the 
information. For example instructions for growing crystals involved the mixing of 
house hold chemicals into a jar and telling the person to blow using a straw into 
                                            
9 Cloud storage is the off site server storage of information and software that 
can be remotely accessed by clients enabling for the reduced requirement of 
hard drives and CD drives as the content can be accessed through the Internet 
when needed.   
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the mixture. Instead of creating crystals the product created by the reaction was 
chlorine gas (McMillan, 2014).           
While we have seen the increasing role the everyday person in the 
production of online content due to the development of Web 2.0. There are the 
negative consequences of the production and sharing of junk information created 
and shared online. This was warned by Bell (1973) to have the consequence of 
conflict between experts and the public. Junk information poses a potentially 
significant risk to undermining climate change communication to the public with 
the potential for climate sceptics to produce content and share them through 
networks of users.  
The final aspect to the light side of the information society was the sharing 
and creation of knowledge would result in collective intelligence as the 
expectation that there would be significant changes to society and even humanity 
itself with the increased quantity of information. An extreme example of this idea 
can be seen with society being envisioned by Masuda (1980, pp. 58-59) to 
change due to computer networks causing society to become “… resembling an 
organism” with both long distance communication and ease of access resulting 
in a “… multicentered complex society…”. The idea of an increasingly connected 
society due to information technological developments was also argued by Bell 
(1973) with the view that society will become increasingly communal rather than 
individually driven.   
The consequences of this change caused by information technologies 
have been suggested to have even wider impacts on human genetics with the 
increased quantity of information. This increased quantity of information upon 
humans and the emergence of collective processing has even been argued by 
Masuda (1985, p. 479) to result in the next stage of human evolution with the 
emergence of “… Homo intelligens…”.  The belief held by Masuda (1985) is 
based upon ‘gene-culture coevolution’ which suggests that there is a link between 
culture that is generated from mental processes and genes, but changing culture 
can also change our genes. For example gene-culture coevolution is argued by 
Gintis (2011, p. 878) to attempt to explore whether genetics: 
“… is responsible for the salience of such other-regarding values as a taste 
for cooperation, fairness and retribution, the capacity to empathize, and 
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the ability to value such character virtues such as honesty, hard work, piety 
and loyalty.” 
Instead Masuda (1985) goes much further than social traits to suggest that 
significant changes of culture resulting from information technology will 
apparently have significant impact with evolution of our genes. This evolution is 
driven by the use of computers and the increased ability of processing information 
and the emergence of collective networks to cause significant environmental 
changes to cause a new species of humans to develop. While these ideas are 
once again technologically deterministic and significantly questionable there is 
the underlying belief that the increasing amount of information is beneficial to 
people.  
We have experienced the huge increase in the amounts of information but 
the beneficial impact is questionable. Instead, the dark side of this aspect of the 
information society is the consequence of information overload. Information 
overload is the personal feeling that there is too much information and has 
consequences on decision making (Liu and Kuo, 2016, p. 2). The long term 
impact of information overload can result in “…stress, anxiety, sleep disorders, 
unhappiness, physical fatigue and depression…” (Liu and Kuo, 2016, p. 2). 
Information overload results in behaviour change with Walgrave and Dejaeghere 
(2017) finding politicians were outsourcing the processing of information and 
became selective in what they engaged with. This poses the risk polarisation of 
public opinion as selective exposure results in the reinforcement of world views 
and in addition the potential for people to opt out from receiving topics that do not 
interest them (Schumann, 2004, Mutz and Martin, 2001, Mutz and Young, 
2011)10. The following section will explore the consequences of the dark side of 
the information society on climate change communication and will begin by 
examining the developments of the Internet.   
 
                                            
10 The consequences to climate change communication are discussed later in 
this chapter 
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2.2: The dark side of the information society and the emergence of 
the Internet 
It is important to note that Bell (1973) and Masuda (1980) were visionaries 
predicting the spread of access to information and growth of the information 
technology impacting our lives, but generally optimistic that there were positive 
outcomes for the most part. They pointed to many of the consequences of the 
Internet age through their concept of information society that emerged before the 
Internet was even invented. Rather than producing the optimistic consequences 
predicted, the ability to widely share and access information has instead actually 
had serious ramifications for communicating climate change and other political 
issues. In addition, this has the potential to undermine perceptions of risk, 
understanding, and support for climate action (see chapter 3). While the public 
understanding literature has not been conjoined with the information society 
before, this shift in information consumption relates closely with information 
processing and perceptions of risk literature11. In this section, I focus primarily on 
aspects of information society that have materialised with the advent and 
widespread adoption of the World Wide Web / Internet and its social impact12.  
The Internet is defined by Ryan (2010, p. 31) as “… a loose arrangement 
of connected but autonomous networks of devices” which are managed by 
protocols that bind networks together and “… govern communication between all 
computers on the Internet”. The World Wide Web is a service that runs on the 
Internet allowing access to information in all formats through web pages 
accessed by web browser applications (Burners-Lee and Fischetti, 2000, Ryan, 
2010, Swiss and Herman, 2000). To explore the development of the Internet and 
its social impact I turn attention firstly to the significant developments and the 
growth of the Internet. Secondly, as predicted by visionary information society 
theorists, I explore how the Internet has led to intense sharing of information 
through social media. Thirdly, I examine the consequences of the information rich 
                                            
11 Introduced in the contribution to the literature section of chapter 1. This 
literature is discussed in chapter 3 and links are made between both bodies of 
literature throughout both chapter 2 and chapter 3.  
12 The World Wide Web is commonly referred to as the Internet in general 
usage. This research will also refer to the common use of the Internet when 
discussing websites.  
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environment upon users’ understanding of issues. Finally, I critically evaluate the 
consequences of junk information upon public reactions to climate change. 
Overall, this section establishes the development and changes that have taken 
place with the Internet by exploring each of the key themes of the information 
society analytical framework used in my thesis. 
 
2.2.1: Early Development of the Internet 
The development of the Internet originates from the Cold War when the 
US military funded computer scientists to develop a decentralised communication 
system, which could not be eliminated by a direct nuclear strike and continue to 
function even if sections of the network were destroyed (Curran, 2010, Ryan, 
2010). The decentralised communication network required by the US military is 
argued by Curran (2010, p. 20) to have been compatible with the scientists’ own 
goals to produce the Internet as a research tool and allow the ideological design 
for “… the open disclosure of information and, in principle, to intellectual 
cooperation in order to further the shared goal of scientific advance[ment]”. The 
development of the Internet meant that the primary users in the 1980s were 
academics, as universities were the first adopters of the technology with a priority 
on the research and communication potential (Curran, 2010). 
The original intended design principle of free access to information fell into 
conflict with commercial interests. The pressure from commercial interests is 
argued by Curran (2010, p. 22) to be at first progressive by making Internet 
access more user friendly with “… a commercial web browser (Netscape)...”.. 
However, this pressure from commercialisation is highlighted by Curran (2010) 
to have potentially seen the enclosure of the ‘electronic commons’ through pay 
walls limiting users to access websites unless paying fees. Instead, the drive of 
commercial interests led to advertising revenue becoming the primary profit focus 
(Curran, 2010). Advertising revenue became a key focus for commercial interests 
because a larger user base was seen as more profitable than subscription access 
for websites, while at the same time a second revenue source was user data 
which could be collected and sold (Curran, 2010).  
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Despite the commercial pressures, the users of the Internet were primarily 
academics in the early 1990s. By 1994 commercial users “… outnumbered 
academics on the internet by a two-to-one ratio” (Everard, 2000, p. 19). The non-
commercial use of the Internet was protected with commercial use being against 
the Acceptable Use Policy of the National Science Foundation [NSF] which 
provided the backbone of the Internet (Ryan, 2010). However, the privatisation of 
the Internet began in 1993 with plans for Internet Service Providers [ISPs] to 
“operate their own networks and gateways would interconnect them” (Ryan, 
2010, p. 121). The NSF Acceptable Use Policy was reformed in January of 1995 
allowing for commercial use which was soon followed by the NSF backbone being 
closed in April 1995 with the NSF reverting to a research network (Ryan, 2010, 
Everard, 2000).  
The continued pressure of commercial interests resulted in a financial 
speculation bubble with prediction of massive profit returns for investing in the 
information technology industry (Howcroft, 2001). This was fuelled by a belief in 
the information society with the idea that the Internet was resulting in the “… 
reshaping of almost all industries…” (Howcroft, 2001, p. 195). Investors had 
heavily invested in the technology market and provided funding for the 
establishment of new online businesses (Howcroft, 2001). The investment in 
online shopping websites was triggered by the success of eBay with the belief 
that online shopping was the future (Ryan, 2010, Curran, 2010). This was the 
case despite products being easily available in physical shops. An example was 
the company Pets.com selling pet food. In addition to having a higher cost due to 
shipping charges, such enterprises were challenged by a lack of public interest 
to shop online due to concerns with transaction security (Ryan, 2010, Curran, 
2010).  
This speculation bubble burst at the beginning of the year 2000 and was 
“… referred to as the dot.com implosion…” (Howcroft, 2001, p. 195). The 
consequence of the bursting of the speculation bubble caused the collapse of 
many of these new companies and made gaining funding from investors for new 
electronic commercial websites extremely difficult (Howcroft, 2001). For example, 
Pets.com collapsed at the end of the year 2000 despite having previously “… 
raised $82.5 million in its IPO [Initial Public Offering] in February, 2000…” from 
investors (Ryan, 2010, p. 129). Businesses such as Pets.com are argued by 
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Ryan (2010) to have spent large quantities of money on advertising to develop 
public brand awareness without developing the infrastructure of servers to cope 
with website traffic or the delivery services required. The consequences of the 
dot.com implosion were wider than just the new electronic commercial websites 
with impacts that affected “… major conglomerates like AOL Time Warner and 
Vivendi…” which had to undergo restructuring due to “… failed Net 
investments…” (Curran, 2010, p. 32).  
The driving belief that resulted in the dot.com implosion was the concept 
of a new economic mode of production with the information society, as previously 
examined in this chapter with the work of Bell (2004) and Masuda (1980), with 
the technological determinist belief in an electronic commercial boom (Howcroft, 
2001). The technological determinist beliefs that resulted in the consequences of 
the dot.com implosion are summarised by Howcroft (2001, p. 202) to be common 
with new technology developments:  
“Just as the telegraph would eliminate wars, the telephone would bring 
democracy and television would educate the masses, the Internet and with 
it the new dot.coms are heralded as the technology that has the potential 
to profoundly affect many industries and the entire retail experience”  
The result of the dot.com implosion was the temporary failure of 
commercialisation to completely take hold of the Internet with commercialisation 
only partially taking place (Curran, 2010).  
In the aftermath of the dot.com implosion there has been a recovery of 
online retailing with electronic shopping growing and becoming more widespread, 
particularly with younger people, with prediction of continued growth (Ha and 
Stoel, 2012, Naseri and Elliott, 2011). Despite the bursting of the speculation 
bubble, there was a major shift which occurred with the Internet entering a new 
phase of website design during the early 2000s, which became popularly known 
as Web 2.0 (Barassi and Trere, 2012, Ryan, 2010). The Web 2.0 is significant as 
the user experience became increasingly interactional with user-generated 
content and websites being designed for user participation (Barassi and Trere, 
2012, Kata, 2012, Ryan, 2010). Alongside the development of Web 2.0, Internet 
use increased, particularly in the Western democracies. In the UK, Internet Users 
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(per 100 people) rapidly increased from 26.82 in the year 2000 to 64.82 by the 
year 2003, which can be seen in Figure 2.3 (The World Bank, n.d.)   
 
Figure 2-3: Internet users (Per 100 people) 
 
Note: This graph was produced from the internet users (per 100) data set from 
The World Bank (n.d.) . The global average is calculated by averaging the 214 
countries within the data set.  
 
2.2.2: Sharing in the era of Web 2.0 
Web 2.0 resulted in the emergence of social networking and online 
communities with distance no longer being a limiting factor in the sharing of 
knowledge and values (Gruzd et al., 2011, Kata, 2012). Social media is defined 
by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010, p. 61) as “… a group of Internet-based 
applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 
2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” The 
new participatory nature of the Internet has had a range of consequences. In 
particular, these include the rise of social media with user driven content, 
organisational opportunities for political movements, and opportunities to 
increase public awareness.  
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Early adopters of social media were primarily the young, who have been 
early adopters of new technology and frequent Internet users (Eynon and 
Malmberg, 2011). However social media has grown in use across a wider 
demographic (See Figure 1.2) with 77% of those aged between 16 to 24 using 
social media in 2009 compared to 30% only of 45-54. This has rapidly shifted 
with both demographics growing in use with 93% of 16 to 24 in 2014 and 68% of 
45-54 (Ofcom, 2015, p. 32). Social networking has become increasingly 
normalised in society with popular websites such as Facebook, which emerged 
in 2004, and Twitter, which emerged in 2006, rapidly growing in popularity and 
user bases (Gruzd et al., 2011, Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). 
There are frequent claims that social media results in a decline of face-to-
face social interaction (Hampton et al., 2011b). The decline of social interaction 
is considered to be a problem by Sigman (2009), who claims that new information 
technology is causing a breakdown of social relations as people instead interact 
in virtual communities. The use of social media is argued by Amichai-Hamburger 
and Hayat (2011) to be much more complex than the popular discourse of social 
isolation that the Internet caused. The assumption of isolation is challenged by 
Hampton et al. (2011b, p. 133) who argue that current research shows that close 
social relations do not break down through Internet usage and the research 
instead suggests that users “… had contact with a higher number of friends and 
relatives than did nonusers”.  
Instead the Internet has allowed for the creation of new social relations not 
bound by geographic location that exist and remain online (Hampton et al., 2011b). 
There is debate surrounding what these new electronic relationships are and 
whether these new social relationships are ‘friendships’ or not (Amichai-
Hamburger et al., 2013). In particular, the anonymity the Internet provides 
highlights the difficulty in defining these new electronic relationships as building 
trust is seen as difficult (Henderson and Gilding, 2004). However, activity in online 
communities under user name pseudonyms is argued by Henderson and Gilding 
(2004) lead to the creation of online identities separate from their offline identities 
which become the basis of forming online interpersonal relationships with other 
users.  
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The growth of online communities was a significant development since 
Web 2.0 users are able to organise around common interests, share knowledge 
and values, and there is the potential to organise political activism (Faraj et al., 
2011, Kata, 2012, Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004). The formation of online 
communities is argued by Kata (2012) to have empowered people with access to 
a diverse range of information traditionally inaccessible to the average person. 
For example, the online communities for issues surrounding healthcare are 
argued by Kata (2012, p. 3779) to have allowed for “… patient empowerment, 
consumer reviews and advice, supportive communities…”.   
Alongside the empowerment of the public through online communities the 
Internet has also allowed for the sharing of information from a wide range of 
sources. This has been claimed to have democratised information and to have 
benefitted political activists (Grignou and Patou, 2004). The cost and time 
required to organise political demonstrations and protests, particularly 
transnational demonstrations, have been significantly reduced by the use of 
Internet (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004). The online communities that have 
arisen have created new social networks for activists that allowed for new 
opportunities to mobilise people onto the streets (Fisher and Boekkooi, 2010). 
The impact of these social networks on whether people choose to attend 
demonstrations is argued by Fisher and Boekkooi (2010) to be due to the social 
networks of activists encouraging participation as potential participants are more 
likely to attend if they know that others in their personal networks are also 
attending. 
The Internet is also argued by Bennett (2004) to have benefitted political 
organisation as global activism now has perpetual awareness campaigns for 
political issues compared to before online activism emerged. The long-term 
awareness campaigns are due to the decentralised organisation that the Internet 
has allowed which prevents campaigns being silenced, as there is no central 
organisation that could be potentially shut down (Bennett, 2004). The potential of 
impact is also greater with the possibility that an awareness campaign can go 
viral on social media through  the sharing of information and Internet memes 
(Guadagno et al., 2013, Kien, 2013).  
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However, while there is the potential for benefiting political engagement 
and improving awareness of societal issues, there have been consequences with 
the democratisation of information and social networks. This includes the viral 
sharing for entertainment, rather than to inform, with serious and complex issues 
being less likely to shared (Chesterman, 2011)13. Even when political or scientific 
information is virally shared it does not mean it’s accurate with wide spread 
sharing of junk information, including examples such as anti-vaccination 
information (Kata, 2012). Even then, there is the risk of users filtering out 
information based upon personal preferences and echo chambers resulting in 
certain information being ignored with it being possible to opt out of environmental 
news and messages (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011, Garrett, 2009).     
For example, the viral sharing of Internet memes highlight some of these 
keys issues while providing a method to potentially reach a large number with 
climate change information. Internet memes are symbols or markers that Internet 
users share, including images, videos, articles, or websites through social 
networks (Shifman, 2013). The term meme originates from a contested concept 
proposed by Dawkins (2006, p. 192) in 1976 who argues memes are culture that 
is transmitted “… brain to brain via a process which, in a broad sense be called 
imitation”. The concept is argued by Shifman (2013, p. 362) to have been highly 
contested, even rejected in many academic circles, but the term has been 
adopted by Internet users for the spread of viral images or videos, which “… often 
also spawn user-created derivatives”. The concept of memes defined by Dawkins 
(2006)  has been rejected not only because they are difficult to define, but also 
because of the wider issue that the study of culture requires a broader 
examination as ideas do not exist in isolation (Bloch, 2000, Kuper, 2000, Sperber, 
2000). However, the term meme14 has resurfaced within academia as the word 
being appropriated for use to describe the viral sharing of information through 
social networking (Shifman, 2013). 
                                            
13 What makes a successful meme and the difficulty faced by climate change 
memetics is discussed in depth in the barriers to climate change communication 
section in chapter 3.  
14 The difficulties facing successful climate change memes are discussed in 
chapter 3  
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The significance of Internet memes is argued by Shifman (2013, p. 365) 
to be the spread of cultural values, norms, and information on a large scale 
through communication “… person to person, yet gradually scales into a shared 
social phenomenon”. These memes have the potential to spread political 
messages and concepts or for dominant messages to be subverted and parodied 
(Cammaerts, 2007, Kien, 2013). There is limited academic research exploring 
the emergence of individual memes and the spread of a meme. This is due to 
both the speed of Internet culture and difficulties in measuring the spread of 
memes.  
However, while memes are a significant development from the Internet, 
this does not mean that the viral sharing of information is inherently positive. For 
example, there is the potential for the Internet to spread misleading or false 
information through social networks of users. A key issue with junk information is 
highlighted by Kien (2013) who argues that once false information has been 
shared virally, there is no way to delete it from the Internet. A consequence of the 
immortality of junk information and the speed that it can be shared has the 
potential for deliberate misinformation campaigns to manipulate the public (Kien, 
2013). An example can be seen in the Kony 2012 video by an NGO called 
Invisible Children which enjoyed viral success “… in early March of 2012” which 
“… attracted more than 110 million views…” (Kien, 2013, p. 557). The video (see 
figure 2.4) was shared by many people who presumed they were sharing “… 
meaningful information about a demented warlord and his enslavement of child 
soldiers in Uganda…” (Kien, 2013, p. 557). The video had an emotional impact 
on the audience and a belief that sharing the information would make a 
difference, which could easily be accomplished on the social network 
environments (Bal et al., 2013, Kien, 2013).   
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Figure 2-4: Kony 2012 
 
Note: Screenshots taken from Invisible Children (2012). The first image says 
“nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time is now” and the third image 
shows a group of young people in military style outfits raising their hands making 
the ‘peace sign’.  
However, the information that people were sharing that they believed to 
be meaningful was factually incorrect such as that “… the warlord in question…” 
was driven out of “… Uganda years before the video was made” (Kien, 2013, p. 
557). While the numerous factual errors are worrying enough in a video designed 
to produce awareness of the focus and work of Invisible Children as an 
organisation and to encourage public donations, the spread of the message by 
Invisible Children is particularly worrying as Kien (2013) highlights that the NGO 
was found to have been “… spending most of their budget on salaries, travel, and 
film production” rather than the charitable purposes claimed (Kien, 2013, p. 557).  
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The example of the Kony 2012 video highlights two issues that have arisen 
with the use of social networking. Firstly, users are engaging in ‘armchair 
activism’, more negatively called ‘slacktivism’ (See Morozov, 2011), which is 
political engagement by sharing of information via social media that the individual, 
perhaps mistakenly, sees as meaningful involvement in politics or making a 
difference in the world (Kien, 2013). Online activism is argued by Morozov (2011) 
to be both easy and have no costs for the user. As a result, these are unlikely to 
be meaningful groups in comparison to offline activist groups where people have 
to meet face to face. For example, the success of the viral video Kony 2012 did 
not translate into political action. Invisible Children’s campaign ‘Cover the Night’ 
was a failure with a tiny turnout in Western cities (Carroll, 2012, Paine, 2012). 
This means that even if there were large amounts of interest in online climate 
change campaigns this will not necessarily result in people becoming engaged in 
offline activism.  
The other issue that Kony 2012 highlights is both the ease of transmission 
of junk information and the difficulty in challenging viral content. There was also 
an attempt to challenge the claims made by the viral video with the Ugandan 
Prime Minster Amama Mbabazi responding to the false claims, but it “… received 
less than 100,000 views” (Kien, 2013, p. 557). There is the potential for junk 
information to be shared virally. The risk of viral sharing of junk information was 
warned about in the early 1990s by Godwin (1994a) who argued that users have 
a responsibility to counter harmful information by creating ‘counter memes’ (See 
also Kien, 2013). A counter meme is a challenge against a popular meme with 
the aim to persuade users to stop using the meme (Godwin, 1994a). Counter 
memes have the potential to reduce the use of offensive memes or the continued 
reproduction of incorrect information within an online environment (Godwin, 
1994a, Godwin, 1994b).  
A successful example of a counter meme was produced by Godwin 
(1994a) who managed to curtail the use of Nazi comparisons in online 
discussions by managing to get the meme ‘Godwin’s Law’ into popular use. A 
variation of this meme can be seen below in Figure 2.5, which encapsulated the 
counter meme in design of a playing card. This was a highly successful counter 
meme, but Godwin (1994b) does recognise that it is not always possible to 
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produce a successful counter meme and even then it relies on users themselves 
taking action to produce and spread a counter meme (see also Kien, 2013).  
Figure 2-5: You played the Hitler card! 
 
Note: Image taken from Know Your Meme (n.d.-e) 
Climate change counter memes have been used to mock a discourse used 
by US Republicans ‘I’m not a scientist’. This discourse has been used since 2013 
to deny anthropogenic climate change by deflecting the question away from 
climate science, avoiding being perceived as anti-science, to instead focus on 
the economic costs of acting to reduce carbon emissions (Chait, 2014, Know 
Your Meme, n.d.-h). This led to a counter meme mocking politicians for their 
scientific ignorance with one example (see Figure 2.6) being a variation of a Star 
Trek meme called ‘Dammit Jim, I'm a Doctor, Not a X’ (Know Your Meme, n.d.-
c). However, these memes did not reach a wide audience or were not particularly 
reproduced by users. This highlights the difficulty to challenge messages with 
viral counter memes, as counter memes are not always simple or even 
necessarily possible without a wide assimilation by a user base (Chesterman, 
2011, Kien, 2013).  
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Figure 2-6: Not a scientist example - 'Dammit Jim' 
 
Note: Image taken from (Memedad, n.d.). 
The sharing of information and viral content has the potential to spread 
environmental messages and the rise of Web 2.0 has enabled users to create 
and share information over a wide network of users. Memes have emerged 
allowing for the sharing of messages but also pose a difficulty as they can easily 
be used for entertainment. The survivability of memes is argued by Chesterman 
(2011, p. 26) to depend on the users “… immunity to counter memes” and have 
a longer survival in Internet culture if they are general enough to be used in a 
variety of ways or mutated to be used with other memes. An important aspect to 
the successful spread of memes is novelty and entertainment as Internet cultural 
transmission of memes is an ever changing environment (Chesterman, 2011). 
This means that serious issues, such as climate change, will struggle, as it’s a 
complex issue, making it difficult to communicate with memes, and also a 
depressing topic. The ability to share information widely is useful with sharing 
having the potential for wide spread political campaigns, but also poses the risk 
that junk information can be easily transmitted to a wider audience or viral content 
sharing increases pressures on users with information overload and potentially 
distracts users from significant political issues in society.  
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2.2.3: Information Overload 
 Another aspect of the information society has been information overload. 
This is the result of the Internet allowing users to generate and access greater 
amounts of information than ever before. The media that people are exposed to 
has been increasing “… dramatically at an exponential rate” (Schumann, 2004, 
p. 241). The amount of information available to access is at an unprecedented 
level in human history (Schumann, 2004). These increases of information 
stimulation are recent, with major advances in communication technology taking 
place within the last one hundred years, with developments in communication 
technology such as commercial television in the late 1940s and more recently the 
rise of the Internet, greatly increasing media stimulation (Schumann, 2004). The 
increase in access to information can lead to the presumption that people have 
access to a wider diversity of information and topics which could potentially lead 
to an improved public understanding of issues like climate change (Schumann, 
2004). 
However, increased access to information might result in people selecting 
information and consequently reducing the diversity of information they receive. 
The Internet, in particular social media, has allowed for individuals to be selective 
and filter the information they wish to receive (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011). 
The selection and resulting reduction in the diversity of information sources is 
argued by MacGregor (1997) to be necessary, as the amount of information has 
rapidly increased while our limitations of time and cognitive processing has 
remained the same15. This means that the amount of information on a range of 
topics available makes it “… impossible to watch it all, let alone analyse it in any 
detail” (MacGregor, 1997, p. 24). It is important to note that MacGregor (1997) 
was focusing upon television coverage and since the wide scale adoption of the 
Internet, the amount of media stimuli that people are subjected to has continued 
to rapidly increase. 
                                            
15 Information processing is explored in chapter 3 
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This continued increase of media stimuli and demands on our attention on 
a range of issues is problematic as there is a cognitive limitation which means 
that only a finite number of issues can be on our minds at one time (Dunaway et 
al., 2010). The rising demands on peoples’ attention can be seen in the increasing 
amount of advertising. “… [T]he average American encountered 560 daily 
advertising messages in 1971 and over 3000 per day by 1997…” (Anderson and 
de Palma, 2012, p. 2). These increasing demands for our attention and the ever 
increasing amount of information has been criticised by Shenk (1997) as the 
pollution of our mental environment that he has called ‘data smog’. The 
information overload caused by the increasing speed and amount of information 
available is argued by Shenk (1997) to result in people being under increased 
stress and to result in confusion as increased information undermines 
understanding.        
As a result, the consequences of increasing media stimulation are that 
people are limiting exposure to “… available messages about the characteristics, 
culture, values, beliefs, point-of-view including worldviews, preferences, and 
behaviour of those we believe may be different from us” (Schumann, 2004, p. 
234). In particular, this filtering of exposure to information has enabled easy 
community networking in virtual space between individuals that the Internet has 
allowed for racist, misogynistic, and homophobic beliefs to be shared and 
become the dominant discourse in some online communities such as the video 
gaming community (Shaw, 2014). These spaces do not just allow for the sharing 
of these values but also the organisation of attacks against individuals who 
critique the behaviour of the online community or the focus of the communities’ 
shared interest as a way of marginalising criticism (Shaw, 2014).  
 One likely consequence of selective access of media stimuli is the 
potential for increasing polarisation of the users’ opinion about political topics. 
Selective media consumption has been an area of increasing academic interest 
as technological changes have meant that the public has access to a much larger 
range of media sources for news and can even “… opt out of news consumption 
entirely” (Smith and Searles, 2014, p. 71).  Before the emergence of cable 
networks and the Internet the range of information to which the public had access 
to was broadly similar, and limited, with messages that included conflicting points 
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of views on political issues (Mutz and Martin, 2001, p. 97). In contrast, the 
selective nature of news consumption is argued by academics such as Mutz and 
Martin (2001) and Smith and Searles (2014) to be potentially harmful to 
democracy.  As the public becomes fractured and polarised on political issues, 
they do not engage with other viewpoints. The consequence of selective news 
consumption to fit pre-existing world views is argued by Stroud (2010, p. 571) to 
result in the reinforcement of beliefs and individuals will be “unlikely to change 
their beliefs”.  
 The Internet has provided access to vast amounts of news media, but has 
risked the polarisation of opinion based upon reinforcement of the pre-existing 
world view of the user (Schumann, 2004, Mutz and Martin, 2001).  Selective 
exposure due to the wide range of potential media outlets means that 
communicating climate science to those not interested in climate change is 
potentially problematic and this is potentially a risk for all political and scientific 
issues (Mutz and Young, 2011). This potential consequence is argued by Bennett 
and Lyengar (2008, p. 725) to not necessarily be the case for all subjects as the 
media still has the role of communicating major news stories, which will be 
echoed throughout differing media outlets and will therefore be difficult for people 
to avoid. The impact of misinformation on public reactions to climate science with 
selective behaviour bias of those holding climate sceptic beliefs would likely have 
their pre-existing beliefs reinforced and are unlikely to be challenged on their 
views.   
The consequence to climate change communication is a result where 
users will limit what they engage with based upon pre-existing views. For 
example, climate sceptic memes, such as those inappropriately conflating 
weather and climate (Figure 2.7) can be shared amongst those who hold climate 
sceptic beliefs. The success of climate sceptic memes is difficult to assess. The 
meme shown in Figure 2.7 has only been shared 452 times on the Quick Meme 
website (in comparison to other types of viral memes such as this variation of a 
cat meme (See Quick Meme, n.d.-b) that has been shared 37, 804 times See 
Figure 2.8). The impact of the meme is questionable upon those undecided about 
climate change. Attempts at viral content aiming to spread climate consensus is 
also unlikely to be engaged with by climate sceptics as they filter out information 
that contradict their worldview.   
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Figure 2-7: Climate sceptic meme - 'global warming my ass' 
 
Note: Image from Quick Meme (n.d.-a). 
Figure 2-8: Some people just need a hug… around the neck… …with a 
rope. 
  
Note: Image taken from Quick Meme (n.d.-b).  
 
Despite the filtering of information, there are examples where viral 
environmental content can become widely viewed. This is due to shocking 
material being shared more widely with those less likely to normally engage on 
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certain topics viewing due to curiosity. A recent example of an environmental 
shock meme can be seen with a video showing a plastic straw being removed 
from the nostril of a Sea Turtle (COASTS, 2015). This is an 8 minute long video 
showing the distressed Sea Turtle (see Figure 2.9) being helped by researchers 
and has reached nearly 5 million views within a month (COASTS, 2015). The 
video included a strong message against single use plastic items. While the video 
description has links to campaigns against single use plastic, such as a campaign 
by GreenEriePA (n.d.), but the impact on viewers is questionable. The PhD 
researcher involved in the video set up a donation page for funding which at the 
time of writing has only achieved $8,625 from 219 people of the $75,000 dollars 
asked for despite the video reaching nearly 5 million views (COASTS, 2015, 
Friggener, 2015). Arguably rather than informing users of the dangers of plastic 
waste this video was a distraction that became an area of focus due to the 
shocking nature of the video.   
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Figure 2-9: Sea Turtle with straw up its nostril - "no" to plastic straws 
 
Note: Screen shots take from Youtube video by COASTS (2015). 
The Internet has resulted in an extremely information rich environment and 
a method to cope with the quantities of information is for the user to filter what 
they want to see. This means that both memes and culture jamming are 
potentially just more noise in an environment competing for audience attention 
amongst many stimuli to the point that meaning is lost (Cammaerts, 2007, Shenk, 
1997). Culture jamming is the use of parody, particularly of corporate advertising 
campaigns, to create awareness of the manipulation of marketing in our mental 
environment and transmit information that challenges hegemonic ideas 
(Cammaerts, 2007, Rumbo, 2002). This focuses on transforming corporate and 
58 
 
governmental messages to criticise the actions of these institutions (Cammaerts, 
2007). This suggests that the Internet has increased the ability for the 
transmission of ideas, concepts, and criticism of society on a large scale. 
However, the communication of climate change through viral memes or culture 
jamming is potentially undermined and simply ignored by users. There have been 
some examples where environmental messages reach a wide audience, but 
successful memes are simple and spread for entertainment value (See chapter 
3). Rather than reaching large numbers of users, content may only be shared 
within a limited community of users who share the same views or interests. 
However, there is the potential for viral content to break through user’s inherent 
filtering of what they see, but these can simply be more distractions rather than 
real issues or the shocking nature of the material may not have any measurable 
sense of impact.  
 
2.2.4: Junk information 
A key risk with the rise of the Internet is the spread of junk information. 
One potential driver of junk information is online communities which have the 
potential to create and spread junk information amongst users. However, there is 
a more insidious issue with dominant social values within online communities as 
they re-enforce previously held values and are normalised to the members of 
these online communities. Re-enforcement of beliefs has serious consequences 
as it creates an illusion that a larger number of people share these views as they 
share information amongst themselves (Kata, 2012). The illusion that a 
community is larger than just the small group of committed active members is 
argued by Kata (2012, p. 3779) to be an “… easy to fall into trap of self-
referencing and mutually reinforcing links that can fool users into believing there 
are many who share their beliefs…”. These communities can damage the 
communication from experts on topics as the personal stories of members are 
shared as if they were fact and undermines the messages from experts in the 
field who are seen as “… just another opinion among many” (Kata, 2012, p. 
3779).  
An example of a small group of climate sceptics can be seen in the Global 
Warming Skeptics (n.d.-a) forum which only has 150 registered members. A 
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screenshot of a climate discussion board on the Global Warming Skeptics (n.d.-
b) forum is below (Figure 2.10) with topics attacking climate models and 
confusing weather with climate in the ‘failed predictions’ discussion thread. While 
the forum only has 150 registered members, the view counts on some of the 
discussion threads are much higher than would be expected as non registered 
users are accessing the information. For example the thread criticising the claims 
that warming is causing Arctic Ice to melt, which links to climate sceptic blogs, 
has been viewed over 4000 times. This suggests that this post has been shared 
to a wider audience with people looking at the information without registering an 
account or a small group of users are regularly engaging with the thread.      
 
Figure 2-10: Climate sceptic forum discussion board example 
 
 
Note: Screenshot taken of the Global Warming Skeptics (n.d.-b) forum in a 
section discussing climate science 
 
The potential of junk information being shared by the general public is also 
argued by Kata (2012) to be problematic with the public mistrust of experts. This 
is coupled with the significant problem that anyone can produce content on the 
Internet, which means junk information can easily be created and potentially 
spread (Keen, 2007). An example of the confusion these communities can cause 
to the general public can be seen in the anti-vaccine movement (Kata, 2012). The 
anti-vaccination movement has been effective at sharing junk information about 
the ‘potential risk’ of vaccines as the general public do not have the scientific 
understanding to distinguish legitimate sources of information (Kata, 2012). The 
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claims made by the anti-vaccination movement have been successful in creating 
doubt in the public of the safety of vaccinating their children as the presence of 
anti-vaccination material in top search results for health information creates the 
appearance of contention in the science (Kata, 2012). Making an aspect of 
science appear more controversial than mainstream science purports was found 
by Corbett and Durfee (2004, p. 140) to cause doubt and reduce certainty in 
climate science. This consequence was also found when individuals viewed 
material that questioned the safety of vaccinations with research showing 
exposure to “… an anti-vaccine website for merely 5-10 min increased 
perceptions of vaccination risks and decreased perceptions of the risks of 
vaccination omission…” (Kata, 2012, p. 3780). 
The creation of doubt has serious consequences. In the case of 
vaccinations, there is a reduced chance that parents will have their children 
vaccinated and certain diseases could become prominent again, but in issues 
such as climate change, doubt undermines public pressure for political action 
(Kata, 2012, Oreskes and Conway, 2010). The Internet has allowed for climate 
sceptics to organise through blogs to promote climate change denial and create 
public doubt in the climate change consensus (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). 
“…[R]eliance on the Internet” is argued by Lewandowsky et al. (2013, p. 624) to 
be a common factor in “… people who reject science…”. The rejection of the 
scientific consensus on climate change is argued by Lewandowsky et al. (2013, 
p. 630) to be driven by personal ideological beliefs with the rejection of science 
on Internet blogs to be “… consistently associated with free market ideology and 
conspiracist ideation”.  
 The creation of junk information alone is not inherently problematic, but 
junk information can be shared to a wide audience or just remain within a small 
community of like-minded users. There is even the possibility for junk information 
to overcome the self-selection of information caused by information overload and 
become widely shared across the Internet. The speed at which information is 
conveyed means that the discourse surrounding climate change events can 
potentially be initially defined by blogs and Internet users (Nerlich, 2010). An 
example of junk information that was widely shared and became a significant 
climate change story by overcoming information overload can be seen in the 
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‘Climategate’ incident in November 2009. ‘Climategate’  was when hackers 
illegally took over a thousand personal emails from the climate scientists at the 
University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit and released them on the 
Internet (Boykoff, 2011, Nerlich, 2010). The term ‘Climategate’ was a climate 
sceptic discourse which attacked public trust in climate scientists by portraying 
climate scientists as dishonest and accusing the researchers of manipulating 
data (Boykoff, 2011, Nerlich, 2010). 
 The coverage of ‘Climategate’ began with online blogs and discussion as 
traditional media was slow to pick up the story (Nerlich, 2010). The online 
discussion surrounding ‘Climategate’ is argued by Nerlich (2010)  to have been 
dominated by conservative right wing bloggers with this small community of 
climate sceptics shaping the discourse before being picked up by mainstream 
media. These bloggers focused upon a small handful of emails to attack public 
trust in climate science and attempt to portray climate change as a ‘hoax’ or a 
conspiracy between politicians and scientists (Nerlich, 2010). An example can be 
seen below in Figure 2.11 with a blog post by Watts (2009) attacking Professor 
Phil Jones over the colloquial use of the term ‘trick’ and accusing him of 
manipulating climate data. These claims of dishonesty and data manipulation 
were investigated with the scientists involved being exonerated of any wrong 
doing in the investigations that followed in the wake of ‘Climategate’ (Boykoff, 
2011, Nerlich, 2010). The House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2010, p. 3) found no evidence of wrong doing, but highlighted a 
resistance to Freedom of Information requests, as they knew requests from 
climate sceptics were an attempt to undermine or attack their work. However, the 
consequences of ‘Climategate’ coverage on the Internet is argued by Nerlich 
(2010) to have potentially undermined public reactions to climate change and 
strengthen climate sceptic views within the general public. 
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Figure 2-11: Climate sceptic blog coverage of 'Climategate' 
 
Note: Screenshot of the Watts Up With That climate sceptic blog (Watts, 2009).  
 The research carried out by Nerlich (2010) explored the impact of 
‘Climategate’ on the metaphors in climate change discourses in climate sceptic 
blogs. The result of ‘Climategate’ on the climate sceptic discourse was a 
significant shift from a sceptic discourse attacking uncertainty in climate science, 
to justifying inaction, to a climate sceptic discourse attacking the strengthening of 
the scientific consensus as religious belief and therefore, further undermining 
climate action (Nerlich, 2010). Another study by Koteyko et al. (2013) explored 
the impact of ‘Climategate’ in comments on climate change articles in the online 
version of ‘The Daily Mail’ which also found that the climate sceptic denial of 
climate change had been strengthened. The main reason for this is suggested to 
have potentially “… allowed the commentators to become more assured in their 
assertions…” (Koteyko et al., 2013). However, there is limited research on the 
impact of the climate sceptic discourses on understanding, risk perception, and 
attitudes to climate action in online communication. 
 The Internet has created new opportunities for climate sceptics to create 
doubt, and undermine pressure for action to be taken to tackle climate change 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013, Nerlich, 2010). There is difficulty in distinguishing 
junk information from real information on a range of topics from health advice to 
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climate change which is further problematic when users are reducing the range 
of diversity they access due to the quantity of information (Kata, 2012, 
Schumann, 2004). Simultaneously, there is the problem of communicating 
climate change which Lakoff (2010) argues is problematic as the public lack the 
conceptual frames of understanding needed for complex issues such as climate 
change. However, junk information is problematic but it can become a greater 
risk at undermining public reactions of climate science if it becomes widely 
shared, which can be seen in the example of ‘Climategate’, where small online 
climate sceptic communities were able to frame the discourse of the event and 
eventually to have that discourse reported in traditional media.   
 
2.3: Summary 
In summary, the overall impact of the Internet upon our lives is 
summarised by Miller and Bartlett (2012, p. 36) to be “… central to forming our 
world-views, our attitudes, and our beliefs.” The Internet has allowed for the 
removal of the barrier of distance in communicating ideas, concepts and beliefs, 
as well as allowing for the organisation of transnational protests and political 
movements. The consequences of the Internet are becoming more important to 
critically examine, as there is a wider adoption of social media in society. For 
example, the adoption of social media has increased with Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010, p. 59) highlighting that “As of January 2009, the online social networking 
application Facebook registered more than 175 million active users”. The growth 
of active users on Facebook has reached 1.35 billion monthly active users by 
September, 2014 (Facebook Newsroom, n.d). The significance of the Internet in 
our everyday lives cannot be understated as Kien (2013, p. 555) argues that:   
“Our civilization’s current global/social/digitally networked media provides 
a virtual, simulacra-based environment that is uniquely different from the 
earth’s physical environment, and yet is profoundly part of our everyday 
experiences.” 
 Therefore, the information society concept is important in explaining a 
fundamental shift in the role of information within society. While the visions of the 
light side of the information society by Bell (1973) and Masuda (1980) were 
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technologically determinist and economically focused, they are in other ways 
ahead of their times.  
However, I reject the vision of the light side of the information society 
proposed by Bell (1973) and Masuda (1980) (Bell, 2004).This research has 
rejected their limited economic focus of their definitions for the information 
society. Instead it focuses on the dark side of the information society as it is 
important to focus on a broader definition that includes the social and political 
changes that have taken place with the rise of information technology. Despite 
the significant flaws in the predictions made, the three aspects of the information 
society are still relevant to contemporary society with aspects of their work being 
visionary. There has been both the sharing and increased production of 
knowledge, but this was incorrectly to have presumed a positive impact. There 
has, indeed been the growth of information in society but this has had negative 
consequences. As a result, the dark side of the information society has been used 
to develop my analytical framework to examine climate change communication 
online (See figure 2.12). 
 
 
Figure 2-12: The dark side of the information society  
 
Sharing
Information 
overload
Junk 
Information
65 
 
 
The Internet has allowed for the ability of the public to share information 
and spread viral messages through social networks. However, there has also 
been the consequence of information overload with people potentially reducing 
access to a range of information on a variety of topics due to competition for the 
user’s attention. Rather than result in people becoming increasingly aware of 
political and social issues, there is the chance that users simply filter out 
information that is not already an interest to them. At the same time of increased 
availability and access to information, there has been the risk of the spread of 
junk information, which is potentially difficult for users to distinguish from real 
information on a topic, particularly complex issues such as climate change. Junk 
information can easily be spread through social media in the same way as any 
other information and can be created by anyone with the example of climate 
sceptic memes (See Figure 2.7).  
The impact of junk information (climate sceptic material) has had limited 
research into its impact on climate sceptic discourse. This has been extended by 
my thesis. Previous research that has examined climate sceptic material online 
by Nerlich (2010) and Koteyko et al. (2013) are interesting as they highlight the 
shifts in the discourses used by climate sceptics, but they are unable to show a 
direct impact on reactions to climate science. Other studies on the prominence of 
climate sceptic information, such as the study done by Gavin and Marshall 
(2011), do not adequately take into account the personalisation of the Internet 
and the ability for the user to filter what information they see (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2011). Therefore, the consequences of the dark side of the 
information society are important to examine its impact upon reactions to climate 
change communication. The following chapter will explore the previous literature 
on media effects and information process and explore what consequences this 
has upon Internet communication of climate change.   
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Chapter 3 - Public understanding and perception of 
climate change 
 
 This chapter examines the debates surround public understanding of 
science, the perception of risk and barriers to communication, of climate change. 
This includes a focus on the debates surrounding what we classify as the level of 
understanding required to be scientific literacy with a focus on the comprehension 
of climate change information. It is important to define ‘understanding’ as the term 
is contested with a broad meaning and as a result can potentially mean anything 
from a basic understanding of how something works to a complex “… 
understanding of a concept or construct in the full context of its field” (Miller, 2004, 
p. 274). In my research I have taken the former approach to measuring public 
understanding. Scientific literacy is broadly defined as the level of understanding 
required to engage with societal issues focusing on environmental issues and 
social issues surrounding technology and science (Holdbrook and Rannikmae, 
2007, Millar, 2006, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, n.d., Sturgis and Allum, 2004, Miller, 1983, Miller, 1998, Miller, 
2004). There are more specific definitions, for example scientific literacy is argued 
by Miller (2004) to be the level of understanding required to comprehend science 
coverage in a broadsheet newspaper. In other words understanding key 
concepts, such as the experimental methods, and a basic knowledge of physical 
and biological science This approach to scientific literacy will be operationalized 
in this research to be developed as control variables for the experimental analysis 
so that the participants’ scientific literacy is not a confounding variable when 
examining reactions to climate change information.  
Public perception of anthropogenic climate change will also be explored in 
this chapter as it is important to examine as it both impacts how risk is perceived 
and support for climate action (See Lujala et al., 2015). Climate change is a major 
political issue and therefore, climate change has received a large amount of 
media coverage. Previous research has highlighted a very strong public 
awareness of the issue in the UK with an Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs [DEFRA] survey from 2002 that showed “… only 1% of the English 
public have not heard of either ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’, or the 
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‘greenhouse effect’…” (Lorenzoni et al., 2007, p. 446). Despite there being public 
awareness of climate change in the UK Lorenzoni et al. (2007, p. 447) argue that 
there is a  “… disparity between the public awareness between climate change 
and concern about climate change…”.  
Concern about climate change has been shown to be on the decline with 
a survey by Capstick et al. (2015) with 82% being very concerned or fairly 
concerned in 2005 to only 67% in 2014. Climate change poses a significant threat 
to humanity yet the perception of risk is influenced by a number of factors with 
the delayed and abstract nature of the threat undermining public pressure for 
action (Lee et al., 2015, Lujala et al., 2015). There is also the additional issue that 
climate change is difficult to communicate to the public as it “… is a complex 
phenomenon, with multiple interdependent social and environmental causes…” 
(Pidgeon, 2012, p. S87). Alongside this some areas of climate science are 
contested with some uncertainty concerning the impact of climate change in the 
future (Pidgeon, 2012, p. S87).   
To explore the debates surrounding scientific literacy I will examine public 
understanding, perceptions and climate change communication in three key 
sections. The first section is focused on the debate surrounding how we define 
public ‘understanding’, scientific literacy, and issues with communicating science 
to the public. Secondly, I will examine the perceptions of climate change and the 
impact of media framing. Finally, this section will critically examine barriers to 
online communication of climate change with limitations of the amount of 
information we can process and the difficulties in producing climate change 
messages with impact. Ultimately, this chapter examines the current level of 
public understanding of climate science and stresses the importance of both 
public understanding for participation in policy debates and the barriers we face 
in communicating climate change information to the public. 
 
3.1: Public understanding science and measuring scientific literacy   
 This section explores the debates surrounding public understanding of 
science and scientific literacy. The debate surrounding the definition of public 
understanding of science are wide ranging from Miller (2004) who argues that 
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understanding is the ability to comprehend science coverage in broadsheet 
newspapers instead proposing a scientific literacy approach, to Shamos (1995) 
who argues that understanding requires deep knowledge of scientific concepts. 
However, to explore scientific literacy this section will also focus on developments 
in science education, but also the impact of popular culture and the rejection of 
science. This section finally evaluates previous research on the understanding of 
climate change.      
 The defining of public understanding is highly contested. Public 
understanding of science has been a subject of debate among academics with 
definitions varying considerably (Miller, 2004). Due to the importance of the 
communication of science and the engagement of scientists with the public it is 
argued by Miller (2004) that public understanding of science should be measured 
by scientific literacy. Scientific literacy is defined as being able to comprehend 
scientific debates in media coverage and the understanding of the potential 
impacts of scientific research and technology upon society (Sturgis and Allum, 
2004, Miller, 1983, Miller, 1998, Miller, 2004). The approach to defining ‘ public 
understanding of science ’ with measuring public ‘scientific literacy’ which Miller 
(2004)  has argued while contested is more of an appropriate standard 
considering that public interaction with scientific research is primarily through 
media reporting. In addition, the term public is highly contested as ‘Public’ refers 
to non-experts as a homogenous group in society when Gauchat (2012) instead 
argues that the public are diverse groups driven by differing ideological views.  
By contrast, Shamos (1995) argues that understanding requires an in-
depth knowledge of scientific concepts which the public does not have. For 
example the development of science education is relatively new with an initial 
public interest during the industrial revolution, but Shamos (1995, p. 41) argues 
that science did not become an educational focus “… until well into the twentieth 
century…”. The introduction of science on to school curricula has been 
problematic and was developed significantly since the late 1980s when school 
science education was thematically split in England and Wales into biology, 
chemistry, and physics (Fensham, 2002).  
However, the science curriculum that was developed has been 
significantly criticised in the Beyond 2000 report as a failure to produce public 
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understanding of science that “… does not equip them [students] to deal 
effectively and confidently with scientific information in everyday contexts” (Millar 
and Osborne, 1998, p. 9). Science has been taught without wider context with 
assessments focusing “… on memorisation and recall…” that do not provide the 
necessary understanding to process media science reports (Millar and Osborne, 
1998, p. 9). The report highlights that there is no teaching of the formation of 
scientific understanding with the justification of knowledge or the language of 
scientific evidence of risk and probability not included within the curriculum (Millar 
and Osborne, 1998, Fensham, 2002).  
This has remained an issue across science education across Europe with 
a report by Osborne and Dillon (2008) highlighting that the curriculum still 
narrowly focuses on the three sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics. The 
curriculum is argued by Ryder (2001, p. 39) to be important to support lifelong 
learning and engagement with science into their adult life. A key aspect for 
lifelong learning is “… knowledge about the practices of science”. Producing an 
understanding of how science works is key to producing confidence in the public 
to encourage active engagement with scientific and technological debates that 
have social consequences (Ryder, 2001, p. 39). The fragmented approach in the 
science curriculum is criticised as completely failing to produce a coherent 
understanding of science which Osborne and Dillon (2008, p. 8) compares “… to 
being on a train with blacked-windows – you know you are going somewhere but 
only the train driver knows where”.  
The wider context of how science produces knowledge, as argued by 
Fensham (2002), was never included in the finalised curriculum. General 
understanding of how science builds knowledge overtime and “… that we cannot 
claim absolute truths in science…” is argued by Shamos (1995, p. 51) to be 
central to communicating scientific research and policy debates focusing on 
technology or scientific development with the public. The lack of understanding 
of what science itself is and the complexity of the term ‘science’ is encapsulated 
by Shamos (1995, p. 47):     
“Is science simply what scientists do, as some circular definitions would 
have it? Or is it a body of useful and practical knowledge about the 
universe? Or is it a method of inquiry? Or is it the search for order in 
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nature? Or is it a search for “first principles” Or is its objective to 
understand, explain, and make predictions about natural phenomena? 
Yes science is all these things, yet more…”   
The complexity of science is argued by Shamos (1995) to make 
communication of science to the general populace not only difficult but modern 
science is portrayed as impossible to communicate in ‘common language’. 
Despite the attempts to increase public understanding of science and 
improve scientific literacy through education, Shamos (1995) argues that science 
education has failed to produce a scientifically literate population in developed 
nations.  This is supported by Hazen and Trefil (2009) who argue there has been 
no real improvement. The drive to develop the publics’ scientific literacy is 
significant as a basic level of scientific understanding is required to participate in 
policy debate related to scientific developments or issues caused by technology 
(Miller, 2004). As such the scientific literacy required is argued by Miller (2004, p. 
274) “… to be sufficient to read and comprehend the Tuesday science section of 
‘The New York Times’”. However, there has been a failure to produce scientific 
literacy with research that has shown that the state of scientific literacy in the US 
and Europe is low where only “… one-quarter of the European and US publics 
qualify as scientifically literate” (Sturgis and Allum, 2004, p. 56).   
Previous research has highlighted that the public have low levels of 
scientific literacy in relation to basic scientific methodology. For example the 1995 
Science and Engineering Indicators Study that examined public understanding of 
the experimental method asked a question to US adults to select the best if two 
experimental designs for testing a drug for treating high blood pressure (Miller, 
2004). The question gave the choice between testing the drug on one thousand 
patients with high blood pressure or five hundred with high blood pressure and 
five hundred with normal blood pressure (Miller, 2004). The result was promising 
as 69 per cent selected the experiment using the control group, but there was a 
follow up open question that asked why they selected the experimental design 
they did. Rather than showing understanding of the experimental method “… 40 
percent of the total population…” selected the control group design due to a belief 
if the drug were fatal “… it would claim fewer victims because it would have been 
administered to fewer subjects” (Miller, 2004, p. 277). This research highlighted 
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that there is a lack of public understanding of the experimental method with 
“approximately 12 percent of US adults selected the two-group design and were 
able to explain the logic of control groups” (Miller, 2004, p. 277). In particular, the 
lack of public understanding of the experimental method is worrying as media 
coverage of developments or discoveries in science are communicated “… in 
terms of an experiment…” (Miller, 2004, p. 277).    
The lack of public understanding of basic scientific concepts that Miller 
(2004) highlights is important as there is also an additional issue in 
communicating of scientific facts and on-going scientific research (Field and 
Powell, 2001). An issue with communicating on going scientific research on topics 
such as climate change is argued by Field and Powell (2001, p. 422) to have an 
additional problem due to it being “… impossible to provide accurate and 
complete information in a single presentation”. Due to the requirements of 
multiple communications of on-going research there is the issue that journalists 
do not consider science necessarily news worthy, particularly as the news they 
seek to report is immediate with a short term focus (Field and Powell, 2001, 
Gregory and Miller, 1998). Even then  Besley and Nisbet (2013) have shown that 
scientists mistrust the media due to the perception that they misrepresentation 
their field of research (Landstrom et al., 2015, p. 281).  
The state of public scientific literacy means that it is difficult to get the 
public to engage with scientific and technological issues in society. One of the 
problems faced in science communication is the disconnect between how the 
average person views the importance of daily life and information they are seen 
as needing to know (Turney, 1996, p. 1088). For example a survey conducted by 
Durant et al. (1992) found that the public viewed medical science to both be the 
most scientific branch of science while also the most interesting (Turney, 1996, 
p. 1088). This interest from the public in medical science is due to the public 
viewing medical advancement as more relevant to their lives (Turney, 1996). 
Instead Turney (1996, p. 1090) argues that the public need to be engaged with 
in a way that interest them rather than “… insisting the public must understand 
the same facts in the same way…”.  
In addition, communicating current research has been argued by Irwin and 
Micheal (2003) to also be impacted by public trust in science is an important 
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factor. Especially with controversial topics such as genetically modified foods and 
climate change.  The idea of science itself as a coherent whole is criticised as 
Wynne (2006) highlights science itself is institutionalised in a variety of ways that 
the term ‘science’ is basically meaningless making measuring trust difficult. 
Attempts to measure trust in science are highlighted by Sturgis and Allum (2004) 
to be flawed as the context of issues with science and technology need to be 
considered. There are also flaws with how science is conducted with Haerlin and 
Parr (1999) highlighting that the lack of transparency and funding from 
corporations is causing mistrust in the science of genetically modified organisms. 
However, Shamos (1995) does not even consider it worthwhile to attempt 
to produce scientific literacy. The benefit that a scientifically literate population 
has is questioned by Shamos (1995, p. 74) suggesting a scientific literate 
population would not benefit society or the public on an individual level. The entire 
endeavour of educating the youth to produce scientific literacy is attacked by 
Shamos (1995) to be a waste of time as “… most students lapse back into 
scientific illiteracy soon after they graduate…”. Rather than trying to educate the 
public to enable their incorporation into discussion making on the issues from 
scientific and technological development Shamos (1995) believes in an 
undemocratic decision making process where experts make the decisions rather 
than the scientifically illiterate public.  
Instead he argues there are negative consequences of trying to produce 
scientific literacy. For example Shamos (1995) argues that scientific literacy has 
the unintended consequence of producing the belief in the majority of adults that 
they hold ‘very good or adequate’ knowledge of science and technology. While 
the public scientific literacy is low there is a confidence held by the public that 
their understanding is good which “… means that most adults know all they need 
or want to know about science” (Shamos, 1995, p. 75). The production of 
scientific literacy in the public through education is considered to be simply 
impossible and the idea of the public being informed in the decision making 
process undermines “… the opinions of credible experts” that the public should 
rely on for scientific or technological issues (Shamos, 1995, p. 77).  
The approach taken to public understanding of Shamos (1995) is critiqued 
by Miller (2004, p. 274) to “… reflect his expectations for his undergraduate 
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physics students…”. The overall conclusion that Shamos (1995) attempts to 
produce public understanding of science are unnecessary is an technocratic 
elitist approach (Miller, 2004, Fischer, 2000). The failure to see an increase in 
scientific literacy in the population could be attributed to the flawed science 
curriculum that did not produce an understanding of how science worked or an 
understanding of scientific language of risk and probability (Millar and Osborne, 
1998, Fensham, 2002). Popular culture has also been blamed by Nisbet et al. 
(2002) for negatively and inaccurately portraying science to the public. Popular 
television shows such as the X-files have portrayed science negatively in popular 
culture. The example of the X-files is used by Nisbet et al. (2002) as the show 
was based around science being unable to explain events or supernatural beliefs 
being superior to the scientific method. Entertainment undermining the 
understanding of science is potentially damaging. For example the American TV 
series ‘CSI’ has been heavily criticised for undermining public understanding of 
forensic science to the point that it has altered the expectations of juries of the 
science presented in court (Schweitzer and Saks, 2007). The consequences of 
showing forensic science as technological magic has been shown by Schweitzer 
and Saks (2007) to result in increasing demands for high tech forensic science 
as evidence and increased scepticism of low tech forensic evidence. Popular 
culture has potentially made developing public understanding more difficult due 
to strengthening misconceptions held by the public about the scientific method. 
However, decisions that affect the public are important to empower the 
public to engage with issues relating to scientific developments or consequences 
of technology (Irwin, 2001, Gregory and Miller, 1998). The ability for the public to 
engage with science is argued by Ryder (2001, p. 36) to be “… a central aim of 
functional scientific literacy”. The ability for the public to engage with the findings 
of studies in local decision-making, in particular an understanding of computer 
modelling, scientific tests, and sample size, to allow for the public to effectively 
engage in decision making (Ryder, 2001, p. 36). Engagement with the public 
through incorporating them into science with ‘citizen science’ has been shown as 
an effective method to get the public interested and encourage engagement with 
science while also benefiting scientists (Garbarino and Mason, 2016). Citizen 
science is a debated concept in social science, which is essentially the inclusion 
of the public into science enabling large scale data collection (See Ellwood et al., 
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2016). There is also the potential use of citizen science there is an opportunity to 
improve public understanding of science (See Trumbull et al., 2000) and improve 
attitudes to science (See Price and Lee, 2013) 
The risk of isolating the public from engaging with scientific development 
or societal problems has the potential of developing an ‘anti-science’ movement 
(Gregory and Miller, 1998). The term ‘anti-science’ refers to any groups that 
criticise science (Gregory and Miller, 1998). The popular view of science is 
argued by Sturgis and Allum (2004, p. 56) has received increasing public mistrust 
along with a “backdrop of widespread scientific “ignorance” amongst the lay 
public”. The ‘ignorance’ that Sturgis and Allum (2004, p. 56) refer to is a lack of 
public knowledge of basic scientific facts with reference to a survey by Durant et 
al. (1989, p. 14) that found only 62.8% knew the Earth went around the sun and 
of that only 34.1% knew that it takes is a year for the Earth to orbit the sun. 
Despite public ‘ignorance’ and mistrust of science the concept of a coherent ‘anti-
science’ movement is criticised by Gregory and Miller (1998) as the term refers 
to anything viewed as anti-science such as astrology to sensational media 
coverage of science. While the ‘anti-science’ movement is questionable as a 
coherent construct there is an argument made by Holton (1992) that to effectively 
challenge  anti-science views held by the public there is a requirement for 
scientists to actively engaged with the public (Gregory and Miller, 1998). 
However, simply engaging with science may not be enough to improve attitudes 
and trust as science is complex (See Brossard et al., 2005).  
 In the case of climate change previous research has worryingly shown 
there is a range of flaws and misconceptions the public understanding of climate 
science. In the first UK scientific literacy test in 1988 it was highlighted by Durant 
et al. (1989, p. 11) that they found that “… a mere 23% recognised a link between 
the burning of fossil fuels in coal-fired power stations and the problem of global 
warming”. This survey had 2,009 participants from the UK with participants being 
over the age of 18. A more recent survey by Poortinga et al. (2006, p. 12) which 
was conducted in 2005 found that participants were aware of the main human 
causes with “… 29% mentioning the burning of fossil fuels…”. The question used 
by Poortinga et al. (2006) was an open question design so cannot be easily 
compared to the survey by Durant et al. (1989). In the US a survey by Bord et al. 
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(2000, p. 208) found that 89% of participants knew that the “use of coal and oil 
by utilities or electric companies” was a cause of global warming. However, only 
46% of respondents thought it was a major cause (See Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3-1: Coal and oil use by utilities or electrical companies a cause of 
climate change? 
 
Note: Data from Bord et al. (2000, p. 208). 
 This example highlights an issue with the public’s understanding of climate 
change. These can be significant flaws in understanding of basic concepts with 
the confusion highlighted by Pidgeon (2012, p. S87) with climate being confused 
with weather. Another problem highlighted in the survey of US university students 
by Bord et al. (2000, p. 208) found that they “…tend to underestimate the role of 
automobiles, utilities, and home heating and cooling in emitting large quantities 
of CO2”. However, there was a range of other factors found that the US students 
believed caused climate change which included “… aerosols, insecticides, 
nuclear power generation, and depletion of ozone in the upper atmosphere…” 
(Bord et al., 2000. p. 208). The cause of climate change being a result of the 
depletion of the Ozone is an interesting example of flawed knowledge which 
Ungar (2000, p. 303) highlights was found both in the US population and in New 
Zealand. New Zealand significantly differs from the US with the population having 
greater environmental consciousness and awareness of the consequences of 
climate change. This confusion was also found in focus groups carried out in high 
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schools in Australia which found that students were aware of the issues 
surrounding the hole in the Ozone but not sure how it was different from climate 
change (Harriet, 2000, p. 318).  
 The issue of Ozone depletion differs from climate change, as the issue of 
the ozone hole was easier to understand as the consequences were simpler, in 
contrast to climate change, which has a wide array of consequences. The solution 
to Ozone deletion are simpler than those to address climate change, and the 
public understood that using certain products contributed to ozone depletion 
(Ungar, 2000, p. 303). This resulted in the American public avoiding goods that 
harmed the ozone layer before regulation was passed. However, ozone depletion 
had entered the public consciousness before climate change and a result 
Kempton et al. (1995, p. 68) argues that climate change information has been 
processed by the public and related to ozone depletion due to both being 
atmospheric issues (Ungar, 2000, p. 304). This was also found in research by 
Bostrom et al. (1994, p. 969) which found in interviews that “…few people 
mentioned any greenhouse gases apart from CFCs…”. 
 Flaws in knowledge are significant as they shape the environmental 
behaviour taken by the public. For example if there is confusion between ozone 
depletion and climate change then people may waste effort on behaviour 
changes that do not help solve the problem, “… such as conscientiously refusing 
to use spray cans, while neglecting such critical strategies as energy 
conservation” (Bostrom et al., 1994, p. 969). The adoption of pro-environment 
behavioural changes as a response to climate change is slow and weak. 
Lorenzoni et al. (2007, p. 447) for example, note that it is more likely that recycling 
is adopted rather than reducing energy usage. This behaviour change stems from 
both a lack of understanding of the causes of climate change but also from 
resistance to changing behaviour from an energy intensive life style. Therefore, 
increasing public understanding of climate science is an important first step in 
encouraging people adopt effective behaviour change and produce political 
support for reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases.  
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3.2: Perception of risk and the framing of climate science 
 People’s perceptions of risk are highly related to the ways in which climate 
change is framed in the media (including the Internet) and by individuals. This 
section focuses on individual and media framing. This is important as pro-
environmental behaviour change is difficult to encourage even if we were to 
overcome the hurdle of public understanding of climate science. Despite wide 
scale awareness of climate change there is little action being taken to deal with it 
(See Naustdalslid, 2011). In particular, there is previous research that the majority 
of the UK public hold the view that climate change does not have a direct personal 
consequence to them and are resistant to changing their behaviour, such as 
travel habits, to reduce carbon emissions (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Other research 
by Gelcich et al. (2014) found in response to the anthropogenic impacts on 
marine environments that survey responses were not changing behaviour due to 
feeling overwhelmed by the scope of the problem and or unsure how they could 
make a difference at the individual level. There has been research on the 
perceptions of young people with a study in Australia by Tucci et al. (2007) which 
"... found that among a group of 10-14 year-olds about 27% believed that the 
world may end during their lifetime due to climate change..." (Ojala, 2011, p, 625). 
 While there is widespread awareness of climate change the attitudes 
towards climate change is split with a UK survey by the Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2010) finding that while a majority support 
governmental action on climate change. There were 38 per cent of respondents 
who viewed climate change as too far in the distance to be a concern (See figures 
3.2 and 3.3). This divide between attitude towards engagement and awareness 
is interesting. Lorenzoni et al. (2007, p. 451) found “… a lack of basic knowledge 
about causes, impacts and solutions to climate change.” Examples of poor 
knowledge are demonstrated by Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) where people 
experience cold weather and therefore, question the validity of climate change 
due to them believe climate change equals warmer weather. Therefore, the 
personal experience of cold weather results in doubt in climate science as the 
poor level of understanding that the climate is warming is equated to warmer 
weather. However, other research by Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2014) suggests that 
ideological processing is more significant than changes to the climate in public 
perception. Alongside this they found that there were barriers to engagement due 
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to the lack of desire to engage with climate change information and confusion 
where to find reliable information on climate science. Therefore, it is important to 
explore the reasons for poor public understanding of climate science and the 
difficulties faced in the communicating climate change.  
Figure 3-2: UK attitudes to government action on combating climate 
change 
 
Note: Data from the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2010, 
p. 16). 
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Figure 3-3: UK concern about future impact of climate change 
 
Note: Data from the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2010, 
p. 1). 
There is range of barriers to effective citizen engagement with the issue of 
climate change. Two fundamental issues with climate change communication is 
argued by Moser (2010, p. 33) to not being visible and no direct impact on health. 
In this regard climate change contrast to other forms of visually environmental 
issues, such as smog, which are visible to the naked eye with a clear impact on 
health. There have been campaigns to attempt to increase awareness to the 
issue of carbon emissions with Moser (2010, p. 33) highlighting a campaigns to 
save energy with one in Australia called ‘You Have The Power’. This campaign 
visualised the impact of energy usage producing greenhouse gas as black 
balloons coming from electrical appliances and filtering out of homes. There have 
been similar attempts to increase awareness of the consequences in UK based 
campaigns with the government advert ‘Act on CO2’, which showed a child being 
read a story about the consequences of climate change (see Figure 3.4). This 
advert attracted a negative backlash with complaints made about the content  
(Sweney, 2009). 
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Figure 3-4: Act on CO2 TV advert 
 
Note: Screenshots from video uploaded by Joe the Electrician (2009).  
Both of these campaigns highlight an issue that people are disconnected 
with the impacts of energy use on climate change along with the issue that 
emissions from the individual is relatively small (Moser, 2010, p. 33). This was 
shown in a study by Semenza et al. (2008, p. 483) to be the second most common 
barrier, after a lack of understanding of how to reduce their impact on climate 
change, that their own behaviour was not seen as significant enough to make a 
difference. This is also exacerbated by climate change being seen as an 
international issue. As a result it is viewed by the public as disconnected from 
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them with domestic issues viewed as holding greater importance (Gavin, 2009, 
Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui, 2009). 
While the public may see climate change as an international issue there is 
also the argument by Moser (2010, p. 34) that due to our disconnection with 
nature in developed countries we do not “… notice subtle, incremental 
environmental changes…”. This is compounded from the large time scales under 
which climate change takes place compared to other forms of environmental 
pollution with much more immediate impacts (Hansen et al., 2012, p. E2422). As 
a result the risks posed by climate change are often viewed as greater for society 
rather than a risk at the individual level (Pidgeon, 2012, p. S88). An aspect of this 
can be due to people being unfamiliar with the impact that climate change will 
have on their lives with examples such as extreme weather events.  
Effective risk communication to the public is argued by Pidgeon and 
Fischhoff (2011, p. 38) requires both a better public understanding of climate 
science and effectively framed messages about the risks climate change poses. 
Framing is a process where information is selected and discourses are used to 
portray an issue in a particular way (Muschert, 2009, Nisbet, 2009, Scheufele, 
1999). This process is an inherent part of media coverage due to the constraints 
of space and time as a result Nisbet (2009, p. 15) argues that there is simply “… 
no such thing as unframed information…”. Frames form the storylines that 
communicate an event or issue to the public of “… why an issue might be a 
problem, who or what might be responsible for it, and what should be done about 
it” (Nisbet, 2009, p. 15). Through the framing of coverage the media also sets the 
agenda for public debate by focusing and excluding aspects of a topic (Scheufele, 
2000).  
 Frames are argued Lakoff (2010) to be important to study as humans are 
not rational and filter information through pre-existing mental frames with 
ideological bias and irrational beliefs. Frames (or sometimes referred to in 
literature as schemas) are the unconscious neural structures in the brain that 
process all information we receive (Lakoff, 2010). These frames are used for “all 
thinking and talking…” which develop, change and strengthen over time (Lakoff, 
2010, p. 71).  These developed frames process issues thematically which links 
to a direct frame and also “… closely related concepts such as categories, scripts, 
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or stereotypes connote mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ 
processing of information” (Dunaway et al., 2010, Entman, 1993, p. 53). For 
example, a study by Hoffman et al. (2016) found that decision making of pain 
management treatments were effected by racial biases in American medical 
students. The study found “… many white medical students and residents hold 
beliefs about the biological difference between blacks and whites, many of which 
are false or fantastical in nature…” (Hoffman et al., 2016, p. 4). This bias in 
processing information from the patient’s condition resulted in reduced accuracy 
of pain treatments when treating black patients due to these irrational beliefs in 
racial differences. Difficulties posed in the processing of climate change 
information along with problems in making the public aware of their own 
greenhouse gas emissions have made climate change communication 
problematic. Even if awareness of the public actions is produced there is the risk 
they will simply see their own emissions as insignificant to the global problem.  
Media framing is significant as the frames used to cover an issue shapes 
the public discussion (Scheufele, 1999). As a result the media is particularly 
powerful in setting the agenda of public discussions with the shaping of what the 
public view as issues but also how they are interpreted by the public (Mercado, 
2012, Nelson et al., 1997). The literature on agenda setting focuses particularly 
on two areas with the influence of the media on public opinion or the effect of the 
media on the policy agenda (Dalen and Aelst, 2013). This section will focus on 
the former as Dalen and Aelst (2013) highlight the difficulties in establishing the 
direct influence of the media on the policy agenda. The media influences public 
opinion and their perception of society (Wolfe et al., 2013).  
The framing of an issue has been shown that it greatly impacts public’s 
perception of issues in society just by how the information is framed. An 
experiment was conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) which gave 
subjects two choices between programs A and B followed by choices between 
programs C and D (Entman, 1993, p.53). The statement given to participants was 
“Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kill 600 people” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, p. 343, 
Entman, 1993, p. 53). Participants were offered two potential solutions:  
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 “If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is 
adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and 
a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two 
programs would you favour?” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, p. 343, 
Entman, 1993, p. 53).  
The majority of participants selected option A (72%). This was followed 
with the choice between two other solutions that are the same with the focus 
being deaths rather than the number that could be ‘saved’: 
“If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted, 
there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds 
probability that 600 people will die” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, p. 343, 
Entman, 1993, p. 54). 
Despite these being the same options as before program C only received 
22 per cent of the vote with program D receiving 78 per cent (Entman, 1993, p. 
54). The simple changes to the phrasing of the programs were enough to alter 
the decisions made by participants with a greater emotional weight with death 
being the focus of Programs C and D.  
Therefore, the way an issue is framed to the public can result in greatly 
influence public opinion and concern (Dunaway et al., 2010). An example 
highlighted by Dunaway et al. (2010, p. 362) is coverage of immigration is often 
framed in a negative way with crime being a focus of most coverage about 
immigration at a much higher amount that the “… actual occurrence in society…”. 
In the US crime was used to frame “… 36 per cent of all network news stories 
covering Latinos” (Dunaway et al., 2010, p. 362). These negative frames 
potentially influence the public to view immigration as a negative thing in society 
and potentially distract from significant issues in society.  
The selective framing of issues in society can be a distraction as there are 
only a limited number of issues that we can focus on at any one time (See 
information overload in chapter 2) (Dunaway et al., 2010). So the media can put 
prominence other issues or produce moral panics directing the public’s attention 
away from issues such as climate change. Moral panics are produced when 
something, this can be new technology or group of people, emerges in society 
and is treated as a threat to the values in society (See Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
2009). For example a recent moral panic has been focused on the sexual risk to 
children the Internet apparently poses (Quayle, 2015). Instead, Quayle (2015, p. 
41) highlights that the Internet is a factor in a small number “… of sexual offences 
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against children in the US…” and “… the rates of child sexual abuse show a 
decline”. The framing of Internet risk creates the image to the public that the 
Internet itself is a risk to the safety of children.      
Therefore, the media can draw attention to issues, but also skew the 
public’s perception of an issue. Despite the potential to skew or distract the 
public the media is vital to draw focus on issues in society as we are only able 
to focus on a finite number of issues at a time due to cognitive limitations 
(Dunaway et al., 2010). A consequence of these cognitive limitations is that the 
media is extremely important to get the public engaged with an issue and its 
relevance to the wider public, (Gavin, 2010). However, coverage itself does not 
necessarily create public support for effective measures to deal with an issue as 
framing can significantly influence how an issue is perceived (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury, 2007). For example, the framing of climate change information has 
a significant influence on the public’s perception of climate science and support 
for effective policy making. Previous research into the framing of climate change 
has particularly focused on climate sceptic coverage (See Boykoff, 2007, 
Boykoff, 2011, Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, Oreskes and Conway, 2010).  This 
research seeks to examine whether climate sceptic material is a risk to online 
communication of climate change and whether there is a causal link between 
sceptic material and reactions to climate science.  
Climate sceptic material makes climate science appear still debated and 
undermine public support for emission reduction has been argued by Oreskes 
and Conway (2010) as the manufacture of doubt. Essentially by creating the 
public perception that climate science is still debated then it undermines public 
pressure to regulate polluting industries. This is a tactic Oreskes and Conway 
(2010) highlight to have been used by the tobacco industry to try to discredit the 
link between cancer and the smoking of tobacco. By keeping the public 
perception that the science was still debated it meant it “… would be safe from 
litigation and regulation” (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). The same approach has 
been taken by fossil fuel companies with the funding of climate sceptics to 
attempt to maintain the public perception that climate science is still debated.  
There is evidence that fossil fuel companies have spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars to fund climate change counter-movement [CCCM] 
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organisations to delay effective climate change policies (Brulle, 2014). The 
funding of these organisations are not always clear with Brulle (2014, p. 691) 
highlighting that companies such as “… the ExxonMobil Foundation were 
heavily involved in funding  CCCM organizations” but have publicly stopped 
funding these groups and instead “… shifted to pass through untraceable 
sources”. Through the manufacture of doubt fossil fuel intensive industry 
protects itself from public pressure to regulate emissions (Oreskes and Conway, 
2010). 
While the framing of climate change information can impact the public’s 
perception and understanding of climate science there not necessary a direct 
effect on the public for example whether they engage with information. In 
particular, selective media exposure to climate change information is important 
to explore as the selective exposure to information can influence a individuals’ 
understanding of climate change and potentially limit the impact of climate 
change communication. Selective media exposure is caused by individuals 
making decisions on what media to engage with which is based upon previously 
held political beliefs and world views (See Garrett, 2009). This is important to 
examine, as the decisions made by people to engage with climate science could 
potentially limit the potential effectiveness of climate change communication if 
users choose not to engage with it. This section will begin by exploring the 
debates surrounding selective media exposure and the potential consequences 
of polarising of the public.  
 The Internet provides an environment where users can directly select what 
they wish to engage with and therefore potentially opt out of receiving information 
from differing points of views. The Internet is argued by Garrett (2009) to allow 
for users to have much greater control over what information and sources they 
are exposed to with the potential for users to simply not see information that 
contradicts their world view. This selective exposure is argued by Schumann 
(2004, p. 234) as a consequence of the increasing media exposure which means 
that people are limiting exposure to “… available messages about the 
characteristics, culture, values, beliefs, point-of-view including worldviews, 
preferences, and behaviour of those we believe may be different from us”. The 
effect of the media on an individual attitudes, values, and understanding of a topic 
is influenced by the exposure to media sources. 
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Selective media exposure can shape how we perceive reality with our 
values and beliefs being influenced and strengthened. For example, Malamuth 
(1985, p. 313) ran an experiment exploring the portrayal of rape in pornography 
and found that exposure to aggressive pornography “… may contribute to males’ 
acceptance of rape myths and/or violence against women”. However, the effect 
of media exposure depends if individuals decide to engage with the media 
content and this section will look at how the Internet has given greater control to 
users with what media content they engage with. The selectivity of media sources 
is influenced by a range of factors with “… a person’s ages, gender, disposition, 
prior experience, mood, ideology, social influences, and social identity” (Slater, 
2007, p. 282).  
For example research by Nisbet and Goidel (2007) into the impact of the 
framing of coverage of the embryonic stem cell research focused on two main 
discourse frames. The coverage was framed as either an issue related to 
‘Christian morality’ or ‘social and economic progress’. The result from Nisbet and 
Goidel (2007) research showed that individuals who viewed media outlets which 
took the discourse frame of an issue to ‘Christian morality’ were more likely to 
have a negative view of stem cell research, while those viewing media outlets 
which used the frame that stem cell research was social and economic progress 
were more likely to be supportive. Through this selective use of media there is 
the effect of the media spiral reinforcing pre-existing beliefs and attitudes (Slater, 
2007).  
The consequence of the reinforcement of pre-existing beliefs through 
selective exposure is the polarisation of the public (Stroud, 2010). Essentially 
there is a fear in the literature surrounding the Internet that users will simply 
produce ‘echo chambers’ for their own beliefs and as a consequence the public 
become increasingly polarised with less tolerance for those who hold differing 
views (Stroud, 2010, p. 557). Experiments by Keating et al. (2016) found that 
group discussions with likeminded people resulted in participants becoming 
increasingly polarised and seeing the other side as more extreme without being 
aware that their own views had become significantly polarised. This is 
problematic if users filter out differing worldviews as they simply reinforce their 
views and become increasingly polarised without being aware of the impact. It is 
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argued by Sunstein (2007) a consequence of this polarised society is social 
fragmentation (Kim, 2015).  
 In contrast, a study by Valentino et al. (2009) found that people did engage 
with differing points of view in particular to be able to counter arguments from the 
other side of a debate. This finding is supported by the research of Kim (2015) 
which found that the effects of polarisation was reduced in social networks where 
individuals engaged with those with differing world-views. Therefore, suggesting 
that just engaging with like-minded media sources does not necessarily produce 
polarisation, but if an individual’s social interactions are also made up of like-
minded individuals then there is a strong process of polarisation and rejection of 
other worldviews. This poses a problem for climate science communication, as 
those who choose to engage with media that rejects the scientific consensus will 
not develop an adequate understanding, but instead have their climate sceptic 
beliefs reinforced. 
  
3.3: Barriers to climate change communication online 
A key problem in applying this literature to climate change communication 
online is that the Internet has the potential that people can opt out of news 
coverage and simply never engage with climate change information. The Internet 
has enabled the general public to filter out information on topics they are not 
interest in through the use of social media (as discussed in chapter 2). The lack 
of engagement goes back to the previously discussed barriers to climate change 
communication where with a key barrier to engagement is argued by Scannell 
and Gifford (2013, p. 77) to be the lack of attachment “… to one’s local area…”. 
Therefore, it is important to increase engagement with climate change 
information, but there is the risk that engagement with climate sceptic material 
might result in the rejection of climate science and increase polarisation if users 
do not engage with the climate consensus. 
 This lack of interest can be seen in the opportunities to spread climate 
change information through meme (see chapter 2). Memes hold the potential to 
widely share information or critique corporate and political institutions. However, 
the success of viral success of memes has been suggested by Weng et al. (2012) 
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to be random with limited attention from audiences and the sheer quantity of 
information being shared. This was shown in the research by Weng et al. (2012) 
that used a computer model to model Twitter which modelled user behaviour with 
meme sharing. They found that the success of a meme were based on the 
structure of a social network and finite user attention so some memes gained 
zero traction while others survived long term with a large audience suggesting 
that the success of virally shared content.is entirely random. In contrast 
Chesterman (2011) argues that memes spread on a range of aspects for example 
including perceived emotional impact and entertainment values, to be simple and 
easily understood, and able to spread in a variety of formats (images, video, audio 
etc). In particular, memes require two key features to survive in Internet culture. 
Firstly, the meme requires enough variety to remain interesting to an audience, 
and secondly, it needs to be mutable which means it can be used with other 
memes. This means that the meme continues to be shared.  
An example of a successful reproducing meme within Internet culture can 
be seen in the My Little Pony [MLP] memes that emerged  in 2010 (Know your 
Meme, n.d.-k, Robertson, 2014). Achieving the key step of viral success (see 
Figure 3.5), but instead of declining in the sharing of content it achieved long term 
success due to the mutability and variety of the meme. Even if a meme was to 
decline there is always the potential for re-emergence in Internet culture. At times 
this is due to memes being event specific examples including ‘2Spooky’ meme 
that emerges every year around Halloween (Know Your Meme, n.d.-a). The 
production of the MLP memes has continued to grow with the Know your Meme 
(n.d.-k) MLP page has, in January, 2015, has 9,203,076 page views and 210,779 
images on the MLP meme image gallery. An example can be seen in Figure 3.6. 
The MLP memes are an example of successful meme with high survivability for 
the key reasons argued by Chesterman (2011): variety and mutability (the ability 
to be merged with other memes).  
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Figure 3-5: Model of successful viral content 
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Figure 3-6: Confound these ponies they drive me to drink 
 
Note: Image taken from RainbowFuckinDash117 (n.d.) 
In particular the success of MLP memes is due to them being highly 
mutable. The merging of MLP with other memes and wider popular culture is 
known in Internet jargon as ‘ponifying’ (Know Your Meme, n.d.-l). An example is 
the mutation of popular image memes to create ‘ponified’ versions. This can be 
seen in a meme called ‘It’s dangerous to go alone! Take this’ (See Figure 3.7), 
that originally emerged in 2006 and uses a quote from the 1986 videogame ‘The 
Legend of Zelda’ which is superimposed on an image of an animal or item being 
offered (Know Your Meme, n.d.-i). Alongside image memes there are many 
examples of videos that have had viral success with one example being an 
ponified animation by Jacob Kitts (2012) called ‘Lord of the Rings Re-enacted by 
Ponies’ (one video in a series of videos that ponifies popular TV shows and Films)  
that parodies key scenes from the ‘The Lord of the Rings’ film trilogy and has 
received over six million views (See figure 3,8).  
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Figure 3-7: Variations of the 'It's dangerous to go alone! Take this' 
 
Note: The kitten example of ‘It’s dangerous to go alone! Take this’ meme is taken 
from Know Your Meme (n.d.-i) and the MLP variation is taken from the Know Your 
Meme (n.d.-j) image gallery. 
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Figure 3-8: Lord of the Rings Re-enacted by ponies 
 
Note: Screenshots taken from Jacob Kitts (2012). 
These MLP memes meet both of the requirements for successful memes 
with mutability and variety to maintain user interest as the ponifying of other 
memes and popular culture has resulted in long term survival within Internet 
culture. However, in contrast climate change has struggled to produce viral 
success with a search for ‘climate change’ on Know Your Meme website, in 
December, 2015, produces a result of only 15 images and 17 videos (Know Your 
Meme, n.d.-m).  For example an attempt at spreading viral climate consensus 
information in an entertaining format (See Figure 3.9) was a video by Hungry 
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Beast (2011). Through the song the video seeks to impart information about 
climate consensus while highlighting the influence of the fossil fuel lobby on 
politicians and criticising climate sceptics with the lyrics including: 
“Feedback is like climate change on crack  
The permafrost subtracts: feedback  
Methane release wack: feedback.  
Write a letter then burn it: feedback  
Denialists deny this in your dreams  
Coz climate change means greater extremes,  
Shit won't be the norm  
Heat waves bigger badder storms  
The Greenhouse effect is just a theory sucker (Alan Jones)  
Yeah so is gravity float away muther f**cker”  (Hungry Beast, 2011). 
 
 The images used in the video along with the lyrics are designed to be 
entertaining yet informative. Despite this the video, in September, 2015, has only 
been viewed 232,209 times since it was uploaded in 2011, compared to ‘Lord of 
the Rings Re-enacted by Ponies’ which received over 6 million views (Figure 3.8). 
This shows a failure to achieve the key step of viral success (see Figure 3.5) even 
if the video had been virally successful it does not offer mutability or variety so 
would most likely have declined in viral sharing rapidly. The impact of the song 
on viewers is also difficult to attain with comments disabled, but has received a 
majority of up votes (positive feedback), which suggests climate sceptics have 
not engaged with it as personalisation of the Internet experience means that its 
unlikely to see climate consensus material  (See chapter 2). However, the video 
highlights a key barrier for climate change of being a complex subject when 
Chesterman (2011) suggests entertaining content is more likely to be successful.  
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Figure 3-9: Climate consensus video - I'm a climate scientist (HUNGRY 
BEAST)' 
 
Note: Screenshots taken from ‘I’m a climate scientist’ video by Hungry Beast 
(2011). Middle left image text says “Tim Leslie PhD Student – Climate Change 
Research Centre , UNSW” and Dr Jason Evans – Climate change Research 
Centre, UNSW”. The middle right image “Dr Leanne Armand – Climate Futures 
Research Centre – Macquarie University” and “Is like climate change on crack”. 
Bottom right image says “Dan Ilic – Alan Jones impersonator – Not a climate 
scientist”.  
These memes highlight the potential difficulty of communicating climate 
change via memes, which may provide difficulty to produce in great variety or be 
mutated with other types of memes to transmit climate change information. The 
success of MLP memes, and the failure of climate change memes, highlights that 
users generally engage in the transmission of memes for entertainment as well 
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the representation of their personal beliefs or values they identify with (Kien, 
2013, Sreekumar and Vadrevu, 2013). Attempts to communicate climate change 
with memes would require environmental networks to engage in the creative 
process of meme production and ability to be shared widely through social media 
as well as being able to successfully adapt popular memes to send an 
environmental message. Even then simply mutating and mimicking other 
successful viral content does not necessarily result in an environmental message 
reaching a wider audience.  
This suggests that memes are not necessarily an effective method of 
political critique, but the Internet has enabled the sharing of critique with culture 
jamming (see chapter 2) being used to potentially reach wider audiences 
(Cammaerts, 2007). There have been an example of successful environmental 
memes. One can be seen in the mimicking of video adverts with ‘A Cheesy Love 
Story’ that raises awareness of Doritos use of palm oil and their contribution to 
the destruction of the rainforest and consequently contributing to climate change 
(See Figure 3.10) (SumOfUs, 2015a). The video is humorous depicting the 
relationship of a couple from their first meeting to wedding and showing that they 
revolve their lives round Doritos (SumOfUs, 2015a) The video then hits the viewer 
with a twist ending when they honeymoon to the ‘Doritos forest’ and the video 
shifts tone to a shocking image of deforestation for palm oil plantations 
(SumOfUs, 2015a) This example achieved some viral success with over 2 million 
views. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of culture jamming as another way to 
engage people with political values and concept is argued by Cammaerts (2007) 
to have no real macro level impact with some evidence of minor impacts, but as 
a facet of other methods in a campaign. The example of culture jamming by the 
SumOfUs (2015a) may have been viewed 2 million times, but the direct impact 
upon users is questionable as it may simply be shared for entertainment between 
users rather than for the political message. Youtube comments potentially 
highlight little impact on some users (See Figure 3.11), but many cases could 
simply be attempting to annoy, intent is difficult to tell with comments. Another 
key issue that limits the impact of culture jamming, which is a similar factor with 
memes, is that anyone can create content. As a result, culture jamming is not 
limited to communicating criticism to counter hegemonic ideology with jamming 
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techniques being used by corporations in marketing and by governments in 
political campaigns (Cammaerts, 2007). 
Figure 3-10: A cheesy love story - the Ad Doritos don't want you to see 
 
Note: Screen shots taken from the video ‘A Cheesy Love Story’ by the SumOfUs 
(2015a). 
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Figure 3-11: Youtube comment example 
 
Note: Screenshot taken from comment section taken from the video ‘A Cheesy 
Love Story’ by the SumOfUs (2015a). 
Additional attempts at creating viral success that the SumOfUs (2015a) 
had with ‘A cheesy love story – the ad Doritos don’t want you to see’ has not been 
replicated in the following videos they have produced. While memes have the 
potential to spread political messages (See chapter 2) the creation of viral 
material is difficult. In attempting to increase public awareness of the harm to the 
Antarctic ecosystem caused by Krill oil health supplements there were two videos 
produced. The first video was an animated music video which only received 
23,602 views (SumofUs, 2015b). The second video instead mimicked Internet 
prank videos which was attempting to increase awareness that Sainsbury’s were 
selling Krill oil health supplements and create public pressure on the supermarket 
to stop them stocking the product (SumOfUs, 2015c). Prank videos are popular 
viral videos where people play pranks on others and film the reactions. For 
example, TheCHAIZYchannel (2015) prank video ‘Shampooing strangers prank’ 
has received over 4 million views. However, in using this popular style of viral 
video the SumOfUs (2015c) released a video called ‘Sainsbury’s, how does it 
feel’, which had people dressed in crab and Killer Whale costumes stealing food 
from people, only received 13,086 views. Either these are simply not gaining 
enough attention to go viral or the mutation of other popular memes to spread 
environmental messages is not well received.   
However, lessons can be learned from the Brony subculture that have 
mass-produced and shared viral MLP content online. Apart from having a 
committed online community it also meets the criteria of variety and mutability 
argued by Chesterman (2011) that is required by online viral content with high 
survivability in Internet culture. This behaviour is seen in ‘ponification’ of other 
popular memes and popular culture and could be potentially mimicked with the 
alteration of popular online memes to spread climate change awareness and 
information. An example of merging a climate change message with popular 
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culture can be seen with ‘Everything is NOT awesome’ video (See figure 3.12) 
by GreenpeaceVideo (2014) which used the song ‘Everything is awesome’ from 
the popular ‘The Lego Movie’ (Lord and Miller, 2014).  This was a successful viral 
video which received over 7 million views and drew attention to a campaign to 
pressure Lego to end a partnership with Shell, which itself was successful with 
Lego not renewing the contract with Shell. This was the most viral video in 
Greenpeace history (Greenpeace, 2014).  
Figure 3-12: Everything is not awesome video 
 
Note: Screenshots taken from GreenpeaceVideo (2014). 
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 Successful viral communication requires engagement with an audience 
online to share the content to a wider audience and without this engagement 
climate change (See Figure 3.5). This has also been shown with the difficulties 
SumofUs (n.d.) as an issue for wider environmental content which is going to 
struggle to reach an audience large enough to achieve viral success. Even if 
content manages to reach a wide enough audience to achieve a viral reach, such 
as the ‘Advert Doritos Don’t want you to See’ by SumOfUs (2015a), there is still 
the problem that the content will not survive long within Internet culture. This is 
due to viral content needing to have variety or mutability to survive in Internet 
culture (See Chesterman, 2011). This is why MLP memes have been so 
successful. In the case of the SumOfUs (2015a) there is the initial viral success, 
but declines relatively quickly as it’s a single video so lacks variety and is also not 
easily mutable.  
However, this highlights a barrier of the viral spread of climate change 
information. The speed of transmission and the frequent changing landscape of 
Internet culture has a consequence of the memes being shared are both short 
term and the information they share does not necessarily produce understanding 
of a concept or an issue (Chesterman, 2011, Kien, 2013). Instead users generally 
engage in the transmission of memes for entertainment and representation of 
their personal beliefs or values they identify with (Kien, 2013, Sreekumar and 
Vadrevu, 2013). The sharing of memes for entertainment can be seen in the 
success of MLP memes, which providing no practical communication purpose 
apart from entertainment. The sharing of viral content for entertainment can 
distract users from more significant issues in society such as climate change. 
Due to the sharing of memes for entertainment, there is the risk that memes which 
focus on societal issues are often intended to be read in an ironic or sarcastic 
way (Kien, 2013). Rather than challenge those who hold onto the values or belief 
that are intended to be confronted with the meme are instead argued by Kien 
(2013) to receive little to no impact as the message is taken at face value by those 
it is aimed at confronting. 
In addition to the serious barrier to climate change information not being 
seen due to the information competition with Internet There also significant 
challenges with climate change being a complex topic. This requires the public to 
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develop the necessary frames to adequately process this information with 
ideological barriers and appealing to emotions.  
A key problem with climate change communication when the public can 
easily opt out of coverage is the difficulty of developing the public’s frames for 
understanding climate science. The communication of climate change is argued 
by Lakoff (2010, p. 73) to struggle to effectively impact the public as the frames 
required are “… built up over a long period of time…” as it is a complex topic. This 
is why pre-existing ideological frames prove to be a significant barrier as they can 
result in the public rejecting climate change information. In addition these frames 
are triggered by emotions that the information is passed through. A potential issue 
with this is the public can reject climate science if a scandal takes place or is 
manufactured.  
Political scandals have been shown by Kepplinger et al. (2012) to have 
significant impacts on media audiences motivating a public response for harsh 
punishments on those who committed the act. This suggests that Climategate, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter, that was a manufactured scandal 
with the misrepresentation of climate scientists emails (See Nerlich, 2010). The 
reporting of this scandal by right wing blogs shaped the coverage before the story 
reached the mainstream media (Nerlich, 2010). This potentially means that the 
effects of Climategate was far stronger than just returning the climate sceptic 
discourse to UK newspapers (See Passmore, 2016). In particularly, the scandal 
potentially reinforced the ideological beliefs of those who already reject climate 
science.  
The second key barrier to communicating climate change is the difficulty 
overcoming ideological hurdles as facts can be dismissed based upon ideological 
belief (Lakoff, 2010). Effective communication of climate change is argued as 
important by Lakoff (2010) to develop the publics’ ability to adequately process 
information about climate change. However, this is not a simple process as the 
ideological frames are strengthened over time through the use of everyday 
language and require this language to be challenged or climate change to be 
communicated in a way to use these pre existing frames (Lakoff, 2010). While 
language activates frames Lakoff (2010, p. 73) argues that “words themselves 
are not frames”. This means that just repeating slogans to get the public the 
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language of climate science in the everyday language of the public is flawed as 
they require pre-existing frames to comprehend the topic (Lakoff, 2010).  
Ideological beliefs have been shown to influence how an individual views 
climate change and environmental issues. An example can be seen in research 
by McCright and Dunlap (2011) into the US public’s belief in climate change which 
has shown that individual’s ideological views shape whether they believe the 
scientific consensus or deny the existence of climate change. In the US this 
ideological split is between the two US political parties with the supporters of the 
Democrats being much more likely to support the scientific consensus while 
Republicans are more likely to deny climate change (Dunlap and McCright, 2008, 
McCright and Dunlap, 2011). This party split is evident in attitudes towards 
general environmental issues and the environmental movement in general with 
Democrats much more likely to support (Dunlap et al., 2001). This is due to the 
Republicans greater interest in protecting “… the industrial capitalistic system” 
rather than environmental considerations (McCright and Dunlap, 2011, p. 180). 
Due to the self-selection of the information caused by information overload means 
that Republican supporters will more likely engage with junk information and 
makes effective communication of climate change difficult.   
In addition, an appeal to emotions is also important. Emotions are argued 
by Roeser (2012) to be a significant factor in climate change communication to 
explain the gap between awareness of the seriousness of the issue and a lack of 
action to deal with it. For example creating public fear about the consequences 
of climate change is argued by Meijnders et al. (2001) to potentially get the public 
to focus and think about the issue critically. However, the use of fear has been 
criticised by O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) as an effective communication 
strategy of climate change. The use of fear has been shown to be highly effective 
in getting the public’s attention to focus on climate change but O'Neill and 
Nicholson-Cole (2009) argue that it instead acts as a barrier to producing public 
understanding and behaviour change. The reason for this barrier is the impact 
that coverage designed to cause a fear response may cause the public to feel “… 
helpless and overwhelmed…” and even potentially result in them taking a position 
of denial (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 375).  
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Fear alone does not create public behaviour change and has been shown 
by Semenza et al. (2008) to be a key barrier as the public view their own 
behaviour as insignificant and a hopeless attempt to mitigate their own emissions. 
Instead the public need to have a message of hope that climate change is a 
serious challenge but one that can be overcome (Roeser, 2012, p. 1038). In 
addition to the message of hope O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) argues that 
the public need to be engaged with climate change in a broader connection to 
their everyday lives. This would potentially overcome one of the key barriers to 
effective climate change communication as its simply seen as an international 
issue (Gavin, 2009, Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui, 2009).  
 
3.4: Summary  
In summary, the debate surrounding understanding of science and 
scientific literacy is a contested area of study, but there is a general consensus 
that scientific literacy in the general public is low. In my research the approach to 
understanding that I am taking is scientific literacy rather than presuming in-depth 
understanding of science is required for the public to effectively engage with 
technological and scientific issues. However, the approaches to measuring 
scientific literacy are varied. The approach of using basic understanding provides 
an interesting insight in previous knowledge held by participants, but this cannot 
be generalised to effectively scientific literacy.  
Instead, I will be focusing upon the ability to understand the scientific 
process. The ability to understand the scientific process empowers the public to 
effectively engage with scientists and scientific studies about issues that directly 
affect them. Understanding of the scientific process has been shown to be low in 
the US public, but this is also expected in the UK as science education has 
focused on biology, chemistry, and physics rather than focus on how science is 
carried out and why. Despite the issues with scientific literacy including the 
problem that due to these range of aspects you cannot label someone 
scientifically literate compared to literacy and numeracy tests. Instead they 
provide an interesting insight into the understanding of differing areas of science. 
Therefore, this research is using the approach of scientific literacy as the control 
variables for the experimental approach (see chapter 4).     
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However, the poor state of scientific literacy poses a problem for climate 
change communication. The vast majority of the UK population is aware of 
climate change but there is also very poor understanding. Climate change does 
have many challenges in developing understanding. In particular, the public feel 
disconnected to the issue and at the same time the issue is also highly 
complicated with the public getting confused over the causes.  
While the Internet offers new opportunities to communicate climate 
change with viral communication there is competition with a large array of topics 
and distractions from serious issues. The fast-paced communication the Internet 
offers means that virally shared material is often for entertainment and be easily 
mutable which is why MLP memes have proven to be so successful. Even if 
information is received it can fail to have an impact on support for action if it 
rejected on ideological grounds or makes the public feel helpless, such as a 
message of fear may cause disconnection from future climate change 
communication.    
Overall, there are issues with climate change communication with the 
public having a poor scientific literacy with significant misunderstandings of 
climate science. The communication of climate change has been problematic in 
the past as framing can undermine the message of the climate consensus, but 
also there is risk that the public will not engage with climate change information. 
Instead information overload means that the public are likely to filter out climate 
change information and instead are more likely to get distracted content shared 
for entertainment. The following chapter will examine the methodology used to 
explore engagement with climate science online and examine the impact of 
climate change information on young people’s understanding of climate change.  
The literature reviews have informed this research design (See figure 
3.13). Information overload (see chapter 2) and information processing are 
explored in the focus groups to better design the information overload treatment 
of the experiments. The literature on climate change reactions is used to create 
the dependent and control variables of the experiment, and frame the discussion 
in chapter 7.  
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Figure 3-13: Research design 
 
 The literature review on the information has been key to defining the 
independent variables used in this experimental design. While this chapter has 
been key in the defining of the dependent variables and the control variables for 
the experimental design (See chapter 4). Overall, by bridging these two bodies 
of literature I can explore how the Internet has effected young people’s reactions 
to climate change.   
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
 
This research seeks to examine the impact of Internet use on young 
peoples’ engagement with climate change and their understanding, perception of 
risk, and support for mitigation. I have carried out this research using a mixed 
methodological approach. Firstly, I use the qualitative approach of focus groups 
to explore how young people use the Internet and their lack of engagement with 
climate change information online. The focus groups examine the sharing of 
climate change information and how that relates to information overload and junk 
information. Secondly, I use a quantitative experimental design to critically 
examine the causal relationship between differing types of Internet media stimuli 
on the participants reactions to climate change. The experimental design critically 
examines the impact of information overload and junk information upon 
participants’ reactions to climate science. This research design has been 
developed using the information society analytical framework (see chapter 2) with 
questions. 
This approach of mixed methods may appear that the research ontology 
and epistemology are in conflict. My research uses a constructivist ontology with 
focus groups being used to explore how young people view the Internet and 
whether they engage with climate change online, while using experiments to 
examine causation of differing information treatments which is a post-positive 
epistemology approach (See Crotty, 1998).  Through the use of the information 
society there is an analytical framework that this research is seeking to examine 
with subsidiary themes for the focus group being deduced through the research 
findings. This provides greater context and also allows for the production of a 
strong ecologically valid experimental design (de Vaus, 2001). The causal focus 
of the experiments is a post-positive approach, as it seeks to understand the 
consequences of different climate change environments on young people (See 
de Vaus, 2001). However, these are not in conflict. This pragmatic approach 
allows for an in depth exploration of the consequences of the information society 
on young people with a qualitative approach building a wider understanding of 
the context and daily impact of the Internet while the quantitative approach allows 
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for examination of direct consequences of information overload and junk 
information.  
This chapter is structured in three parts. Firstly, this section begins by 
briefly introducing the methods this research is using, along with why other 
approaches have been rejected, and the decision to use a mixed methodological 
approach. This is followed by a second section, which explains the rationale for 
the use of focus groups to explore how young people engage with and share 
climate change information, as well as the sampling approach used, and how the 
focus groups were conducted. Finally, this chapter justifies the selection of the 
experimental methodological approach while also explaining the research design 
used for the experiments. This section will also include how these experiments 
have been conducted and the sampling methodology employed.  
 
4.1: Mixed methodological approach 
The mixed methodological design enables a wider research scope (See 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2) and a more complete examination than simply using either 
a qualitative or quantitative method (Read and Marsh, 2002, Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009, p. 7). The use of a qualitative methodological approach allows 
for the collection of rich data and enables an in-depth view on how participants 
view a topic within their social constructs (Bryman and Teevan, 2005, Have, 
2004, Marvasti, 2004, Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009). There are two possible 
interpretations of information overload. It could refer to two potential 
consequences with Shenk (1997)  arguing that increased information increases 
stress and creates confusion, so potentially there is too much climate change 
information available, or the increased amount of information results in users 
becoming selective (See chapter 3) and filtering the topics and information they 
wish to receive (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011). The focus groups made it 
possible to select the most ecologically valid interpretation. The reveals that the 
latter with information competition resulting in selective behaviour (See chapter 
5). The quantitative methodological approach of experiments have been selected 
as it has the benefit of being able to draw a causal link between exposure to 
climate change Internet media stimuli and reactions to climate science (See 
Bryman and Teevan, 2005, Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009). To reduce the risk 
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of potential ethical issues in the use of both methods there was informed consent 
(See appendix A and B) with the right to leave the study at any point of the 
participant’s choosing (de Vaus, 2001, Moses and Knutsen, 2012). The use of 
focus groups compliments the research conducted through the experimental 
method, as the qualitative research builds context.  This qualitative approach, of 
focus groups informed the research design of the experimental methodological 
approach in particular by allowing for the exploration of the rapidly increasing 
media stimuli (information overload) on Internet users and how this has impacted 
engagement with climate change (Schumann, 2004, p. 241). This information will 
enable the experimental design to be more valid since it more accurately mimics 
information overload (see chapter 2) that the participants experience using the 
Internet. Through this research design I seek to answer the two key research 
questions (See chapter 1) and in particular, I have used these methods to answer 
the following subsidiary research questions (see Table 4.1): 
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Table 4-1: Subsidiary research questions explored by which method 
Research Questions [RQ] Subsidiary 
research 
questions [SRQ]  
Question Method 
RQ1: How do Internet users 
engage with climate science and 
policy debates surrounding 
anthropogenic climate change?  
 
 
SRQ1 Context: How do Internet users perceive their engagement with the 
Internet and connectivity?  
Focus groups 
SRQ2 Context: Do users receive and engage with information about 
climate change through their Internet and social media usage?  
Focus groups 
SRQ3 Sharing: How do Internet users share information with others? Focus groups 
RQ2: To what extent does online 
communication of climate change 
impact young peoples’ 
understanding, perception of risk, 
and support for mitigation of climate 
change? 
SRQ4 Information overload: Does the competition for the user’s attention 
reduce the impact of climate change information on understanding 
climate science, perception of risk, and support for climate action? 
Experiments 
SRQ5 Junk information: To what extent does information on climate 
change that contradicts the scientific consensus undermine public 
understanding of climate science or reduce perception of risk and 
support for action? 
Experiments 
SRQ6 Information overload and junk Information: Does information that 
contradicts the scientific consensus have less of an impact on 
understanding, perception of risk, and support for action when there 
is competition for young people’s attention?   
Experiments 
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16
                                            
16 See also Table 4.4 for more information on hypotheses. 
Context: How do Internet users 
perceive their engagement with 
the Internet and connectivity?  
 
Sharing: How do Internet users 
share information with others? 
Junk information: H1. Contradictory information 
from the scientific consensus reduces young 
people’s understanding of climate science. 
 
Information Overload: H3. Even with competition 
from differing topics in an information 
competitive environment the impact of climate 
change information on young peoples’ 
understanding of climate science will improve. 
Focus groups 
Experimental design 
Junk information and Information 
overload: H5. This effect is 
reduced when presented 
alongside other topics competing 
for the young people’s attention. 
 
Context: Do users receive and 
engage with information about 
climate change through their Internet 
and social media usage? 
Junk information: H2. Climate sceptic material 
reduces young people’s perception of risk that 
climate change poses to society and 
undermines their support for climate mitigation. 
Information Overload H4. Despite the 
increased amount of information the 
perception of risk that climate change poses to 
society and support for climate mitigation will 
improve.    
 
Junk information and Information overload: 
H6, Junk information in an information 
competition environment does not reduce 
young people’s perception of risk from 
climate change and does not undermine 
their support for climate mitigation. 
Figure 4-1: Methods address the following questions/hypotheses  
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Experimental Treatment 3: 
Information overload with 
climate sceptic material 
Focus groups 
Information society literature 
review 
Information processing and 
media effects literature review 
Figure 4-2: The literature review and focus groups have been used to develop the experimental 
treatments 
Experimental Treatment 1: 
Climate sceptic information 
Experimental Treatment 2: 
Information overload with 
climate consensus material 
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4.1.1: Ethical considerations 
This mixed methods approach to my research had a series of ethical 
considerations. The participants were informed that they could withdraw from the 
study and given key information so they could give informed consent (See 
Appendix A and B). The focus groups transcription I made sure to remove any 
information that could establish the identity of the participants. This makes sure 
no harm or consequences for taking part in the focus groups as individuals cannot 
be identified (Bryman and Teevan, 2005). However, I had to be careful with the 
amount of information given to participants in the experiments, as there had to 
be clear information so participants could give informed consent but not enough 
to undermine the data collection. The consent form for the experiments (See 
appendix B) were clear about the procedure, but did not mention it was interested 
in climate change, as those in the information overload treatments would likely 
ignore the other environmental news stories and focus on the climate change 
ones. Also as the experiments were measuring scientific literacy there was no 
collection of personal demographic information to make sure the data remained 
completely anonymous. 
   
4.2: Focus Groups  
The focus groups seek to gather contextual data on engagement with and 
sharing of information about climate science through the use of two phases of 
focus groups. This approach has been chosen due to key advantages compared 
to both quantitative and other qualitative approaches. For example, the main 
advantage that a focus group approach has over face to face interviewing is the 
challenge of exploring the use of the Internet, which has become normalised in 
the participants’ lives, but has a wide range of potential uses for engaging with 
information and entertainment (See chapter 1). A group discussion exploring their 
usage of the Internet and the interactions between themselves produces deeper 
understanding as they can question each other and build upon ideas mentioned 
by other participants (Bryman and Teevan, 2005). The qualitative approach of 
focus groups allows for the gathering of deeper understanding and context on 
how participants engage with climate change information and how they perceive 
the significance of the Internet in their lives. The group interaction aspect is 
argued by Bryman and Teevan (2005, p. 195) to have the benefit that participants 
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will question each other and produce “… more realistic accounts of what people 
think…” through discussion.  
There is the potential risk with focus groups that quiet participants could 
have limited participation if there are louder members in the group which can take 
a greater amount of time (Bryman and Teevan, 2005, Bell, 2010). This requires 
the facilitator to keep the group well moderated to make sure all participants are 
able to contribute and to prevent the participants going off topic (Bryman and 
Teevan, 2005). The approach of focus groups does have the potential that the 
group can put pressure on participants to conform and can reduce the amount 
participants will disagree with each other or have an open discussion on socially 
unacceptable topics which would not be an issue in one to one interviews 
(Bryman and Teevan, 2005).  
A key criticism of focus groups and more widely of qualitative research 
approaches is a lack of representativeness due to the small sample sizes (Reed 
and Payton, 1997, p. 766). Rather than produce representative data that can be 
generalised, the focus groups instead provide in-depth contextual information 
with interactions between members offering insights about the topic of interest 
that one would not be able to get through one to one interviews or quantitative 
approaches (Reed and Payton, 1997). For example, surveys can be used to 
collect representative data. However, the data on Internet use they gather is 
shallow with surveys, such as the British Household Panel Survey (n.d.-b, p. 19), 
which ask Internet related questions: 
“Does your household have access to the internet from home?”  
While survey questions of this nature provide information on household 
access to the Internet, they do not provide an insight on how the Internet is being 
used. The contextual information from focus groups is also greatly beneficial for 
reducing the inherent bias from my own experience of Internet and social media 
without the contextual evidence from interviews, my own Internet use might have 
undermined the internal validity of the experimental design. An important aspect 
of the Internet experience is personalisation (see chapter 3). Facebook is unclear 
how exactly it selects what to show its users and Google personalises search 
results based on browsing history (See Grant, 2009, Lee and Cranage, 2011, 
Sullivan, 2009).  
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 The focus groups were carried out using a semi-structured approach, as 
there is a risk that allowing open discussion would result in a large amount of 
information not being on topic with important aspects not being covered (Bryman 
and Teevan, 2005). At the same time, enough structure is required to maintain 
understanding of the questions being asked, but without intervention undermining 
the flow of discussions. Therefore, a semi-structured approach was used with the 
facilitator only interrupting discussion to move on to the next question, to pick up 
on points of interest that may not have been picked up on by other participants, 
and to refocus discussion when the participants go off topic (Bryman and Teevan, 
2005).  
Participants were selected by convenience sampling. Convenience 
sampling is the selection of participants who are accessible, but in this case 
selection of participants is also based upon purpose as well as convenience as 
the research design is interested in young peoples’ use of the Internet (Marshall, 
1996). Five focus groups took place, with a mixture of undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from a range of courses (See Table 4.2). These were 
conducted in two stages, with the first stage groups used to develop the second 
stage groups (See Appendix C and Appendix D). There was no significant climate 
related events or coverage in between the two stages of focus groups with no 
major climate change events causing a spike in media coverage found using a 
Lexis Nexis search. All focus groups have been used in the analysis. The first 
two focus groups were run with large groups that provided some key insights and 
were used to help refine the questions for the final three focus groups. Therefore, 
the participants that were recruited for the first two focus groups were politics 
undergraduates as they are accessible and meet the theoretical interests of the 
study with their use of the Internet being among frequent Internet users (as 
discussed in chapter 2). The other three focus groups were conducted with 
smaller groups of young people from a diverse range of university courses. 
Overall, five focus groups were run with a total of 37 participants. 
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Table 4-2: Focus group participants 
Focus 
group 
Stage Date  Number of 
participants 
Courses the students 
were studying 
FG1 Stage 
one 
March, 2015 11 Politics  
FG2 Stage 
one 
March, 2015 12 Politics  
FG3 Stage 
two 
April. 2015 6 Politics, music, film 
studies, and biology 
FG4 Stage 
two 
April, 2015 4 Politics 
FG5 Stage 
two 
April, 2015 4 History and biology  
 
The stage two focus groups that followed were also recruited through 
convenience sampling and snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is common in 
qualitative research as it allows for participants to be found within the scope of 
the researcher’s interests (Devine, 2002, p. 205). The use of the snowball 
sampling method meant that the participants selected were still students, but 
allowed for a wider sample of the young Internet users targeted for this research. 
While the limited sample means that results cannot be generalised to a wider 
portion of society, the use of students in the focus groups provides a valuable 
insight into young people’s engagement with climate change information and 
helps provide a more accurate representation of the Internet in the experimental 
designs.   
The focus groups were conducted in an appropriate room for the number 
of participants and also a quiet environment for recording the sessions. The 
recording of the focus groups has been completed through the use of two 
Dictaphones. The use of two Dictaphones meant there was no need to take notes 
of what the participants said during the focus groups. Note taking is argued by 
Bryman and Teevan (2005) to be too disruptive. During the start of each of the 
focus groups there is a brief introduction to the research and a consent form is 
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handed out to each participant and completed by every participant. The focus 
groups included prompts to help focus the discussion.  
 
4.2.1: Transcription and analysis 
 The focus groups were transcribed using the following transcription 
conventions: 
I – Interviewer  
P- Participants are numbered in the transcription.  
AP – all or majority of participants  
? - Unclear who the speaker is 
?? - Unclear who the speaker is but most likely a different speaker from 
the previous unknown line above.  
// - Indicates overlap from previous speaker.  
** indicates noises such as general murmuring of agreement or laughter** 
[Removed] - used to remove personal details that could compromises 
anonymity of a participant or participants 
The transcription conventions are important as they standardise the style 
and the level of detail in all focus group transcriptions (Hennink, 2010). This 
research is not particularly interested in a detailed content analysis on how the 
information is communicated by the participants, which means that there is not a 
high level of detail in the transcriptions. I omitted pauses and fillers, like ‘ums’ 
from the transcript (Eros, 2014). Overlap and general group reactions have been 
recorded. These transcriptions were then coded into key themes of both how the 
Internet is used and engagement with climate change. The four theoretical 
themes of interest, are also split into subsidiary themes that the focus group 
transcripts have been coded into (See chapter 5). The subsidiary themes were 
formed inductively while the main themes reflect the context of the Internet on the 
lives of the participants and the other three are from the information society 
framework used in this analysis.  
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4.3: The experimental method  
The experimental method has been selected for this study as it is an ideal 
methodology for examining causation as it is designed to focus on an 
independent variable upon a dependant outcome while the other variables are 
removed (de Vaus, 2001, Stoker and John, 2009, Stoker, 2010, Moses and 
Knutsen, 2012). A key aspect that this research seeks to examine is the 
consequences of information overload and also critically examining the impact of 
junk information upon participants’ reaction to climate change. To establish 
causation the basic experimental design uses a control group and a test group 
influenced by the independent variable allowing for the two groups to be 
compared (Lijphart, 1971, Moses and Knutsen, 2012, de Vaus, 2001). There has 
been a growing popularity of this methodology. In particular, economic research 
has embraced the experimental method to examine behaviour to test economic 
theories (Smith, 1994).  
This method is central to the hard sciences, such as biology, but is a more 
recent development in social science research (McDermott, 2002, Stoker, 2010). 
Lijphart (1971, p. 683) states that: 
“The experimental method, in its simplest form, uses two equivalent 
groups, one of which (the experimental group) is exposed to a stimulus 
while the other (the control group) is not. The two groups are then 
compared, and any difference can be attributed to the stimulus.”  
Through the control of other factors (e.g. scientific literacy) we can 
determine whether the stimulus is the causal factor (de Vaus, 2001). This makes 
the experimental method particularly good for testing theories in practice which 
has been used in behavioural economic research (Smith, 1994). It is necessary 
to carefully design the experiment to have strong internal validity (Loewenstein, 
1999). Strong internal validity is important to maintain as the interest is in the 
impact of the stimulus given to the treatment groups and this cannot be presumed 
if the researcher does not factor in potential external events or even a failure to 
randomly assign participants to treatment groups (Loewenstein, 1999). 
Presuming the internal validity is strong then the experimental method is excellent 
at establishing causal links between variables and enables statistical analysis of 
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the results that can be compared to examine the impact of a stimuli (Bryman and 
Teevan, 2005, de Vaus, 2001). The experiment used a controlled environment 
with computers unable to access the Internet so the participants could only 
engage with the media stimuli provided.   
The experimental method is not often used in social science for practical 
and ethical reasons (de Vaus, 2001, Moses and Knutsen, 2012). Firstly, the 
experimental method has practical limitations in certain types of social science 
research as social scientists do not have access to influence government policies 
or institutions to examine large variables such as economic development (Green 
and Gerber, 2003, Stoker, 2010). Instead the experimental method requires a 
reductionist approach that seeks to reduce the area of interest to a certain 
variable of interest (de Vaus, 2001). Through this reductionist approach there can 
be examination of a variable while the control allows for direct causal inference, 
as long as the experiment has been carried out correctly to prevent loss of internal 
validity (Loewenstein, 1999). However, a consequence of this reductionist 
approach is the issue that external validity is lost as the setting of the experiment 
is artificial so the ability to generalise the findings can be questionable (de Vaus, 
2001). This is why focus groups were conducted to make the media stimuli more 
realistic as it better reflected competition with other topics.  
The artificial reality of the laboratory experiment has a key advantage, 
which means that there is greater internal validity, as there is the removal of 
external variables that could alter the impact of the treatment on participants 
(Bryman and Teevan, 2005, p. 31). The laboratory experiment gives control over 
the allocation of participants and the strength of the experimental method is 
random allocation of participants to treatment and control groups (de Vaus, 2001, 
p. 70). Random allocation of participants has the benefit of making “… the groups 
comparable in all respects with regard to the experimental variable” (de Vaus, 
2001, p. 70). The groups need to be carefully run and requires careful 
measurement of the variables of interest to maintain both the internal and 
external validity of the experiment (McDermott, 2011, p. 35). Secondly, there are 
ethical issues with potential harm to participants and with “… intervening in the 
running of political democratic processes and institutions for the purposes of 
experimentation…” (Stoker, 2010, p. 303, see also de Vaus, 2001, Moses and 
Knutsen, 2012). Harm can be reduced with the experimenter making sure all data 
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is anonymised and that the participants are never lied to or feel deceived. The 
experiment participants were informed of anonymous data collection and gave 
informed consent (see Appendix B). 
However, the experimental method has allowed for the collection of 
empirical data from the treatment groups with results that can establish a causal 
link to the impact of a media treatment on participants’ reactions to climate 
change information, which can be generalized over a larger population (de Vaus, 
2001). Therefore, the focus of this research is not limited by the practical 
limitations. This is also not limited by ethical issues as this research uses 
informed consent and does not seek to mislead participants. There is one 
potential issue with informed consent forms. Disclosing too much information on 
what the goals of the experiment are to the participants in a study of behaviour 
can risk the participants conforming to expectations and resulting in the study 
being invalid (de Vaus, 2001). To avoid the potential of participants conforming 
and undermining the validity, this research gives the minimum necessary 
information to participants on the consent forms at the beginning of the 
experiment for informed consent (de Vaus, 2001). The participants had the 
opportunity to opt into receiving a debrief of the research findings (de Vaus, 
2001).  
Participants were university students from a range of undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses from a variety of university campuses (the University of 
Exeter and the University of Southampton). They were carefully vetted to be aged 
18 to 25. The use of students is common in politics experiments with papers 
published “… from 1990 through 2006, one fourth of experimental articles in 
general political science journals relied on student subjects, whereas more than 
seventy percent did so in more specialized journals” (Druckman and Kam, 2011, 
p. 42). An example of an experiment exploring the impact of the media on the 
perception of the certainty of climate science was carried out by Corbett and 
Durfee (2004) with a 209  students. They were split into three treatment groups 
with 54 receiving climate change information, 51 receiving controversial material, 
and another 51 receiving both controversial and consensus with 53 in the control 
(Corbett and Durfee, 2004, p. 139).They found that controversy focused media 
articles resulted in a decline of the participants’ certainty of climate science, but 
the researchers highlight that the use of students means they are reluctant to 
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generalise the results to a wider population (Corbett and Durfee, 2004, p. 142). 
The use of students as participants is highlighted by McDermott (2011, p. 36) to 
be seen as a risk to external validity of the experiment as a result of the narrow 
sample population, in particular the use of students could undermine 
generalisation of results.  
Despite the reluctance by Corbett and Durfee (2004)  to generalise their 
results due to the use of students, it is important to note that the use of students 
has been defended in political research. For example, Druckman and Kam (2011, 
p. 51) argue that student and non-student populations do not significantly differ:  
“… when it comes to partisanship (we find this for partisan direction and 
intensity), ideology, importance of religion, belief in limited government, 
views about homosexuality as a way of life, contributions of immigrants to 
society, social trust, degree of following and discussing politics, and overall 
media use.” 
Due to the similarity of students and non-students, there is a limited impact 
that students have on external validity. The similarities particularly in media use 
and political engagement mean that students are viable for examining the casual 
impact of media exposure on their perceptions of climate change. University 
students are also meet also in the target study group of young people.  
The decision to study young people is due to previous research that 
suggests that technological advancements and electronic communication have 
become normalised in the lives of young people (Eynon and Malmberg, 2011). 
The spread of technology can be seen in the adoption of social media with the 
average age shifting “… from 33 in 2008 to 38 in 2010” as a wider range of society 
adopt the technology (Hampton et al., 2011a, p. 3). Therefore, the impact that 
information overload and junk information has on the understanding of climate 
change science upon Internet users can be generalised to a wider portion of 
society as information technology is more widely normalised and adopted by a 
wider user base.  
The sampling is a convenience approach as undergraduate students are 
within the theoretical interests of this study and they are accessible. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups or the control group. 
These experiments had 183 participants in total that were split between three 
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treatment groups and the control (See Table 4.3). The participants were randomly 
assigned to either one of the treatment groups or the control group. Additional 
participants for the control were collected using an online survey due to difficulties 
in recruiting an adequate sample size. So as to not violate the assumption of 
random selection the control and treatment groups were then weighted using 
propensity scoring17 to ensure matching between samples. 
Table 4-3: Number of participants 
Group  Number of participants 
Control 81 
Junk information 33 
Information overload 34 
Information overload and junk information 35 
Total 183 
 
These were collected over a series of sessions due to difficulties recruiting 
participant numbers with Two data collection sessions on Penryn campus on the 
27th January and the 16th March 2016, Streatham campus on the 26th February, 
and the final experiments were run on the 5th May at the University of 
Southampton. An additional online survey was run shortly following the 
Southampton data to increase control data. Initially the media stimuli were 
selected from within the week previously from the first data collection on Penryn 
campus, but due to the lack of participants the same media stimuli was used for 
all experiments with no major spike in climate change coverage between January 
2016, and May, 2016.   
The experiment was run with three treatments and a control. Each of the 
treatment samples were randomly given one of the three media stimuli. If they 
were in a treatment group they either received climate sceptic information, 
climate consensus with competition for user attention, and junk information with 
competition for user attention. The control received no media stimuli. The design 
of this experiment meant that sharing could not be examined as to keep strong 
                                            
17 Propensity scoring is discussed in a later section on the analysis of the 
experimental results. 
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internal validity the experiments were run in a controlled self-contained 
environment. They could have shared in what was in the self-contained 
environment among each other, if a different design approach was taken, but that 
would not have captured how people share in real life as the focus groups 
illustrated that they share infotainment not climate change information. There was 
additional control data collected using an online survey. The control group allows 
for comparison of the impact of the media stimuli upon public understanding and 
perceptions of climate change.  
The media stimulus consists of a range of online newspaper articles and 
blog posts selected based upon treatment type. Identifying information for each 
media stimulus was removed so the source and type (blog or newspaper article) 
was not given to participants so they could only judge based on content rather 
than where the source originated from. The experiment was computerised using 
Excel and self-administered by the participants’ in a controlled environment with 
the exception of the additional survey data collected for the control (See Figure 
4.3). The participants had a controlled environment in Excel with the use of 
macros saving the data, moving them on to the next section, and they could not 
freely move around the Excel document18. The participants started at the 
welcome screen and when they pressed the ‘start’ button they were moved to the 
excel sheet with the scientific literacy questions. These scientific literacy 
questions were used for control variables. Following the completion of the 
scientific literacy questions, the excel document would move them on to the next 
section depending which version of excel document they were started on 
(randomly put in either a treatment or the control). Those in a treatment group 
were then moved onto the screen with PDF versions of articles hyperlinked to the 
work book. Those who were in the control were taken straight to the climate 
change questions and after 10 to 20 minutes those in the treatment groups moved 
onto them. These questions were asked after the media stimuli due to the interest 
in exploring information overload. If participants were presented with climate 
change questions then shown climate change information in competition with 
other environmental issues it would have changed how the participants engaged 
                                            
18 The use of macros in Excel and the screens seen by the participants are 
detailed later in this chapter  
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with the information as the purpose of the study is made clear to them. After 
completing the climate change questions, all participants were moved onto the 
final questions with the participant survey and once that was finished a thank you 
message (the Excel Workbook then saved and closed itself).       
Figure 4-3: Computerised experimental design 
 
 
 Excel has been chosen for this experiment to produce the controlled 
environment requirement. I organised a shared IT account that had no Internet 
access so the data collection for the treatment groups would not require Internet 
access. Excel was also on all the computers available without having to organise 
specialist software to be installed on each of the computers used. Additionally I 
could control what the participants saw with settings within Excel. For example, 
the use of Macros to hide sheets and move the participants between Excel sheets 
meant that participants could not freely move around the Excel Workbook (See 
Figure 4.4). These macros enabled me to check that all questions were answered 
by participants and automatically saved the Excel Workbook between the sets of 
questions to make sure there was no risk of losing data from computer or software 
Welcome screen 
Participant 
survey and thank 
you message 
Junk 
information 
Information 
overload 
Information overload 
with junk information 
Scientific literacy 
questions 
  
Climate science 
questions 
No 
media 
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crashes (See Figure 4.5). The ‘thank you for participating’ sheet included a macro 
that saved and closed the Excel Workbook (See Figure 4.6). As well as the 
control of the participants’ experience in the experiment, the use of Excel allowed 
for the collection of both multiple choice and open survey questions. It also 
enabled participants to engage with offline media stimuli (that mimicked online 
media), which was stored as PDFs and accessed through hyperlinked images 
(See Figure 4.7).       
Figure 4-4: Welcome screen start button macro 
 
Note: This macro simply moves the participant from the welcome screen to the 
scientific literacy questions while hiding the welcome screen sheet from the 
participants’ view.  
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Figure 4-5: Macro for the scientific literacy questions continue button 
 
Note: This macro checked that all the scientific literacy questions had been 
answered by the participants. If questions had not been answered it would bring 
up an error message and if they had it would move them onto the next sheet, in 
this case the sheet with climate change questions as this was the control group.  
Figure 4-6: ' Thank you for participating' sheet exit macro 
 
Note: This macro simply saves, resets the view to the welcome screen for the 
next time the workbook is opened, and closes the workbook.  
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Figure 4-7: Media stimuli from junk information treatment group 
 
Each image is hyperlinked to the PDF article and participants could click through 
to each. The design was meant to mimic the appearance of social media displays. 
The order of the articles was randomised for each participant.    
At the beginning of the experiment all participants saw a welcoming screen 
(See Figure 4.8). Participants were then taken to the first set of questions that 
measured their scientific literacy (See Figure 4.9). The measuring of scientific 
literacy is important to gauge the level of science understanding the participants 
have. Allocation to the treatment group is random, but if a group has a high 
amount of individuals who are scientifically literate then they could potentially 
skew results as they may simply ignore climate change information that 
contradicts the scientific consensus. There were some participants in the control 
not randomly selected. With the need to increase the sample size. They 
answered the computerised survey matching the treatment groups to the 
additional research participants meant that these did not skew the results.   
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Figure 4-8: Experiment welcome screen 
 
Note: This welcome screen meant that all participants began the experiment at 
the same time.  
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Figure 4-9: Scientific literacy questions 
 
Note: Questions 1 to 12 and question 15 are all multiple choice that participants could select from a drop down menu while 
questions 14 and 16 were open questions. The coding for these can be found in Appendix F. The open questions were coded 
as 1 if the participant showed clear understanding with correct use of terminology or a general sense where they correctly 
described, for example the experimental method, but did not use the correct terminology. If not the open question would be 
scored as 0.  
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4.3.1: Control variables 
The measurement of scientific literacy is debated by academics. For 
example, factual knowledge is viewed as important by Durant et al. (1989) in 
measuring scientific literacy while in contrast Ryder (2001) argues the 
understanding of the scientific method is more important for efficient public 
engagement (See chapter 3). The scientific literacy questions provide control 
variables in my models. They include tests of basic knowledge of both biology 
and physical sciences, and the participants understanding of probability, the 
experimental method, and whether they knew what it means to study something 
scientifically. It also tests to see if they can reject pseudoscience. The participants 
are given scores on the number of correct answers (See Appendix F).  
 The concept of scientific literacy (see chapter 3) is an adaption of the basic 
concept of literacy, the ability to read and write, to be applied to the ability to read 
and understand science reporting (Miller, 1998). However, to compare scientific 
literacy to the basic concept of literacy is a simplistic and broad approach as “… 
scientific literacy might include everything from reading the label on a package of 
food, to repairing an automobile, to reading about the newest images from the 
Hubble telescope” (Miller, 1998, p. 204). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2003) argue “… that people cannot be classified as 
either scientifically literate or not literate” (National Science Board, 2014, p. 7-20). 
Therefore, key aspects of this concept have been operationalised into control 
variables for the experiment, as these provide a key insight into scientific 
knowledge of the participants’ that could influence the results of the experimental 
treatments. 
 These scientific literacy control variables measured three key factors of 
scientific literacy. The first key factor is basic knowledge of science that includes 
both biological and physical sciences. The approach of measuring the basic 
knowledge of scientific concepts has been one of the key aspects of measuring 
scientific literacy. Basic knowledge of science is measured through a short series 
of mostly true and false questions. These questions have been used in the US 
survey by the National Science Board (2014, p. 7-22) which included questions 
on both the physical sciences, such as “All radioactivity is man-made”, and 
biological sciences “Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria”. Through the use 
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of a limited number of these questions it has enabled the measurement of basic 
knowledge of both the physical and biological sciences.  
This approach of basic knowledge included in scientific literacy tests is 
argued by Bauer (2009, p. 223) to be a fundamental problem. This problem is 
argued by Ryder (2001, p. 36) that it does not measure scientific literacy as public 
critical engagement with science requires understanding of scientific 
methodology rather than basic ‘textbook’ scientific knowledge. There are 
limitations with the measuring of basic knowledge, as it does not inherently give 
a picture of whether they understand science, but instead shows only if they have 
basic ‘textbook’ knowledge. The limited nature of these questions means that 
National Science Board (2014, p. 7-22) highlight that while the questions are “… 
keyed to knowledge taught in schools, generalisations about Americans’ 
knowledge of science should be made cautiously”. Despite limitations, these 
questions have been incorporated into my scientific literacy test because they 
offer an insight into the participants’ pre-existing basic knowledge of science. 
Overall, the inclusion of basic scientific knowledge is included in my scientific 
literacy tests due to such questions offering an interesting insight of pre-
established knowledge of the participants. However, individual questions are not 
particularly helpful. Instead grouping them into biological and physical science 
indexes gives an idea of the participants’ pre-existing basic knowledge in each 
field (See National Science Board, 2014) 
 The second key factor used in measuring scientific literacy examines the 
participants’ understanding of scientific processes. Measuring the understanding 
of scientific processes focuses upon questions that give a control variables giving 
the treatments scores for the understanding of probability, understanding the 
experimental method, and if they know what it means to study something 
scientifically. Understanding of probability is significant to measuring scientific 
literacy as probability is presented to the public in science reporting (Miller, 2004, 
p. 278). Another key aspect to understanding science reporting in the media is 
the concept of experiments, which is often used to frame scientific research to 
the public with the presumption that the public understand the nature of 
experiments (Miller, 2004, p. 277). Alongside these key concepts to 
understanding the scientific method there is also the additional examination of 
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whether there is understanding of what it means to do a scientific study (Miller, 
2004, p. 275). 
The understanding of probability is important for the public to understand 
as Miller (2004, p. 278) argues that “probability underlies all inferential statistics, 
and the results of a wide array of scientific research presented to the public… in 
terms of statistical reliability of the results”. The surveys conducted in the US by 
National Science Board (2014, p. 7-24) used the survey questions:  
“A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup means that they’ve got 
one in four chances of having a child with an inherited illness. (1) Does 
this mean that if their first child has the illness, the next three will not have 
the illness? (No); and (2) Does this mean that each of the couple’s children 
will have the same risk of suffering from the illness? (Yes)” 
If these questions were correctly answered then the survey respondent 
was classified as understanding probability. 
The National Science Board (2014, p. 7-24) measures experimental 
understanding with two questions. The first using the following statement and 
giving a choice between the two research designs: 
“Two scientists want to know if a certain drug is effective against high blood 
pressure. The first scientist wants to give the drug to 1,000 people with 
high blood pressure and see how many of them experience lower blood 
pressure levels. The second scientist wants to give the drug to 500 people 
with high blood pressure and not give the drug to another 500 people with 
high blood pressure, and see how many in both groups experience lower 
blood pressure levels. Which is the better way to test this drug?” 
 A fundamental problem with relying on this question alone would be the 
presumption that participants have selected the correct method due to 
understanding that control groups are a key aspect of the experimental method. 
Instead, Miller (2004, p. 277) found that this question received an emotive 
response with most respondents correctly choosing the experimental design due 
to less people being potentially harmed by the drug test. Therefore, to test 
whether or not the participant has chosen the correct experimental design due to 
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understanding the importance of the control group there is a second question. 
This question is an open question: “Why is it better to test the drug this way?” 
This second question enables measurement of whether there is understanding 
of the experimental method or not. This was coded in the experimental design 
(See Appendix F) as a score of 1 if the response to the open question was correct 
either using the correct terminology, for example referring correctly to treatment 
and control groups, or broadly describing the experimental method without the 
standard terminology, for example with descriptions of comparative study. To be 
classified as understanding the experimental method the participant was required 
to correctly select the closed question with scientist 2 running an experiment with 
a treatment and a control group, and also being judged as having a clear 
understanding or a general sense of the meaning of the experimental method in 
the open question.   
The understanding of scientific study is measured in the surveys by 
National Science Board (2014) through the use of two questions. The first 
question is a multiple choice and asks:  
“When you read news stories, you see certain sets of words and terms. 
We are interested in how many people recognize certain kinds of terms. 
First, some articles refer to the results of a scientific study. When you read 
or hear the term scientific study, do you have a clear understanding of 
what it means, a general sense of what it means, or little understanding of 
what it means?” 
 This question seeks to gauge whether the participants are confident in 
whether they think they understand the term ‘scientific study’ with a multiple-
choice response with the correct answers being ‘a clear understanding’ or 
‘general sense’. These participants were then tested with the following open 
question: “In your own words, could you tell me what it means to study something 
scientifically?” This question was used to examine whether the participants knew 
that scientific studies seek to test hypotheses or show awareness of systematic 
comparison. A score of 1 (See Appendix F) is given if the participant 
demonstrates either ‘a clear understanding’, where they demonstrate a clear 
understanding of the answer with accurate terminology, or ‘’a general sense’, 
where they demonstrate understanding of the concept but do not use correct 
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terminology. To be given a score of 1 for the understanding of scientific study 
correctly answering this open question or the open question for understanding 
the experimental method and being judged as understanding statistics. Scientific 
study is a more complex variable as it requires understanding of aspects of both 
statistics and the experimental method. Overall, these questions enabled three 
control variables to measure the understanding of the scientific methods between 
the experimental groups.    
The final aspect of scientific literacy tests have included whether or not 
participants in surveys reject pseudoscience. Pseudoscience claims attempt to 
appear scientific when they are not plausible or have evidence to support the 
claims (Pena and Paco, 2004, p. 1). The rejection of pseudoscience is seen as 
an important indicator to whether the public can distinguish science from fake 
claims. This is used in the National Science Board (2014, p. 7-25) surveys which 
asks whether astrology was ‘scientific’, ‘not very scientific’ or ‘not scientific at all’. 
The issue with belief in pseudoscience is highlighted by Pena and Paco (2004, 
p. 6) to often be viewed as a public expression of “… ignorance about the 
underlying philosophy and methodology  of science…”. The rejection of 
pseudoscience is the final control variable.  
Therefore, by using these control variables it enables the removal of the 
confounding factors of previous scientific knowledge and scientific 
understanding. This allows for the impact of the experimental treatments to be 
accurately measured. The experimental treatments will be discussed in the 
following section.   
 
4.3.2: Experimental treatment groups 
Following the scientific literacy test the three treatment groups (See Table 
4.4) were provided with a series of online newspaper articles and blog posts. 
Video and image memes have not been included in the experimental treatments. 
Videos added an additional practical issue with both having to provide 
headphones for each user and massively increasing the hard drive space 
required to be preloaded onto the computers. Image memes would have also 
required additional space but instead they are normally simplistic messages (See 
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chapter 3) and the focus groups found them untrustworthy despite being a shared 
aspect of the Internet experience (Chapter 5). The identifying information of the 
origin or each of the articles will be removed to reduce self-selection bias based 
upon the source the article is from. The order of the articles is randomised for 
each participant. The participants were recommended spending no more than 
twenty minutes on this section of the experiment. The articles each of the 
participants received depended on the treatment group they had been assigned. 
The junk information treatment group received six climate sceptic articles. While 
junk information and information overload treatment received the same climate 
sceptic articles they were also mixed with six articles on genetically modified 
organisms and six articles about the impact of pesticides on bees. The 
information overload receives six climate change articles from the climate 
consensus perspective that is also in competition with the additional 
environmental news stories.   
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Table 4-4: Treatment groups 
 Climate change consensus media Climate sceptic media (Junk information) 
Climate 
change only 
(There is no 
information 
competition) 
This is not tested as this research is interested in the 
consequences of information overload and junk 
information. The three treatments are contrasted to the 
control group to examine the impact of the media stimuli.  
This treatment receives only information that 
contradicts the scientific consensus from climate 
sceptic sources. The information they receive will be 
six articles from newspapers and blogs. 
Hypotheses N/A  H1. Contradictory information from the scientific consensus 
reduces young people’s understanding of climate science. 
H2. Climate sceptic material reduces young people’s 
perception of risk that climate change poses to society and 
undermines their support for climate mitigation. 
Information 
competition 
with other 
environment
al topics 
(Information 
overload) 
This treatment receives only information that is from the 
scientific consensus of climate change. The six climate 
consensus articles are in competition with six articles 
about genetically modified organisms and six articles 
about pesticides. This is due to both of these also being 
environmental issues facing society.  
This treatment receives only information that 
contradicts the scientific consensus from climate 
sceptic sources. The six climate sceptic articles are 
in competition with six articles about genetically 
modified organisms and six articles about 
pesticides.  
Hypotheses H3. Even with competition from differing topics in an information 
competitive environment the impact of climate change information on 
young peoples’ understanding of climate science will improve.  
H4. Despite the increased amount of information the perception of 
risk that climate change poses to society and support for climate 
mitigation will improve.    
H5. This effect is reduced when presented alongside other 
topics competing for the young people’s attention 
H6: Junk information in an information competition 
environment does not reduce young people’s perception of risk 
from climate change and does not undermine their support for 
climate mitigation. 
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 The first treatment group will received six climate sceptic articles from 
climate sceptic sources (See table 4.5). This treatment is compared to the control 
and was expected to have a lower understanding of climate science, weaker 
perception of risk, and worse attitudes to taking action to mitigate climate change. 
This expected result is tested by hypothesis H1 and H2:  
H1. Contradictory information from the scientific consensus reduces 
young people’s understanding of climate science. 
H2. Climate sceptic material reduces young people’s perception of 
risk that climate change poses to society and undermines their 
support for climate mitigation. 
Junk information shared online (See chapter 2) can create doubt in climate 
science, not only potentially undermining public understanding, but also the 
potential for the perception of risk to be reduced and undermining public pressure 
for action (See chapter 3).  
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Table 4-5: Climate sceptic articles 
Article name Type of source Description of content 
‘Is global warming a 
hoax’ 
Website Claims global warming is a hoax. Uses a common sceptic claim of global 
cooling trends and argues that climate change is a conspiracy by the 
government.  
‘Horrible new threat from 
global warming – fewer 
pearl necklaces (or not)’ 
Website – blog 
‘Watts Up With 
That?’ 
This is a short article that criticises researchers as using climate change as “lip 
service to justify a grant” while also claiming that rising ocean temperatures 
mean that ocean acidification is not a significant environmental impact on 
marine animals.   
‘If the UK were to try and 
achieve COP21 ideas – 
hold on to your hats!’ 
Website – blog 
‘Watts Up With 
That?’ 
This article attacks COP21 for apparently suggesting the move from gas 
powered household heating to electric heating. The article claims that the 
moving from gas household heating would require 250 coal power stations or 
1.5 million wind turbines.    
‘2015 Global Temp, Or 
How Some Scientists 
Deliberately Mistook 
Weather For Climate’ 
Website – 
‘Climate Change 
Dispatch’ 
This article claims that global warming is not taking place. Instead the article 
suggests record breaking temperatures to be due to the El Niño effect and 
therefore, warming has not occurred as it was an “truly exceptional year for 
weather, and for misleading press releases.” 
‘Base policies on reality, 
not deceit’ 
Website – 
‘Climate Change 
Dispatch’ 
This is another article claiming that climate change is a conspiracy to benefit 
the ruling elite and mislead the public with the funding of ‘one-sided research’ 
to reject ‘reliable’ fossil fuels.   
‘How geological forces 
are behind the 'Warmest 
Year Ever'’ 
Website – 
‘Climate Change 
Dispatch’ 
This article claims that global warming is not taking place and there has been 
no real temperature increase. Instead this argues that the public are being 
misinformed by propaganda when the real cause is the El Niño effect rather 
than greenhouse gas emissions.  
Sources: (WhoReallyKnows, 2016, Watts, 2016, Foster, 2016, Whitehouse, 2016, Driessen, 2016, Kamis, 2016) 
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The second experimental treatment group receives articles (See Table 
4.7) that support the scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change. In 
addition they also receive articles on pesticides and genetically modified 
organisms as the Internet has resulted in competition for the users’ attention (See 
chapter 2) while climate change also struggles to get attention due to other 
environmental issues competing for the publics’ attention (see chapter 3). The 
focus group explored whether they engaged with climate change information and 
found that information overload was experienced as competition for attention 
rather than too much information about climate change (see chapter 5). 
Therefore, to test the impact of climate change information in a high information 
environment, there has been six consensus articles (See Table 4.6) with twelve 
other environmental science stories competing for the participants’ attention (See 
Table 4.7).  
 The results will test the hypotheses H3 and H4: 
H3. The competition from differing topics in an information rich 
environment undermines the impact of climate change information 
on young people’s understanding of climate science. 
H4. The competition from other topics reduces the perception of risk 
that climate change poses to society and reduces support for climate 
mitigation.  
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Table 4-6: Climate consensus articles 
Article name Type of source Description of content 
‘Record hot years near 
impossible without 
manmade climate 
change – study’ 
Newspaper – The 
Guardian 
This article focuses on the recent record-breaking temperature and 
a recent scientific study reinforcing human activity as the driving 
cause.  
‘Snow blindness 
The Republicans and 
climate change’ 
Magazine – The 
Economist 
This article discusses the confusion of weather with climate 
demonstrated by a US Republican Senator and a wider focus on 
climate denial in the Republican party.  
‘In Greenland, a climate 
change mystery with 
clues written in water and 
stone 
Website This article discusses the melting of the Greenland ice sheet with a 
particular focus on the research being conducted in the region and 
warning of the risk of large sea level rise that climate change is 
causing  
‘Lake Poopo: Bolivia's 
second largest lake dries 
up due to climate 
change, displacing 
thousands of people’ 
Newspaper – The 
Independent  
The focus of this article is on the disappearance of Lake Poopo in 
Bolivia and the consequences of climate change to water resources.  
‘Why are some British 
newspapers still denying 
climate change?’ 
Newspaper – The 
Guardian 
This article is critical of other UK newspapers for failing to 
adequately communicate the climate consensus to the public.  
‘How Likely Is The 
Observed Recent 
Warmth?’ 
Website – Realclimate This is another article discussing the recent warming trends, but 
focuses on the likelihood that the trend in warming has been caused 
by humans with a clear message that with high confidence the 
observed warming is due to human activity.  
Sources: (Carrington, 2016, The Economist, 2016, Daniel, 2016, Mortimer, 2016, Ward, 2016, RealClimate, 2016) 
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Table 4-7: Competing environmental science articles 
Article name Type of source Environmental issue focused on 
‘EPA study shows neonicotinoid pesticides really are 
killing off honeybees’ 
Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘Ontario, Canada admits pesticides are killing mass 
amounts of bees. here’s what they’re doing about it’ 
Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘German Supermarket Chain Bans Bee-Killing Neonic 
Pesticides On Produce’ 
Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘Millions of bees turning up dead around GMO corn fields 
soaked with neonicotinoid pesticides’ 
Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘EPA's first neonicotinoid assessment finds risk to honey 
bees’ 
Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘EPA releases phase one neonic testing results’ Website Impact of pesticides on Bees 
‘Genetically-modified Fuji apple could be on tables soon’ Newspaper Genetically Modified Organisms 
‘Zika Virus Could Stir Demand for GM Mosquitoes’ Website Genetically Modified Organisms 
‘Brazil's Zika virus could be tackled with genetically 
modified mosquitoes’ 
Newspaper Genetically Modified Organisms 
‘EU fires pro-GMO scientific adviser who wanted to deny 
nations the right to ban GMOs’ 
Website Genetically Modified Organisms 
‘How The TPP Could Lead To More Global Trade Of 
GMOs’ 
Website Genetically Modified Organisms 
‘CBS Morning Show Runs Heavily Biased Segment on 
GMOs’ 
Website Genetically Modified Organisms 
Sources: (Reynolds, 2016, Walia, 2016, Sarich, 2016, Gutierrez, 2016, Thomas, 2016, Davies, 2016, Irwin, 2016, Regalado, 
2016, The Guardian, 2016a, Heyes, 2016, Husted, 2016, Meyer, 2016) 
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 This treatment group is sought to determine whether there was an impact 
of junk information in an environment where there is competition for the attention 
of the user. Due to this competition on the participants’ attention, it is much less 
likely to engage with junk information climate change in the information overload 
treatment groups. The information overload group with climate change 
consensus information is expected to have a higher understanding than the 
information overload group with sceptic information. Therefore, the impact of junk 
information in information rich environment will be tested the following hypothesis 
H5 and H6:  
H5. This effect is reduced when presented alongside other topics 
competing for the young people’s attention 
H6: Junk information in an information competition environment 
does not reduce young people’s perception of risk from climate 
change and does not undermine their support for climate mitigation.
  
The expectation is that the junk information will have a lessened impact 
due to the participants being able to select which articles they are interested in. 
This means those who have better understanding of climate science could simply 
filter out the junk information articles by their titles and images alone. As a result 
the effect is weaker and participants’ should have a better understanding of 
climate change, a higher sensitivity to risk of climate change, and better more 
positive attitudes towards climate action than the group that solely received junk 
information.  
 The control group was used to provide a comparison to the treatment 
groups that received the media stimuli. This group received the initial scientific 
literacy testing. This was followed by the section on climate change questions. 
No media stimuli were given, enabling a comparison to the significance of the 
stimuli given to each treatment group. The control group also received the follow 
up questions. The essential purpose of this group is to provide comparison.  
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4.3.3: Dependent variables 
 Following from the media stimuli there were a series of questions that 
examine the participants’ knowledge of and attitudes towards climate change. 
There were three broad types of questions asked. The first sought to gauge the 
basic understanding participants have of climate change, such as whether they 
were able to identify the causes of climate change. The second set of questions 
examined the impact the media stimuli had upon the participants’ perception of 
the risk climate change poses. The final set of questions directly examined the 
participants’ attitudes towards climate change. These questions were presented 
together on the same screen and enabled comparison on a key range of factors 
that could have been influenced by the media stimuli. These three types of 
questions are discussed in detail in the following sections, but have been 
selected as they have been used in previous research (See chapter 3) by other 
academics and allow for the potential comparison with prior results (Bord et al., 
2000, Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2010, British 
Household Panel Survey, n.d.-b).  
 The first basic knowledge questions sought to measure the participants’ 
understanding of climate science (See Figure 4.10). These questions sought to 
measure three factors in the participants understanding. Firstly, participants’ 
understanding of the causes of climate change was measured. To do this, the 
participants’ were given a list of potential causes and were asked to select 
whether they are a major cause, minor cause, or not a cause at all. This question 
was used in a survey of US university students by Bord et al. (2000, p. 208) which 
found that respondents underestimated the impact of cars and confused things 
that were not a cause such as pesticide use. These scores were combined 
together giving a total score of 8 to create the ‘understanding of the causes of 
climate change’ dependent variable.   
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Figure 4-10: Basic knowledge questions 
 
Note: Question 1 Question from (Bord et al., 2000) with Question 2 being inspired by common misconceptions highlighted by 
Gore (2006). The final question simply tests whether participants held a basic understanding of which gases were greenhouse 
gases.  
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In addition to examining whether the participants understood the causes 
of climate change there is also a series of true and false statements which tested 
a range of basic understanding of climate science. These directly test how the 
participants understand the consequences of climate change, with questions 
such as “Human activity is a significant cause of climate change”, along with 
statements testing the participants’ basic knowledge of climate science that 
examines their perception of climate science. One of the examples tests whether 
the participants understand that there is a scientific consensus surrounding 
human activity causing climate change with a false statement that “Scientists 
disagree about whether humans are changing the Earth’s climate”. These scores 
were combined together to create the dependent variable measuring the 
understanding of climate science with a total possible score of 6. Finally, to test 
the basic knowledge of the participants, there is an inclusion of a final question 
asking if they can identify the greenhouse gases. The score from this was 
combined to create the dependent variable for the basic knowledge of 
greenhouse gases with a total score of 8 possible.  
These basic knowledge questions are important to examine whether the 
media stimuli from the treatments has impacted the participants’ basic 
understanding. Flaws in understanding are potentially highly problematic as 
attempts at adopting pro environmental behaviour results in the public failing to 
choose methods that would reduce their impact on the climate (See Bostrom et 
al., 1994, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Overall, these three questions check basic 
knowledge of climate change and its effects.    
 The second set of questions seeks to examine whether the experimental 
treatments impacted how they perceived the risks from climate change at both 
an individual level and a societal level (See Figure 4.11). These have been 
included to examine the impact of media exposure on their perception of risk from 
climate change. Previous research has found that the public view climate change 
as a greater risk to society than to themselves (Pidgeon, 2012, p. S88). These 
questions have been used in previous research by Bord et al. (2000) for 
examining the risk perception of climate change in the US public.  
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Figure 4-11: Perception of risk questions 
 
Note: Questions taken from Bord et al. (2000) 
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 Finally, the last set of climate change questions seek to measure the 
attitudes to the problems posed and the importance of tackling carbon emissions 
(See Figure 4.12). These questions seek to test two key aspects. Firstly, they 
enable examination of whether the media exposure from the treatments shapes 
the participants’ views of whether climate change is an issue for the UK or 
whether they see the problem as international issues are more likely to impact 
developing countries. Secondly, these questions also measure whether the 
participants are influenced by media exposure on their perception of whether 
climate change requires action either for it being seen as too far in the future to 
be a concern or whether the action of the UK alone would make a difference. This 
has been shown in previous research to be a barrier in the communication of 
climate change as it is seen as an international issue and is instead in competition 
with domestic issues, such as the economy, for the public’s attention (See Gavin, 
2009, Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui, 2009). 
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Figure 4-12: Climate change attitude questions 
 
Note: Questions from Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2010) and the British Household Panel Survey (n.d.-
a) 
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 Overall, by measuring these three key aspects of the participants reactions 
to climate science and it allows to compare the impact of the differing 
experimental treatments to the control group. This means that the impact of the 
media stimuli can be compared between how it has impacted the participants’ 
basic understanding of climate science, whether they perceive climate change as 
a risk, and what their attitudes on taking action to combat climate change. These 
three factors provide a larger picture into the impact of junk information and 
information overload than simply measuring attitudes or basic knowledge.  
 
4.3.4: Follow up questions 
 The final part of the experiment consisted of a series of follow up questions 
(See Figure 4.13). This section recorded how the participants felt the experiment 
went for them. This includes two closed questions where the participants 
responded to whether they found the instructions clear and if there was confusion. 
This is followed by an open question which allows them to expand on these 
points. Those that took part in a treatment also had the additional open questions 
asking how they chose to engage with the media stimuli and whether they 
decided to engage with some media examples more than others (See Figure 
4.14). Additionally, the follow up questions for all participants also ask closed 
questions to whether they see science and climate change when they are online. 
There is also an open question which seeks to find out in their own words if they 
engage with climate change information when they are online. Finally, the follow 
up questions sought to find out how they frequently they engage with different 
types of media.  
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Figure 4-13: Follow up questions 
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Figure 4-14: Additional questions for the treatment groups 
 
 
4.3.5: Statistical Analysis 
 The data collection from the experiment collected participant’s scientific 
literacy (control variables) and their reaction to climate change information after 
the media stimuli (dependent variables). The research examines the group 
results through the use of statistical analysis using the software SPSS. It is 
unfortunate that allocation of participants into the control and treatment groups 
was not entirely random. This is because of the difficulties of ensuring a large 
sample size. Data collection was carried out on three university campuses as 
getting the initial data collection proved to be problematic. Even recruiting from 
methods and environmental politics units being taught on Penryn campus only 
gained 101 participants in total compared to the 180 that I had expected to attend. 
This was reflected in attempts at other campuses with an organised data 
collection at Southampton University to increase the total numbers, which only 
resulted in 6 additional participants when I was expecting around 40 students to 
attend. Running them on the University of Exeter Streatham campus only gained 
an additional 15 participants when I had expected around 50 participants to 
attend. In order to increase sample size, an additional 61 participants for the 
control group data was collected through an online survey (See Appendix E). The 
online survey was sent out to campus based student groups on Facebook and 
shared out by people online. This introduces a self-selection bias as non-random 
samples have been introduced.  
In order to balance the non-random samples, I used propensity score 
matching and stratification. Propensity scoring is a method of weighting results 
using pre-treatment factors, in this experiment scientific literacy, allowing for the 
improvement of internal validity of the between group comparisons (Holmes, 
2014). Propensity scoring also allows for the avoidance of confounding variables 
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caused from differences in the application of the experiment and may impact the 
causal claims. This sample-matching approach is frequently used in quasi-
experimental designs (Holmes, 2014). The purpose of this approach is to attempt 
to adjust and weigh data where randomness cannot be guaranteed to eliminate, 
or, at worst reduce, differences on confounding variables. The idea was to make 
the treatment groups match the control data as much as possible. Cochran (1968)  
and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that a significant amount of difference 
between control and treatment groups can be reduced by stratifying in this way. 
The stratified sample matching took the following steps: 
1. The control data (from both the experimental conditions and survey) was 
combined with the treatment data. 
2. A logistic regression was estimated where Ri=1 if i is in the control group, 
otherwise Ri=0. The model was used to estimate 19:  
𝑃𝑅(𝐶𝐺 = 1) =
𝑒𝛽𝑥
1+𝑒𝛽𝑥
= 𝑃   
The co-variates were the full set of variables collected as part of the 
experiment (and the survey version of the experiment). See Appendix E 
for a full copy of the survey and details of variable construction (see 
Appendix F). The model was satisfactory, with a Chi2 test of 71.00*** 
(significant at the 0.00 level) and a reasonable adjusted R2 of 0.260 
(Nagelkerke R Square). The model correctly predicts 98.1% of the 
treatment group cases. 
3. Next, I looked at the predicted probabilities of the combined treatment 
groups and sorted the individual cases’ propensity scores into quartiles to 
determine the cut-off thresholds for the stratification. The thresholds were 
as follows: quartile 1 = 0.01381 THRU 0.16827; quartile 2 = 0.1682902 
THRU 0.326875; quartile 3=0.326875 THRU 0.5201305; quartile 4 
=0.5201306 THRU 0.54248. 
                                            
19 Notes for equation:  
 CG = Control group 
 eβx = Regression on co-variates  
 P = probability  
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4. Turning now to the control group data, combined for the experimental and 
survey settings, I defined 4 stratification groups as per step 3. The same 
thresholds were used. 
5. In the next step, I calculated the weight for the treatment groups in each 
strata by taking the frequency in that strata for the control group, and 
dividing it by the frequency for the treatment group as illustrated in Table 
4.8.  
 
Table 4-8: Frequencies in each strata and the resultant weights 
Quartile 
(stratum) 
Control group 
frequency 
Treatment 
group 
frequency 
Calculation New weight 
for treatment 
groups by 
strata 
1 20 60 20/60 0.333 
2 19 27 19/27 0.704 
3 22 13 13/22 0.692 
4 20 2 20/2 10.000 
Total 81 102   
 
6. Finally, a weight of 1 was assigned to all of the control group cases. 
Linear regressions tests were used to examine whether there was a 
significant impact in the stimuli on the participants’ reactions to climate change. 
These linear regressions are run comparing each treatment in turn to the control. 
The results are then analysed as three models each testing each dependent 
variables. Model 1 does tests the impact of climate consensus stimuli in an 
information overload has on each dependent variable. Model 2 tests the impact 
of junk information (climate sceptic material) only on each of the dependent 
variables. Model 3 tests the impact of climate sceptic media in an information 
competition environment on each dependent variable. This approach of 
modelling is similar to experimental research by Margetts et al. (2011) that 
examined the likelihood of people signing petitions and donating money to the 
causes of the petition. This research was interested in behaviour shaped by how 
many people had previously signed a petition and used this model to test each 
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treatment of high over one million signatures (Model 1), medium being between 
100 and one million (Model 2), and low being less than 100 (Model 3). This 
approach of the models testing the treatments has been used in my experimental 
analysis.     
In particular, linear regressions were run on nine dependent variables 
used in the experiments. Firstly, three linear regressions have been run on each 
of the climate science understanding results looking at whether there is any 
significant impact of the media stimuli on knowledge on greenhouse gases, 
understanding the causes of climate change, and understanding of climate 
science. Secondly, linear regression was run on four dependent variables that 
measured the perception of risk to the participants as an individual, and their 
perception of risk to society. In addition, linear regressions were run on two 
dependent variables that examine the participant’s perception of risk climate 
change poses to the UK and also internationally. Finally, linear regression was 
run on attitudes for the support for climate change mitigation with dependent 
variables measuring whether the media stimuli have impacted their support for 
Britain combating climate change and whether they felt that climate change was 
too far in the future to be a concern.  
Through the use of this mixed methodological approach, this enables a 
detailed exploration of the impact of the internet and its consequences on 
reactions to climate change information. The following chapters will detail the 
analysis and findings of these methods. The focus groups (chapter 5), examines 
the use of the Internet and engagement with climate change information online. 
This informs the information overload treatments which are statistically analysed 
in (chapter 6) to examine the direct causal consequences of the experimental 
treatments on the dependent variables. 
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Chapter 5 - Focus group analysis 
 
 This chapter analyses the results that emerged from the focus group 
discussions on Internet usage and the sharing of climate change information 
online. These focus groups sought to answer the following questions, and are 
also used to create valid experimental treatments for the information overload 
treatment groups (to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H6): 
• Context: How do Internet users perceive their engagement with the 
Internet and connectivity?  
• Context: Do users receive and engage with information about climate 
change through their Internet and social media usage?  
• Context: Are there barriers to interacting with climate change information 
online? 
• Sharing: How do Internet users share information with others? 
 
These focus groups have been coded (See Table 5.1) into key themes 
that emerged from developing the analytical framework of the information society: 
context of Internet use, sharing, information overload, and junk information. The 
subsidiary themes emerged from the discussion about the Internet in the 
participants’ day-to-day life and whether (and if so how) they engage with climate 
change information. The focus groups tease out participants’ wider engagement 
with online discussions and use of the Internet to engage with serious issues. A 
wider exploration of how participants viewed the Internet is important, as the initial 
focus groups highlighted a significant lack of engagement with climate science in 
the majority of participants. This included an unexpected finding of significant 
barriers to climate change discussion online. It found that the Internet is not a 
place to discuss serious issues, and also that there is a fear of negative 
responses or harassment from others. These perceptions of Internet 
communication and barriers to online climate change engagement were explored 
in more depth in the final three focus groups.  
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Table 5-1: Focus group coding 
Theoretical themes Subsidiary themes 
Contextual • Usage 
o When 
o How 
o Why 
• Connectivity with friends and family 
• Community 
o Online 
o Offline 
Sharing • Memes 
o General entertainment 
o Shock 
o Environmental 
• Accessing information 
o Hobbies 
o News 
o Environmental 
o Amusement 
o Internet as a medium to 
discuss issues 
Information Overload • Tailoring 
o Selection 
o Ignoring 
o Novelty 
o Distractions 
Junk Information • Misleading information 
o Climate sceptic material 
o Untrustworthy sources 
o Memes 
 
This chapter is split into two key sections. Firstly, I explore participants’ 
perception of their usage of the Internet in their day-to-day lives. Secondly, I 
explore the participants’ sharing of climate change information online and their 
perception of online communication. This second section is split into five sub 
sections to explore the engagement with the sharing of information through social 
media, their perceptions of information overload and junk information. These 
subsections will explore themes related to each of these as well as examples that 
cross between these categories, such as whether there is a cross over between 
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sharing and junk information. Overall, this chapter seeks to produce an in-depth 
understanding of the range of ways young people use the Internet, how they 
connect and share information with other users, and whether they engage with 
climate change information online, and if so how. Ultimately, there appears to be 
significant barriers to viral sharing of climate change information, because the 
sharing of information being motivated by entertainment. At the same time, viral 
media is being untrustworthy. Other issues included the problem of barriers to 
public engagement in general, with a fear of backlash and a view that discussing 
climate change online is not a productive activity. These exploratory research 
findings suggest that disengagement is a much larger issue for climate change 
communication that requires future research.        
 
5.1: Use of the Internet 
 This section will examine the use of the Internet among the participants of 
the focus groups [FGs]. There are two key areas of interest. Firstly, this section 
will explore how the participants use the Internet, including when and how they 
are connected. Secondly, this section will examine how they use social media in 
their day-to-day lives. The use of the Internet was normalised among all 
participants in all focus groups with social media playing a significant role in their 
lives for both connecting with others, and also receiving information.  
 
5.1.1: Connectivity 
There was a general consensus in all FGs that they always felt constantly 
connected. This was evident from the response to the question ‘how do you use 
the Internet in your daily lives?’ In FG1 the first response was from Participant [P] 
4 who said “I literally use it 24/7”. This response was met by slight laughter from 
the group with other participants agreeing and highlighting that their day-to-day 
usage of the Internet was similar. In FG2, P highlighted that they used the Internet 
“As soon as I wake up and before I go to sleep” (See line 28). Other participants 
in the group agreed with P9 giving the example of moving to a new house:  
“… put it this way if you move into a new house and it’s [the Internet] not 
there at all it feels like you are back in the Stone Age.”  
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Other participants echoed this sense of being constantly connected:  
“P1: It’s part of my routine. I need to get up and check my Facebook and 
Instagram and do the same before I go to sleep.  
P2: I… we… I use it more than I think I do and I only notice that when you 
don’t have Internet. If you’re bored or waiting for a bus whatever you just 
find yourself on the Internet. No Wifi and then you realise that.” 
The slip of ‘we’ suggests that P2 thinks this is normal behaviour but he 
corrects it to describe his own experiences. Constant connectivity is expected by 
the participants from FG2.  
The Internet has become a normalised part of the participants’ day-to-day 
lives and it’s only noticed when the constant connection is not available. This was 
reflected by P4 in FG5 who highlighted that constant connectivity was an 
expectation from many of their peers with an example of a recent incident on 
campus where the Internet was down for a short time:  
“We lost connection to the Internet for ten minutes the other day and 
everyone was freaking out.” 
Another participant in FG5 acknowledged the constant connection with the 
Internet being used to access music:  
“P1: When I am home I always have music on and when I am at a mate’s 
house we always have music on. So even if we are not actually browsing 
the Internet we have Youtube or Soundcloud or something up playing in 
the background of our lives.” 
Youtube is a video hosting website that was created in 2005 and has more 
than one billion users (Youtube, n.d.-a, Youtube, n.d.-b). Soundcloud is a social 
media website built around uploading music to be shared with other users, which 
also has integrated support to share the user created music on larger social 
media websites, while also being available as a smart phone app (Soundcloud, 
n.d.). Again this reflects that constant connectivity to the Internet has become 
normalised. This expectation of constant connectivity has become normalised 
with smartphones and tablets enabling Internet access on the go. Mobile devices 
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used to access the Internet have rapidly increased with Vincent and Harris (2008) 
showing that more people are accessing the Internet through these devices which 
is exceeding desktop computers (Fortunati and Taipale, 2014, p. 318). This is 
reflected in the focus groups as mobile devices are the main way some of the 
participants regularly access the Internet. An example can be seen when P2 of 
FG2 informed the group that their smartphone “… with me absolutely 
everywhere”. The convenience of mobile phones to access the Internet has 
meant they are one of the main ways that the participants connected to the 
Internet.     
Another key aspect that emerged immediately in the discussions from all 
of the focus groups was that they used the Internet for a wide range of purposes. 
This included using apps on smart phones such as WhatsApp, which enables 
users to instant message friends and family without paying like a user would using 
normal mobile phone texting (WhatsApp, n.d.). There were examples of the use 
of the Internet for accessing music through the Spotify website and phone app. 
Spotify is a website that allows for the user to listen to millions of music tracks 
and either pay a monthly fee or allow Spotify to play adverts between songs 
(Spotify, n.d.). Other uses included online video games such as WoW [World of 
Warcraft]. WoW is a massive online role-playing game set in a fantasy world that 
charges a monthly subscription to play, which peaked at 12 million subscribers in 
2010 (Kollar, 2014, World of Warcraft, n.d.).  
There were also frequent mentions of the use of the Internet for accessing 
video entertainment. Examples in FG2 included references to the video hosting 
website Youtube (n.d.-a) to “… connect to just see some funny videos”. More 
traditional television media was referred to with reference to both legal and illegal 
video streaming websites by P9 in FG2:  
“P9: I probably watch a lot of TV shows off the Internet as well through 
nefarious websites 
PA: **laughter** 
P9: and legal ones as well…”  
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This highlights the Internet has absorbed traditional entertainment media 
with television, music and video games being accessed or operating through the 
Internet.  
Besides entertainment, participants said they used the Internet daily to 
access a range of information through Google searches or for course information 
through ELE [Exeter Learning Environment]. In particular, there was a reliance 
shown on Google by some of the participants. Such as with. P5 and P11 in FG1 
with comments such as “I Google everything”. The Internet is seen by P5 to be 
“…essential for me in so much of what I do”. FG2 had P9 mention that they used 
the Internet to directly access news through the Guardian app. The Guardian app 
is an electronic version of the Guardian newspaper available on tablets which can 
be viewed offline after download or while connected enables users to view 
embedded videos in the articles (The Guardian, n.d.). It was clear that the 
participants in all the focus groups used the Internet for a range of entertainment 
sources as well as accessing information.  
 
5.1.2: Social media 
Another common use was social media for entertainment, connecting with 
friends and family, and accessing news. The use of social media is to be 
expected, as young people were the initial adopters of social media and have 
remained the largest age group using social media (Pew Research Center, n.d.).  
Social media was referred to frequently within both focus groups. Participants use 
a range of social media services such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. 
Facebook is a social networking website which emerged in 2004 and expanded 
to have 1.35 billion monthly active visitors in September, 2014 (Facebook, n.d., 
Facebook Newsroom, n.d). Twitter is a social networking website that allows 
users to connect and send Tweets (short messages) to users who follow them. It 
has 288 million active users with 500 million Tweets sent per day (Twitter, n.d.-b, 
Twitter, n.d.-a). Instagram differs from Twitter and Facebook with a much stronger 
focus on the sharing of pictures and videos (Instagram, n.d.). When FG1 was 
asked about social media use, there was an immediate response from P3 
speaking for everyone in the group: 
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“I: Ok so how many people here use social media?  
P3: everyone 
I: everyone?  
P3: yep 
PA *murmur of agreement*” 
 General agreement was shown between all the participants in FG1 that 
they all used social media.   
The reasons to use social media varied across individuals. Keeping in 
touch with friends and family was a common reason to use social media. For 
example P2 in FG2 highlights:  
“P2: I use mine for various reasons. One being keeping in touch with family 
and friends and we have found even as a group here that it’s a much 
easier, it shouldn’t be, way to keep in touch and how far we have gone 
with our research is on Facebook than Email. It’s much more instant so I 
use it for work and for pleasure.”  
Social media is not only used to keep in touch with people far from the 
user, but also the students keep in touch with each other through social media 
platforms such as Facebook despite seeing each other face to face regularly. An 
interesting aspect mentioned was that Facebook was used for group work rather 
than emailing due to the convenience it offers. The use of social media was even 
referred to as vital by some participants. For example P1 in FG1 said that social 
media was viewed as vital for the organisation of events that were not online, 
such as student society events, stating that:  
“P1: I wouldn’t say I use the Internet as a forum for communication. I think 
a lot of us use it organise certain things. So as a [student] society. 
Whatever you do in the real world doesn’t happen. You have to use the 
Internet to organise what kind of communication you will have outside of 
that.” 
Social media is not only seen as necessary for communication and 
organisation of events that are not based online, but also as the only way to 
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effectively reach people. This view was also seen in FG2 where P9 gave the 
example of general usage being the organisation of social events:   
“P9: I use it for group taking groups in particular titles that are for different 
things that get your friends to talk. So you get a bunch of friends to talk 
about a bunch of subjects between this area and that. So you want to talk 
about going on holiday together you go to the holiday page or if you want 
to meet up for a drink then you go to this page and say who’s free tonight 
and instantly you are connecting 10 to 15 people instead of texting. So it’s 
a lot easier to all plan on one page 
I: So it’s very convenient 
P9: Convenient and very fast”  
This highlights the view that social media is an important aspect of the 
participant’s social lives for the convenience it offers for organising and staying 
connected with people. This was also supported by P1 in FG3: 
“P1: I use it to communicate with fellow students in my course. Mostly 
through facebook groups mainly to arrange times and practices to it kind 
of condenses us all into one place where we can arrange and change 
schedules so I use it in that sense. 
I: so it’s quite important for daily organisation? 
P1: yeah it’s organisation. If there is a group of you all together.” 
This convenience of organisation meant that social media was important 
to the participants’ day-to-day lives.  
In contrast, others used social media for primarily engaging with and 
receiving information. For example, FG3 highlighted that P3 has had a changing 
use of social media with P4 also supporting the usefulness of social media to 
receive information:  
“P3: I think I have started using it less for interaction as I have used it more 
as it use to be a social pull for me and now I very rarely use Facebook for 
interaction. I spent last year turning from a page full of friends saying what 
they did in the shower to a page full of alternative media 
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P4: I use it for research” 
The ease and convenience of use for receiving information was also 
brought up in FG5 who found it particularly useful for following current events:  
“P2:  News station on Twitter. I know you should not use it for news, but it 
does come up with new stuff very quickly.  
PA: **murmers of agreement**.  
P3: I like the new thing they introduced with Facebook. The trends down 
on the right hand side so you get breaking stories pretty quickly. I got the 
BBC news app on my phone that give breaking news updates which is 
quite useful.”  
An interesting aspect of the response from FG5 was a negative view on 
using social media for this purpose with the focus group agreeing with the 
statement made by P2.  
In addition to receiving information online, there was also engagement with 
online communities. The Internet has enabled users to form communities 
surrounding shared interests and empower the user base on a range of issues 
such as health information (Kata, 2012). The engagement with online 
communities received a wide range of responses but there was a general 
consensus that the participants were members of some form of online 
communities. For example there was P8 in FG1 who highlighted that they used 
online communities for specific hobbies:   
“I am part of a camera and online photography forum and other sports 
forums and stuff like that and other like sports forums and stuff like that.”.  
This use represents the expected use of the Internet for gathering 
information from individuals with similar interests.  
However, there were two very different uses of the Internet for accessing 
online communities. For example, P9 from FG1 viewed their use of online 
communities to be essentially people they normally interact with in their day-to-
day life. This use of online communities was viewed by P9 as: 
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“P9: I would say I am part of groups but they are based on. Not like there 
not Internet. They are like my friendship groups and society groups that 
have a presence on the Internet for ease of communication and stuff. So I 
would not say it’s an online community. It’s more a real life thing that spills 
out onto the Internet to every now and then.”.  
 P9 views their use of the Internet communities is simply spill over from 
their offline communities they participate within. In contrast there was P5 who 
was also in FG1 and is active in a range of online communities: 
“P5: I am part of quite a few online communities. Obviously a variety of 
games on Steam. Civilization forums I tend to go on. I may not comment 
or post. I tend to have a detailed look at what other people are saying and 
how that could improve my gameplay so in that respect I am part of that 
community. In games like Team Fortress 2 I sometimes use the in game 
chat and there is quite a community feel in that there is information and 
memes that are within the community itself that don’t tend to travel far out 
of it. I also play World of Warcraft and there is a server community as a 
whole. Through things like trade chat and sometimes debate or jokes are 
exchanged between different people.  
I:  A sort of community feel?  
P5: Exactly a community feel. Even though there is a veil of anonymity is 
present in all of them.”  
 The list of online communities that P5 refers to revolves round an interest 
in video games and playing online. For example, P5 refers to Steam which is a 
digital distribution platform for video games that has incorporated social media 
functions such as the ability to share videos, screen shots, and chat (text based 
and over microphones) (Steam, n.d.). Steam enables players to buy games and 
stay connected with friends. This enables friends to play online games together, 
such as Team Fortress 2, which is a free-to-play online team based first person 
shooter (Valve, n.d.). An interesting factor that emerged was P5 felt part of a 
community although the online experience was anonymous through players 
using pseudonyms. This highlights both the wide range of engagement with 
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online communities and perception that the Internet is necessary in organising 
the participants’ offline meet ups.  
Overall, the Internet is used frequently in the lives of the participants. The 
ability to access the Internet on the go was commonly seen with examples of the 
participants’ day-to-day usage via smartphones.  Access of the Internet has 
become normalised with participants only noticing their dependency on the 
Internet when there is no connection. The Internet has become a significant part 
of their lives with social media in particular being a central way to keep in touch 
with people. The use of social media extended past keeping in touch with people 
but was seen as necessary for organising offline events in their day-to-day lives. 
Therefore, as the Internet is significant in their day-to-day lives it is important to 
examine how they view online interaction and whether they engage with online 
communities.   
 
5.2: Information society analysis 
This section explores the results from the focus group through the 
information society analytical framework. The analysis is split using the 
information society analytical framework to enable me to explore the rich data 
that was collected from the focus groups. Firstly, this section will examine how 
the participants viewed the sharing of information and how they perceived their 
engagement with climate science. Secondly, this section will explore how 
participants viewed information overload and explores if they tailored their 
Internet usage to see particular information. Thirdly, this section examines how 
users perceived junk information and explored whether they engaged with it. 
Fourthly, this section will explore the overlap between sharing and information 
overload. Finally, this section will explore the overlap between the sharing of viral 
junk information.         
 
5.2.1: Sharing 
 The Internet has enabled the sharing of information with the emergence of 
online communities, the ability to share memes, and the growth of social media 
used. For example, the use of online communities to share knowledge was 
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highlighted by P5 in FG1 to be helpful in their hobbies. The sharing of knowledge 
for mutual benefit with other members in a community with the same interest is a 
key aspect to sustain online communities (Faraj et al., 2011, p. 1224). For 
example, P5 discusses their participation on forums to improve performance in 
video games such as Sid Meier’s Civilization V, which is a strategy game where 
the player plays as a civilization from the stone-age to space age (Sid Meier's 
Civilization V, n.d.). The participation on forums with other players of the game 
allows discussion of tactics and for P5 to improve their strategy when playing. 
 Another key aspect of sharing was the ability to quickly transmit 
information to a wide range of users through the use of Internet memes. Memes 
can be potentially shared for entertainment or potentially used to spread political 
messages throughout a network or to subvert dominant messages (Cammaerts, 
2007, Kien, 2013). Therefore, the participants in the focus groups were asked 
whether they saw memes online. An example was provided of an environmental 
meme (See Figure 5.1). When FG2 was shown the example meme it received a 
response from P12 who highlighted that:       
“P12: I have never seen an environmental meme before. I normally just 
see silly ones.  
I: Can you give an example of a silly one?  
P12: ummm there is pressure. I’m trying to think 
PA: //**laughter from the group** 
P5: Grumpy Cat” 
 Grumpy Cat is a popular online meme of a grumpy looking cat (see Figure 
5.2), which has had commercial success and has even been made into a movie 
‘Grumpy Cat’s Worst Christmas Ever’ (Know Your Meme, n.d.-f, Moylan, 2014). 
This was also seen in FG1 with P4 stating that they do see memes:      
“P4: yeah just not environmental ones.  
I: What sort of memes do you see? 
P4: Funny ones 
P8: general ones like cats and things 
P11: //Bad luck Brian”.  
The response of P4 stating that they see funny ones had the reaction from 
the group to call out memes such as Bad Luck Brian. Bad Luck Brian was an 
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image meme of a blond hair teenage boy with braces with a caption describing a 
negative event (See Figure 5.3) (know Your Meme, n.d.-b). All five of the focus 
groups showed that memes were shared primarily for entertainment rather than 
the communication of serious issues.  
Figure 5-1: Example of environmental meme 
 
Note: Shared by Greenpeace UK (2014) Facebook page on the 7th December to 
draw attention to a Petition against coal. This gained 8,491 likes and was shared 
over 3000 times.  
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Figure 5-2: Grumpy Cat example 
 
Note: Image taken from Know Your Meme (n.d.-g) 
Figure 5-3: Bad Luck Brian example 
 
Note: Image from know Your Meme (n.d.-b).  
The immediate response to the climate change meme from all FGs 
participants was negative. The meme example was criticised as too simplistic by 
participants in FG3:  
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“P4: this is not a good example of that is it **holds up the environmental 
meme** 
PA**laughter** 
 I: That is an environmental meme a UK based one by Greenpeace.  
P3: Greenpeace do do some good ones.  
P4: not sure this is an example of Greenpeace doing  
P3: That’s what I’m saying they do do some good ones but maybe not this 
one 
P4: it’s pretty simplistic. It’s what I was saying about not reducing stuff to 
140 characters” 
 The design of the meme was also criticised by FG4: 
P3: that is a crap meme. I have seen a lot better. Like I don’t focus on 
Internet memes 
P2: You don’t use arrows on a meme. It presumes the user is stupid. 
 
 They criticised both the design and message of the example meme 
provided. 
 The focus groups highlighted a lack of engagement with memes that 
focused on serious topics. P3 in FG3 highlighted that they scroll past them only 
pausing to laugh rather than follow any links to do with them. Those engaged with 
environmental material such as P4 in FG5 did so through news channels and 
therefore did not see environmental memes. Instead this resulted in an interesting 
discussion where the view to ignore serious issues online was agreed because 
they felt discussing such issues on the Internet was a waste of time. In particular, 
social media was argued by P8 in FG1 to be used for keeping in touch with people 
and passing time rather than discussing serious issues:  
“P8: I think it’s because I don’t know how many people see social media 
as a way as engaging with things and discussing anything. I know I 
definitely don’t at all. Social media is in keeping in contact with people, 
organising things but mainly, just pass time and stuff. I know I don’t go 
there to discuss any topic with anyone and I think a lot of people have that 
as well so they go on and then like this is not what I am here for. Even if 
they did engage it’s not a serious discussion. It does not mean anything 
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because you then never see it again. You might not even know the person 
as well so it just does not even matter.”  
 This was supported within the focus groups with the view that social media 
was a superficial form of communication between users. While in FG2 there was 
a different view made by P6 but also supported by P5 that put people off having 
serious discussions due to negative responses from other users even in an 
anonymous environment:  
“P6: I think it is the intimidation. Even though it’s anonymous if you don’t 
know what you are talking about then you don’t want to put your voice as 
much, but if you do think you know more about it then you will feel more 
obliged to sort of to get your comment.  
P5: There’s always the risk of being drawn into a flame war. Especially on 
Youtube. It’s  
PA:// **laughter** 
P5: It’s not worth. It’s not worth it even if you are 100% accurate then 
somebody would just insult you and say something about your mum  
PA://**Laughter** 
P5: it’s not very worth it” 
 
 A potential negative response from other users was seen as a key reason 
to not bother to engage in online discussion. This negative response is referred 
to by P5 as a ‘flame war’, which is Internet slang referring to a group of people 
arguing over a topic using mostly insults (Know Your Meme, n.d.-d). This 
perceived risk of backlash from getting involved in climate change discussion was 
a key demotivation to Internet users.  
 When the focus groups were asked about engagement with climate 
change information, they highlighted that apart from the risk of backlash, they 
perceived climate change to differ from other issues they view online. An example 
was given by P2 that as climate change was not viewed as a personal issue they 
would not get involved compared to debates on abortion:  
“But when it’s more of a personal issue I have some friends who have 
some very strong opinions about abortion or homosexuality. Hey what are 
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you saying? This is not right as it’s a personal opinion. That almost forces 
you to engage with it because it’s a personal thing.”  
  Interestingly, P8 also from FG1 shared a similar view that climate change 
differed significantly from other topics, but instead argued that there was less 
likely to be a relaxed discussion in contrast to an online discussion on sports or 
personal hobbies:  
“You know it’s like discussions on how you should could do this better then 
someone might disagree and be like this could work better and might have 
a discussion. It might just be because it’s not as big an issue. If you 
disagree with someone how to best train your calves does it matter to you. 
You’re just going to just carry on doing like you know if you then. I don’t 
know if that’s a factor in it because climate change is such a like if you 
have a genuine opinion and someone is the opposite. As [removed] it 
effects everyone in a really big way so of course it’s kind of that clash its 
much less important issues they can just have a chat about it and then.”.  
 Due to the topic focus not being considered as a significant political issue 
P8 had the view that the discussion was much more accessible and enjoyable. 
The risk of backlash was clearly a shared reason to prevent participants engaging 
in political debates online. This fear is justified with online communities criticised 
by Shaw (2014) to allow for the organising of harassment campaigns against 
those who are critical towards something that the community has a shared 
interest in to attempt to limit criticism. The risk of getting involved in a ‘flame war’ 
and receiving harassment is a factor in undermining the participant’s engagement 
with climate change debates online.  
 Overall, the sharing of information was seen as important by members of 
the focus groups. However, a key aspect that emerged was disengagement with 
climate change information. This was due to the perceived risk of backlash if they 
got involved in online discussions; this also applied to a wide range of issues that 
they considered serious. At the same time, the engagement and sharing of 
memes also reflects this with memes being shared for entertainment purposes 
rather than to drive political discussion or build understanding of serious issues.  
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5.2.2: Information overload  
 The amount of available information has dramatically increased (See 
Schumann, 2004, p. 241). This means that there is a risk of information overload 
with the potential for people to become overwhelmed by the amount of 
information. This concept was explored with the focus groups and a key aspect 
that became evident in all the focus groups was that the amount of information 
did not result in a feeling of being overwhelmed. Instead the quantity of 
information had resulted in competition for the user’s attention. When the focus 
groups were asked about engaging with climate change information the result 
was a lack of engagement. There were examples such as in FG2 with P1 who 
rarely saw climate change information:  
“P1: It’s quite rare, but it tends to come in clumps. If for example there has 
been some kind of big study on it then I might see a few in a day, but then 
I might go months without seeing anything at all and I might see loads 
again.”.  
 Instead, the only members who regularly received climate change 
information were already connected to the environmentalist network and followed 
organisations such as Greenpeace. Interestingly, due to the competition caused 
by information overload, a number of the participants had tailored their online 
experience purposively to avoid seeing climate change information. For example 
in FG1 both P8 and P9 highlighted that they filtered their online experience, in 
particular their social media accounts. However, both of these participants viewed 
this differently:  
“P8: because you can tailor your social media to what you want to see. So 
while that’s quite insular in the way I interact with social media it also 
reflects how social media works. You end up seeing what you want to see. 
So for me personally I have no interest in climate change so my social 
media reflects that.  
P9: I say personally more that it happens unintentionally. Like I follow or 
subscribe to things like pages for like human rights groups and things like 
that and I see tweets all the time about that and I get information about 
that. I just never like followed it’s not intentional I don’t want to get any 
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information about climate change its just I have not clicked anything that 
then gives me that constant feed of information.”  
 
 Due to the lack of interest in climate change, their social media usage 
reflected that, with them not following or subscribing to sources that discuss or 
share climate change information. This filtering behaviour was argued by 
Schumann (2004) to be a response to the extremely high quantities of media 
stimuli to prevent suffering from information overload. This personalisation of 
information received has negative consequences that values and personal beliefs 
are reinforced rather than challenged (Schumann, 2004, p. 234). In this case both 
P8 and P9 received no climate change information and as a result will not see 
anthropogenic climate change as a serious issue. While P8 has no interest in 
climate change, they are happy that their general interests are reflected on their 
social media. On the other hand P9 agrees but argued that this was not 
intentional behaviour on their part.  
 The competition for the attention of the user was highlighted in an 
interesting example from FG1 with P5 spending a lot of time among online 
communities that reflect their interest of video games. Rather than seeing or 
engaging with serious information online, they received and shared jokes with 
online communities focused on video gaming.  Their engagement with memes in 
particular was summarised by P5 as:  
“P5: as a gamer I tend to see a lot of memes that don’t tend to make a lot 
out of sense out of gaming and unlike some memes. With gaming memes 
there tends to be quite a lot in a very frequent period of time. Especially on 
some of the bigger games. Especially World of Warcraft. There tends to 
be new memes every three or four weeks and if you have not played for a 
period of time then you don’t tend to get the in joke. But on going players 
tend to have meme pages of hundreds of memes inside their head which 
make perfect sense to them but to other people would just be unfunny. 
They would be unfunny and the humour would not make sense at all. 
Those memes tend to be very related to the communities they come from 
and a lot of the humour tends to be the community’s reaction to a boss 
quote in WOW or a certain viral video associated with Team Fortress 2.”  
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 These online communities create a range of in jokes that would not make 
any sense to someone outside of that online community. When P5 was asked for 
the example, there were multiple examples given including “: Spy Crab from 
Team Fortress 2. ‘You are not prepared’ from WoW…”. Spy Crab was a Team 
Fortress 2 meme where players playing as the spy class could do a crab-like walk 
if they held the ‘disguise kit item’, looked up, and crouched while walking forward 
(Know Your Meme, n.d.-p). An example of the Spy Crab meme can be seen in 
Figure 5.4. ‘You are not prepared’ was from World of Warcraft. (See Figure 5.5) 
which was a quote from a boss in the game called ‘Illidan Stormrage’ and became 
viral within the WoW community (Edwards, 2013). This is an example of memes 
being used for entertainment within the online community with P5 highlighting 
that “It would not make sense unless someone was a former player and had been 
involved in that community”. These memes are just jokes rather than conveying 
any serious message like memes attempting to communicate climate change. 
The memes referred to by P5 are shared for entertainment and sharing in jokes 
within the WoW community. In particular one of the examples reflects the critique 
of memes by Kien (2013) who argued that memes can undermine information 
campaigns to tackle serious societal issues. In this case the ‘Spy Crab’ meme is 
a parody of conservation awareness campaigns.  P5 became a dominant voice 
in the group during this section of the focus group and clearly spends a lot of free 
time within these online video game communities. The consequence of this 
competition for P5’s attention has meant that they engage with content and 
information that directly appeals to them, in this case for entertainment. This 
detracts from time that P5 could be spent engaging with climate change or more 
general serious information while also shaping a perception that memes are just 
jokes rather than a way of communicating significant messages.   
  
173 
 
Figure 5-4: Spy Crab meme example 
 
Note: Image taken from Know Your Meme (n.d.-q) Spy Crab image gallery.  
Figure 5-5: 'You are not prepared' meme example 
 
Note: Image taken from Edwards (2013) 
 In addition to competition for the users’ time there were also a number of 
barriers to engagement with climate change information online. For example a 
small number of participants suggested a lack of confidence in their ability to 
discuss climate change resulted in them avoiding joining online discussions. This 
was generally seen as a feeling that they lacked adequate knowledge on the 
174 
 
subject to engage with climate change debates online with P4 from FG5 reflecting 
that:  
P4: It’s hard enough to keep the science in your own subject as opposed 
to when your interest lies in something completely different trying to keep 
up with a whole branch of science. You got to trust what people relay to 
you.  
 This lack of knowledge did not mean that participants were not interested, 
with P4 from FG2 highlighting that “…I am interested but I don’t know enough 
about it at the moment…”. However, the majority of the focus group participants 
did not reflect the perception that they lacked knowledge about climate change.   
 Instead one of the more interesting findings highlighted by the focus 
groups was that the Internet was not seen as a place to have serious discussions. 
This has the potential to be a significant barrier to using the Internet to 
communicate climate change as it suggests users will simply be disinterested in 
engaging with climate science. This finding is potentially extremely problematic 
as previous literature suggests that the Internet has amazing benefits to political 
organisation and communication. For example the Internet enabled the ability to 
organise global activists and allow for international protests (See Kata, 2012) 
while also allowing for the public to become empowered with the democratisation 
of information to be shared throughout online communities (See Bennett, 2004). 
There are two aspects of this attitude that emerged. Firstly, it was seen as having 
no real impact. The second issue was that other users did not take online 
discussions seriously and derail the discussion with ridiculous posts. 
The perception of social media from the participants was not seen as a 
tool to discuss serious issues. In particular, social media was argued by P8 in 
FG1 to be used for keeping in touch with people and passing time rather than 
discussing serious issues:  
“P8: I think it’s because I don’t know how many people see social media 
as a way as engaging with things and discussing anything. I know I 
definitely don’t at all. Social media is in keeping in contact with people, 
organising things but mainly, just pass time and stuff. I know I don’t go 
there to discuss any topic with anyone and I think a lot of people have that 
as well so they go on and then like this is not what I am here for. Even if 
they did engage it’s not a serious discussion. It does not mean anything 
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because you then never see it again. You might not even know the person 
as well so it just does not even matter.”.  
 
 This was supported within the focus groups with the view that social media 
was a superficial form of communication between users.  
 This perception of online discussions being superficial was reflected 
across the other focus groups. Part of this was due to the view that arguing with 
others online was ineffective as a form of communication. For example the idea 
that it was impossible to change other user’s minds on significant issues was a 
major reason for demotivation for the participation in online discussions. P12 from 
FG2 highlights the experience of online discussion was a time sink rather than a 
productive experience:  
“I just don’t think I would not bother as getting into online arguments is 
really long and I just don’t have the energy for it as what happens is people 
just debate for ages and you’re not going to change each others minds so 
some matters I just keep quiet and scroll past. So yeah that the way I see 
it.” 
 This perception of it being a waste of time was also reflected by P4 in FG5: 
 “I usually I will take part if it’s not going to lead to anything. Rarely any 
philosophical debate or argument I use to do that any day I could and its 
pretty futile. I used to get involved in things I did not know much about 
which did not help. Not anymore. I stop myself.”  
 Significant or serious topics received a general consensus across all the 
focus groups that online debating was ineffective or a waste of time.  
 In comparison offline communication was seen as much more effective 
with ‘proper’ engagement with the topic. For example P3 in FG1 highlighted that 
they felt that individuals online simply did not adequately engage in the 
discussion:  
“I mean when it’s done in person it’s so much better as its faster replies, 
proper engagement, and people are going to think about what they say. 
They are not going to copy past some article they quickly found I think this 
actually even though I did not think it 30 seconds ago.” 
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 Again this reflects the perception that online discussions are simply not 
seen as a worthwhile use of time as having an impact on others is seen as key 
to motivate engagement. 
 In addition to the experience not being seen as a worthwhile experience 
there is the issue that becoming involved in online discussions was seen as 
difficult due to the chaotic nature of social media. If a contentious issue emerged 
FG1 highlights there are already a large quantity of responses:  
P11: and there is always arguments on it and there are hundreds of 
comments and no one gets anywhere. And I don’t understand why people 
comment on it.  
P9: Then you get that on comment going guys let’s all try to have a proper 
argument. Why are you bothering to try to control this?  
P11:// There are hundreds of comments. No point 
P9// You should know there is nothing you can do about this and the 
people who are commenting then the persons going to forget about it and 
not take anything from it and move on and then half of them are there just 
putting funny comments anyway and annoying people. So it’s just 
Pa: **laughter from group**  
 
 In addition to the quantity of people posting comments there is also the 
problem of others posting comments to derail the discussion.  
 Even then, the quality of other comments is a factor that deters the 
participants engaging with serious discussion. The view that other users’ 
comments are low quality are highlighted as a reason for disengagement in FG3, 
but the participants do suggest they get some enjoyment from the comment 
section even if they do not engage with it:   
“P6: There is that really good meme that says I’m just here for the 
comments 
P3: The Michael Jackson one  
P4: sometimes scary  
P6: //It’s sometimes terrifying but often funny”  
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 The meme they refer to is seen below in Figure 5.6 which is an image 
showing Michael Jackson eating popcorn. This reflects back to the previous 
section, where viral content was seen as a form of entertainment, which appears 
to be the case for comment sections online as well. Engaging with online 
discussions is seen as a waste of time and the spaces to engage in discussion 
are seen as low quality while also being entertaining by how awful the quality of 
the comments are.  
Figure 5-6: Michael Jackson Popcorn meme 
 
Note: Image taken from Lima (2016) 
 Overall, the view that the Internet is unsuitable for serious discussion was 
prevalent in all of the focus group discussions. The opportunity to engage in 
serious discussions was seen as a waste of time. This is a troubling finding as 
there are serious consequences to communication serious issues in society as 
the Internet use has grown massively over the last decade (See The World Bank, 
n.d.) with social media growth and becoming increasingly normalised in society 
(See Ofcom, 2015, p. 32).There was a consensus that engaging in climate 
change debates would not benefit anyone and be unlikely to influence others. In 
some cases the suggestion that they might engage in online discussion was just 
178 
 
seen as funny. Potentially this is a major barrier to effective climate change 
communication online as there is the risk that people just won’t feel that there is 
any benefit from engaging.  
An interesting finding from the focus groups was the fear of negative 
backlash from other users as a major demotivating factor in the decision of 
whether to engage in online discussions. A reason for this perception of risk is 
due to the Internet providing anonymity to users which increases aggressive 
behaviour to others due to a disconnect between seeing other users as human 
beings and the highly unlikely chance of reprise as their identity is unknown (See 
Santana, 2014, Smith et al., 2007, Sproull and Keiesler, 1991). This was 
highlighted as a significant risk to engaging with climate change online across all 
of the focus groups.  
The idea of behaviour change due to this disconnect with other users was 
reflected in FG2 when P3 suggests that their interaction changes if they don’t 
know who they were talking to: 
“I: what if you knew the person from your day-to-day life?  
P3: Yes I think we are more respectful if you know them. So on 
Facebook… people comment and they don’t know each other and it’s a bit 
tense and your going everyone just calm down so you just try to avoid it 
all together.” 
 
This suggests that the negative behaviour caused by the breakdown of 
social behaviour norms is a significant factor in reducing the likelihood of the 
participants taking part in climate change discussions.  
Consequently, the fear of backlash was highlighted by P4 in FG5 as a 
factor in deciding whether to engage with issues online or avoid them entirely:  
“I: What do you get in engaged with then? What sort of topics? 
P4: Not very much at the minute really. I will do some things about science 
on things like Reddit. The non-contentious stuff like genuine questions, 
which we are pretty sure about. I try to avoid contentious things. Stuff like 
pesticides people get angry very quickly.” 
 
179 
 
The idea of an issue being contentious is essentially seen as a warning 
sign, potentially leading to aggressive responses which P4 highlights they only 
want to take part in online debates if they “… know its not going to lead angry 
discussion”.  
 The fear of backlash is not unfounded as there is the risk of negative 
responses from other users and there have been examples of organised attacks 
on individuals due to the victim sharing their opinion online. An example of this 
can be seen in the response to a Kickstarter campaign started by Anita 
Sarkeesian, asking for $6,000 to fund a video series examining female 
representations in video games, which resulted an organised online attack 
(Lewis, 2012a, Shaw, 2014). The attack (See Figures 5.7 and 5.8) was both 
directly targeted messages and vandalism of her online pages including:  
“… her Wikipedia page was vandalized, she was sent (and continues to 
receive) rape and death threats, images were posted of her being raped 
by video game characters, and a flash game was created that allowed 
players to “Beat Up Anita Sarkeesian” by clicking a picture of her until it 
turned into a bloody pulp” (Shaw, 2014, p. 3).  
Despite being targeted by a portion of the online gaming community, Anita 
Sakessian has continued with production of the series and received well above 
the initial asking money for her Kickstarter, as the attack resulted in producing 
large scale awareness for her project (Shaw, 2014, Lewis, 2012a). The outrage 
of a community of gamers meant this received massive public attention and 
highlighted the issue of sexism in the online gaming community.   
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Figure 5-7: Example of online abuse targeted at Anita Sarkessian 
 
Note: This was one of many tweets sent within a week to the Feminist Frequency 
Twitter account. Image taken from Feminist Frequency (2015).  
Figure 5-8: Interactive "Beat up Anita Sarkessian" game 
 
Note: Images taken from Lewis (2012b). 
This harassment campaign was a response to criticism of gender portrayal 
in video games, which suggests that the fear of backlash is a potential for not 
engaging with climate change communication. The risk of harassment online was 
a determining factor in what the participants decided to engage with online. For 
example, P8 in FG1 argued that they engage with hobbies online, as the risk of 
aggressive behaviour from other users was low:   
“You know it’s like discussions on how you should could do this better then 
someone might disagree and be like this could work better and might have 
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a discussion. It might just be because it’s not as big an issue. If you 
disagree with someone how to best train your calves does it matter to you. 
You’re just going to just carry on doing like you know if you then. I don’t 
know if that’s a factor in it because climate change is such a like if you 
have a genuine opinion and someone is the opposite. As [removed] it 
effects everyone in a really big way so of course it’s kind of that clash it’s 
much less important issues they can just have a chat about it and then.” 
 Due to the focus not being on significant issues in society there was a view 
that people were not as likely to have strong emotional responses to 
disagreements.  
 Even with users being anonymous they were put off taking part in serious 
discussions. The potential of a negative response from other users was seen as 
a key reason to not bother with engage in online discussion and the idea of 
engaging in online comment sections seen as a funny prospect by the other 
participants. This perceived risk of backlash from getting involved in climate 
change discussion was a key demotivation to Internet users.  
 The fear of harassment and backlash appears to be a strong motivation to 
avoid discussing climate change online and other serious issues in society. The 
anonymous environment and the ease to make new accounts means that there 
is a risk that an individual or group can easily engage in harassment of an 
individual. This perception of the risk of backlash appears to be a major factor in 
the participants’ decision to engage with climate change online and wider issues 
in society. As a result this is a major barrier to the communication of climate 
change online as it means that users are less likely to actively engage with the 
information.  
 Overall, a clear response from the focus groups was that information 
overload had resulted in the filtering of the information they receive with 
competition from differing topics for their attention. This section has highlighted 
that some participants felt they lacked knowledge on the subject to adequately 
engage with climate change online. This is reflected by previous research (See 
Bord et al., 2000) which shows that the general population has a low 
understanding of climate science. In addition to the lack of confidence, there is 
another problematic issue where the participants viewed the Internet as a place 
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for entertainment and not serious communication of issues in society. This had 
consequences, as climate change was filtered out along with more serious 
issues, to instead receive information through social media on hobbies and 
entertainment. In the case of FG1, P5 was spending a lot of free time within online 
communities that appealed to their interests, which meant they were less likely to 
engage with more serious issues such as climate change. This is a particularly 
worrying finding when these focus groups previously established that the Internet 
is the primary method that the participants engage use to with information. 
However, one factor that explains this lack of engagement can be seen in the fear 
of backlash, validated by examples of individuals being targets of harassment by 
organised groups.  
 
5.2.3: Junk information  
The Internet has enabled anyone to produce content and there is a risk of 
junk information. In the case of climate change, junk information is climate sceptic 
material, which goes against the climate consensus of anthropogenic climate 
change. To explore the reaction to junk information, the focus groups were asked 
what they did if they received unwanted information in their social media. The 
general response, if they received information that challenge their’ worldview, or 
someone posted something of questionable content, was that it would be ignored. 
For example, P3 in FG1 noted that climate sceptic content can simply be ignored 
by not engaging the poster:   
“The great thing about the Internet you can just scroll past it and refuse to 
engage with it. That is the beauty of it. You don’t have to be ignored by it 
and no obligation to comment. It’s just simply you scroll past it and get on 
with your day. The propensity to engage with that sort of media is very very 
low.” 
 The way that P3 phrases this statement is very positive to the fact that you 
can filter the information you receive through social media. This approach of 
simply ignoring something was particularly interesting, as P11 from FG1 would 
not reply online to someone posting the climate sceptic meme even if they knew 
him or her in person, but instead highlights:   
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“P11: I think if I saw it on my Facebook and I knew the person and they 
were actually posting it seriously I would really want to go ask them why 
they would post something like that and try to understand. But not 
something I would reply to on the Internet. I would have to talk to them and 
I have to know them.” 
 A confrontation over why something was posted required P11 to know the 
person in their day-to-day life but a face-to-face discussion was desired rather 
than directly questioning them online.  
A climate sceptic meme was handed round each of the focus groups (see 
Figure 5.9). This received a negative reaction from every focus group. FG1, for 
example were critical of the person who produced it: 
“P11: A total lack of misunderstanding of basic facts.  
P7: Seems like shit pulled off of a Fox News report.”  
A similar reaction was seen in FG2: 
“P4: my gut reaction depending on how you feel about obviously the gut 
reaction you have towards one of them which is like the climate sceptic 
one which is like yeah but shut up. It’s not what anyone is saying.  
P1: I almost feel that was made to take the piss out of climate sceptics as 
it’s too silly.  
P4: I get climate sceptic discourse if you were to discuss it but that’s the 
lowest hanging fruit. The climate is not changing as it’s snowed.  
I: that’s actually from a climate sceptic blog. 
P1: really wow” 
 
There was a general consensus across all the focus groups that they 
would ignore content of this sort with others highlighting that they do not see 
climate sceptic memes with P3 in FG3 commenting “I don’t think I have ever seen 
even actively looking at anything they got...”. 
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Figure 5-9: Climate sceptic meme example 
 
Note: Image taken from climate sceptic blog (Neoavatara, 2010). 
 There was a limited range of reactions from this potential circumstance of 
someone posting questionable content that they knew on Facebook. One 
reaction from P5 in FG1 was to also ignore the person “… but I would have a look 
at the article and have a quiet chuckle at its idiocy”. A much stronger reaction was 
from P11 in FG2 who instead would “Stop following whoever posted them…”. 
However, most of the participants would not have engaged with an online 
discussion and instead simply ignored the post.  
There was only one participant in FG1 that said they would say something 
if questionable content was posted or shared by someone that they are friends 
with or follow on their social media.   
“P4: I can get like well I did not engage in an argument then if something 
really crosses the line I would let that person know they are an idiot. Like 
on Twitter the earlier day like the Jordanian pilot who got burnt alive with 
some boys putting up the photo of him on his knees burning and putting 
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comments on top that were taking the piss. I can’t remember what. I just 
let some guy know he’s not ok in his head. There are just some things that 
I can’t hold myself back from as they are crossing the line thinking they are 
funny when they are not. I do tend to get a bit emotional sometimes when 
they go too far. But like I can still scroll past but I am still like you’re an idiot 
but I won’t say it all the time.” 
 P4 is referring to images from a video showing the Jordanian pilot Moaz 
al-Kasasbeh who was burnt alive in a metal cage by Islamic State (BBC, 2015). 
The reaction by P4 was not to engage in discussion but instead respond to the 
poster of the offensive material to let them know that they found the post to be in 
bad taste. Even then, P4 highlights there is a chance they would simply ignore 
junk information by scrolling past material.  
 In the case of the reaction to climate change junk information, there were 
participants in FG2 who were climate sceptics. Both P10 and P7 believed in 
natural causes for climate change:  
“P10: Call me controversial but I believe in the sunspot theory. Like the 
number of sunspots around the sun is causing more heat to come here. I 
don’t really believe this carbon malarkey. I do like the idea that there are 
resources that are running out in this world and we need to conserve them 
and I do think just burning coal is not great for this natural environment of 
this earth and I do believe in renewables.  
P7: I don’t believe it’s human created but human influenced. I did research 
into it and it seemed to be that the Earth goes in a natural cycle, but we 
are pushing it further much further out which is dangerous. I don’t think it’s 
completely our fault, but we’re not helping.” 
  
 This view that climate change is a natural occurrence is a common climate 
sceptic belief. The sunspot theory mentioned by P10 is recognised by many to 
be a climate sceptic myth with a belief that the sun has increased in activity and 
as a result has increased the amount of heat the Earth receives. Instead, the sun 
has been in a slight cooling trend since the 1960s (Damon and Laut, 2004). When 
P10 was discussing accessing climate change information there was a key 
element of doubt:  
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“P10: I’m very sceptical on all these climate reports generally. I mean ever 
since that scandal with that East Anglian University and since then I have 
been very conscious of what’s being reported.”  
 There was a mistrust of climate change information with P10 directly 
referring to ‘Climategate’ as one of the key reasons he directly mistrusts coverage 
of climate change he sees. ‘Climategate’ (see chapter 2) initial coverage started 
online with climate sceptic blogs seeking to create mistrust of climate scientists 
(Nerlich, 2010). This attack on climate scientists appears to have created or 
reinforced the climate sceptic beliefs of P10.  
 Interestingly, while the climate sceptics had little interest in engaging with 
climate change information, there were non-sceptic participants in FG2 who did 
not see engaging with climate change worthwhile. For example, P11 argued that 
while they agree with human caused climate change, they saw little point in 
engaging with climate change online:  
“P11: I’m very much on the same page. I think it’s definitely caused by us. 
They are incredible bores. They just can’t be reasonable. They just want 
to put their views out there as loudly as possible so it’s not very interesting. 
They repeat themselves endlessly.  
I: So you don’t see it as worthwhile to engage with it? 
P11: No because the sort of people don’t want to be engaged because 
you’re not going to change their minds and they’re not interested in 
changing yours. Just going to have a go at you if you disagree with them. 
And that’s either side.”.  
  
Online discussion of climate change was viewed as a waste of time by P11. A 
key aspect that made this a waste of time to P11 was a perceived political bias 
and a belief that it was ineffective to have a political debate online.  
 Overall, junk information potentially causes a risk to young people’s 
understanding of climate change if climate sceptic discourse was to go viral. An 
interesting finding from FG2 was that the disengagement with climate change 
was found in those who were self-identified climate sceptics. Climate sceptic 
discourse has the potential to persuade people and possible cause further 
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disengagement with climate change as doubt about the seriousness of climate 
change is created. Again, this stems from previous findings that the Internet is 
not seen as a place to debate serious issues. When coming across junk 
information like climate sceptic material, the main response from participants was 
to simply ignore it. This suggests that the greater issue is disengagement rather 
than climate sceptic discourses.  
 
5.2.4: Sharing and Information overload 
The focus groups highlighted an interesting overlap between sharing and 
information overload. Despite participants filtering the content they received, 
there was the potential for viral content to reach a wide audience. An example 
was brought up by P5 in FG1 who mentioned a shocking meme that was shared 
within their network: 
“…for example if anyone has heard of ‘Shrek is Love Shrek is life’ 
PA: **a mixture of chuckling and groans**  
P5: that was used quite extensively within our Facebook chat by certain 
members who actually struck upon it a lot earlier before it became a 
general meme back when it was just a meme focused within the gaming 
community.”   
  
 ‘Shrek is Love, Shrek is Life’ was a shock meme of a story of a young boy being 
sexually assaulted by Shrek which was originally posted on 4chan (See Figure 
5.10) (Know Your Meme, n.d.-n). This original post was then turned into an 
animation using video game characters (See Figure 5.11) which has over 8 
million views (Sykotic, 2014). The reaction from the group highlights that the 
meme was either viewed or the other participants were aware of it. While the 
shocking nature of the meme is surprising, it also led to a series of reaction videos 
on Youtube with the Youtubers react video by The Fine Bros (2014) reaching 
over 16 million views. This shock meme has spread due the shocking nature and 
the entertainment found in watching peoples’ reactions to the video which means 
it has been shared like the previous meme examples for entertainment purposes.   
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Figure 5-10: Shock meme example - 'Shrek is Love, Shrek is life' 
 
Note: Image take from Know Your Meme (n.d.-o) with the worst expletives edited 
to blur out.  
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Figure 5-11: 'Shrek is love, Shrek is life
Note: Screen shots take from the Youtube video by Sykotic (2014).  
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 There is the potential for viral content to overcome steps taken by users to 
avoid information overload. The shock meme of ‘Shrek is love, Shrek is Life’ 
received a strong reaction from the focus group members. However, in the 
context of climate change communications, non-climate change shock memes 
shared for entertainment are a distraction from serious issues. The shocking 
nature means that they become widely shared and viewed despite potentially 
having only entertainment value. Shock memes highlight the potential 
distractions the Internet can provide.    
 
5.2.5: Sharing, information overload and Junk information  
 Another overlap occurred between sharing, information overload and junk 
information. In the focus group discussions of memes, it emerged that the 
majority of FG2 viewed memes negatively as a way for communicating serious 
issues. For example, P9 said that when they did see political memes they were 
“… normally a one-shot issue” and simply suggested that memes are not 
designed for transmission of serious issues. The communication of political 
issues via memes was criticised by P11 and P5 who highlighted a mistrust of 
memes in memes:  
“P11:  A political one I saw doing the rounds recently with two photos of 
the House of Commons with one labelled MPs discussing their pay and 
the other one was discussing child abuse. I think the political ones tend to 
be ill informed.  
P5: I have seen a lot of memes to do with feminism and especially anti-
feminism in comment sections of things. Then again a lot of it seems to 
spout from misinformation. I don’t think you could see memes as a reliable 
source.”  
 
Both P11 and P5 highlighted a mistrust of memes as a reliable source of 
information. An example given by P11 is the images of Members of Parliament 
[MP] in the House of Commons with labels on the images of the House of 
Commons with very few MPs debating a topic such as ‘debating the living wage’ 
while contrasted with an image of parliament packed with the label ‘debating MPs’ 
pay’ (See Figure 5.12). This meme is criticised by Hardman (2014) who highlights 
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that the ‘debating MPs pay’ was an image of the first day of the new Parliament 
after the 2010 election and the information on each of the images is misleading. 
This meme plays into the current levels of public distrust towards UK politicians 
and Hardman (2014) suggests that if public trust was higher then these memes 
might not spread so well. This is one of the risks of viral content with low quality 
or incorrect information remaining immortal on the Internet with many simply 
seeing the meme and believing the message without exploring further. As a 
result, it reinforces the belief that politicians are untrustworthy (Kien, 2013).  
 
Figure 5-12: House of Commons debates meme 
 
Note:   Image taken from Hardman (2014) 
 This example highlights the ease of transmitting junk information through 
social networks while distracting from other serious issues in society. The focus 
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groups suggest that junk information can potentially spread rapidly if it falls into 
pre-existing views or judgements. This demonstrates that viral content cannot be 
viewed as a inherently trustworthy source of information and the spread 
reinforces the mistrust of memetics found in the focus groups as a form of 
communication. In Particular, FG2 showed there was distrust towards them as a 
source of information, presuming instead that they were incorrect or misleading. 
As a result, the use of memes is potentially limited as a way of communicating 
serious issues like climate change if the information is seen as unreliable then it 
will be ineffective at mobilising people to take action or influencing their pre-
existing views.   
Overall, social media has offered the opportunity for the viral 
communication of climate change. However, this to be undermined by a variety 
of issues. There was a lack of engagement with climate change information 
online. Instead, the sharing of memes over social media was done for 
entertainment rather than for communicating serious issues. The participants 
demonstrated that they filtered out topics that were not of interest, with climate 
change being shown to be in competition for their attention with a vast range of 
subjects. There were some examples that showed it was possible that viral 
content could bypass this filtering, but it was shocking material and even then it 
was shared for the purpose of entertainment. In addition, memes were seen as 
an untrustworthy source of information, which decreased the participants’ 
motivation to engage with them. Therefore, the key strength of Internet 
communication, that a vast range of people can be reached, is undermined by 
the perception of viral content and a lack of trust in it. This suggests that attempts 
at viral communication of climate change will most likely be unsuccessful.  
 
5.3: Summary 
 The focus groups have provided a useful insight into the impact of Internet 
aspects of the information society (sharing, junk information, and information 
overload) upon public understanding, attitudes, and perception of risk of climate 
change. In all of the focus groups, the participants had a sense of always being 
connected with the Internet, in particular social media, playing an important role 
in the organisation of social events, work, and accessing news in their day-to-day 
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lives. This connectivity was only noticed in the absence of the Internet for some 
of the focus group participants. However, the consequences of the sharing, 
information overload, and junk information (and their intersections) were reflected 
in the findings of the focus groups. 
The focus groups highlighted that all participants were aware of and 
engaged with memes. However, there was a consensus that memes were a form 
of entertainment and not a method to communicate information about issues in 
society. Participants engaged with memes for entertainment, and the majority 
simply did not see climate change or environmental memes. Instead of engaging 
with climate change, the participants had shared experiences of entertainment 
memes such as ‘Grumpy Cat’. The ‘Shrek is life, Shrek is love’ shock meme that 
FG1 participants had a shared awareness of, had reached a wider audience due 
to its shocking nature. Despite its shocking nature, the main driver of its viral 
success was entertainment created from watching other people reacting to the 
video. The FGs reflect that the main driver of the success of Internet memes in 
general appears to be the entertainment value of the content.  
Examples that emerged from the focus groups highlight that viral 
communication was seen as a form of entertainment while there was also 
awareness of the Internet being echo chambers and concern over junk 
information (See figure 5.13). The examples from the focus group have been 
placed on the information society model previously discussed in chapter 2. 
Memes such as ‘Grumpy Cat’ and ‘Bad Luck Brian’ were widely shared for 
entertainment purposes  and a distraction from serious issues rather than for 
communicating serious messages. This reflected the arguments made by 
Chesterman (2011) that memes were successful if they are simple and 
entertaining messages rather than complex serious topics, which is why there are 
so many more successful MLP memes to climate change memes (See chapter 
3).  Interestingly, there was awareness of the filtering and echo chamber nature 
of the Internet, but this was generally seen as a good thing. Examples given in 
FG1 with video game memes from the WoW community reflect the echo chamber 
nature with a series of in jokes being shared within a community. However, 
despite the filtering behaviour, viral content can successfully reach a larger 
audience with ‘Shrek is life, Shrek is Love’. There was also a distrust of virally 
shared information as there was awareness of false information shared with the 
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example of the ‘MP voting’ meme. Despite this, the vast majority did not see 
climate sceptic material, and some presumed the example sceptic meme was a 
joke. The focus groups suggest that while there is a risk that climate sceptic 
material can go viral, it has difficulty achieving this compared to more emotive 
domestic politics, which reflects the information processing discussed in chapter 
3.  
Figure 5-13: Memes shown on the dark side of the Information society 
analytical framework 
 
 The perception that memes are for entertainment means there is a barrier 
for viral communication of climate change information. The spread of memes 
requires engagement from users and a lack of interest or engagement with 
climate change is going to undermine the potential viral spread of information. 
The lack of interest or desire to engage with climate change has been shown in 
previous research by Lorenzoni et al. (2007) to be a key obstacle to developing 
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public understanding of climate change. The focus groups also doubted the ability 
for memes to spread serious information as the memes that the participants were 
familiar with were shared for entertainment rather than for communication of 
political issues (Kien, 2013). Even when political memes were shared, the focus 
groups showed distrust towards them as a source of information, believing 
memes to be simply used for jokes than serious communication. Memes were 
seen as junk information and simply not engaged with as a serious form of 
communication, with climate change memes simply not being seen or engaged 
with. 
This highlights that Internet poses new challenges to climate change 
communicators as the personalisation of the experience means that users can 
easily opt out of media coverage of the issue. This is both a conscious and 
unconscious process as users select what they wish to engage with, while at the 
same time automated filtering based on past user engagement is taking place. 
However, some of the participants were aware they engaged in filtering, but as 
they had no interest in climate change they did not see it as an issue. The 
information rich environment meant that the ability to filter out climate change 
information was even seen as a positive by some of the focus groups members 
to avoid being overloaded with information. Therefore, rather than there being too 
much climate change information, the experimental design will include additional 
topics in competition for the participant’s attention. The focus groups highlighted 
that engagement with climate change information took place if a participant was 
already connected to environmental networks such as following Greenpeace on 
Twitter or Facebook.   
However, if the participants’ were interested in engaging with climate 
change information there was two key barriers that undermined engagement.  
There was a clear view held by the participants that the Internet was not seen as 
a place to have serious discussions, and there was little motivation to access 
climate change information. A key barrier was a fear of online harassment and 
backlash of getting involved in climate change discussions. In addition to this fear, 
there was a view that social media was a place for entertainment and not serious 
discussion. Considering the dominance of the Internet in the participants’ lives, 
with most participants not using traditional forms of media, this view that social 
media was a place for entertainment undermines climate change communication 
196 
 
online. This suggests that a major issue with climate change communication is 
the lack of engagement, and producing content to bypass the filtering behaviour 
used by users to avoid information overload. Communicating climate change 
through the Internet has barriers and to improve engagement with young people 
by making sure climate change is covered within the school curriculum (See 
chapter 3). 
 The focus group results may be interpreted by some readers to mean that 
climate change is unsuitable as a case study to explore the impact of the Internet. 
However, I strongly believe that this disengagement with climate change makes 
it more important to study. The seriousness of climate change and how people 
are impacted by information they see online is extremely important to study. The 
development of public understanding of climate change is challenging, but 
important to create political pressure for effective resolution. The findings from 
the focus group have been taken into consideration in the experimental design 
with information overload reflecting the idea that climate change is in competition 
with a sea of other information competing for user attention. The information 
overload treatments reflect the competition with other information online. 
Therefore, the following chapter examines the consequences of climate change 
engagement in an information rich environment and the potential for the public to 
be misled by junk information.   
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Chapter 6 Experimental analysis 
 
This chapter analyses the results from the experimental treatment groups. 
The experimental data is examined in four sections. Firstly, I examine the affects 
of post-stratification propensity scoring on the control variables. Secondly, this 
examines the impact of the media stimuli on the participants’ basic understanding 
of climate science. The third section evaluates the impact of each of the 
treatments upon the participants’ perception of risk that climate change poses. 
The final section examines the consequences of each treatment on support for 
action to tackle climate change. The data analysed using logistical regressions 
and has been weighted using propensity scoring (See chapter 4).  
 
6.1 Control variables 
The control variables have been weighted due to the additional non-
randomised surveys to reduce the impact of confounding variables. The 
frequencies of the data weighted and not weighted can be seen below in Table 
6.1. The weighted results are generally closer with similar results between the 
control and the treatment groups. Therefore reducing the impact of confounding 
variables skewing the experimental results. This weighting worked particularly 
well for control variables such as understanding of the experimental method, 
which had before variations between 0.7 (Junk information and information 
overload) as the lowest with 0.85 (information overload) as the highest. After 
weighting the lowest score was 0.71 (both the information overload treatment and 
junk information and information overload treatment) with the highest being 0.73 
(junk information). Weighting worked less well for the control variable for the 
rejection of pseudoscience, which had a low score of 0.33 (information overload) 
and a highest 0.59 (junk information). After weighting the range is narrower with 
the lowest being 0.39 (junk information) and the highest of 0.56 (control).  
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Table 6-1: Mean scores for the control variables before and after statistical 
weighting 
Control variable  Control Junk 
information 
Information 
overload 
Junk 
information 
and 
information 
overload 
Physical science 
mean score out of 
a total of 6 points  
5.25 
(5.25) 
5.05 
(5.06) 
5.05 
(5.23) 
5.73 
(5.65) 
Biological science 
mean score out of 
a total of 7 points 
5.86 
(5.86) 
5.19 
(5.73) 
6.08 
(5.6) 
5.83 
(5.68) 
Understands the 
experimental 
method 
0.72 
(0.72) 
0.76 
(0.76) 
0.85 
(0.71) 
0.7 
(0.71) 
Understands 
probability  
0.94 
(0.94) 
0.6 
(0.82) 
0.91 
(0.83) 
0.97 
(0.94) 
Understands the 
scientific method 
0.77 
(0.77) 
0.58 
(0.76) 
0.84 
(0.68) 
0.84 
(0.82) 
Rejects 
pseudoscience  
0.56 
(0.56) 
0.59 
(0.39) 
0.33 
(0.46) 
0.49 
(0.38) 
Note: Questions examining understanding of experiments, probability, scientific 
method, and rejection of pseudoscience were binary results of either 0 or 1. Basic 
physical science knowledge was out of a total of 6 and basic biological knowledge 
out of a score of 7.  Scores in parenthesis are post-weighted with the pre-
weighted score being before.  
 The poor matching for pseudoscience could be due to a huge imbalance 
of non-randomness across the sub sample. Another possibility of the weakness 
in the pseudoscience weighting could be due to the nature with the measurement 
approach of asking about belief in astrology as Afonso and Gilbert (2010, p. 332) 
argue pseudoscience to be a continuum rather than a binary true and false with 
examples such as acupuncture being found to have some “… limited scientific 
acceptance following carefully controlled experiments”. As a method of 
examining scientific understanding it is questionable as the assumption 
underlying the measurement is that belief in pseudoscience is caused by a lack 
of scientific understanding. In much the same way that attitudes towards science 
depends on a variety of other factors (See Sturgis and Allum, 2004) there is an 
argument by Afonso and Gilbert (2010, p. 332) that while surveys have found 
widespread belief in pseudoscience “… the individuals concerned must have 
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some necessarily non-scientific grounds, for their trust”. Belief in pseudoscience 
can be produced by a lack of understanding of scientific methods, but also by 
personal beliefs (Afonso and Gilbert, 2010, p. 343). Despite these issues with 
measuring belief in pseudoscience the inclusion of whether or not astrology is 
scientific has been included as a control variable, as it does offer some insight 
into how the participants perceive what is scientific or not and whether they can 
reject scientifically incorrect claims. 
 Overall, the participants have demonstrated a generally high level of 
scientific literacy with the majority scoring highly in basic knowledge and 
understanding of the scientific process. However, there appears to be difficulty in 
rejecting pseudoscience compared to other control variables. All these control 
variables have been used in the linear regression models to examine whether 
they have influenced the results to the dependent variables. The following section 
provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and whether the media 
stimulus has had significant effects on the understanding, perception of risk, and 
attitudes to climate change mitigation.    
  
6.2: Dependent variables:  
There were nine dependent variables analysed with the use of linear 
regressions presented as three models. The data used in these models were 
weighted as the inclusion of non-random control data (see chapter 4) resulted in 
all variables being non-significant with some close to being significant at p>.05. 
Once propensity scoring had been used to weight the non-random data the 
results found a wider range of significance that will be discussed in this sections. 
These models compare each treatment to the control group. Model 1 compares 
the junk information treatment to the control. Model 2 compares the information 
overload and junk information treatment to the control. Model 3 compares the 
information overload treatment to the control group. The experimental treatments 
were designed to critically examine three aspects, to see if there has been an 
impact. First, examining whether basic understanding of climate science is 
affected by media stimuli used in the experimental treatments. Second, this 
section evaluates the perception of risk between each of the treatment groups. 
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Finally, their attitudes to climate change mitigation. To begin with, this section will 
examine the impact on basic knowledge of climate change.  
 
6.2.1: Basic knowledge of climate change 
This section examines the impact of the media stimuli on three dependent 
variables. First, it examines whether there has been any significant impact of the 
treatments upon the knowledge of causes of climate change. Second, it looks at 
the consequences as to whether the treatment groups were able to correctly tell 
which climate change statement was true or false. Finally, it evaluates whether 
the treatments impacted the participants’ ability to correctly identify greenhouse 
gases. Ultimately, this section evaluates whether the treatments have 
significantly impacted the participant’s basic knowledge of climate change.   
To begin with this chapter examines the impact of the media treatments 
on the participants’ understanding of the causes of climate change. The 
responses for the total score for understanding the causes of climate change 
across treatment groups are shown in Figure 6.1. The median score was 5 out of 
8 in all but the junk information treatment which had a median score of 6 out of 8. 
The control had a lower extreme with a score of 1 and an upper extreme score of 
8 which highlights the range of scores for the understanding of the causes of 
climate change. The information overload had the lowest spread of results with 
the upper extreme scoring 6 and the lower extreme scoring 3.   
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Figure 6-1: Understanding the causes of climate change 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data. 
  
Table 6-2: Logistical regression for participant's score for causes of 
climate change 
 Model 1 - Junk 
info 
Model 2 - Junk 
and Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload  
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.33* 0.16 0.34* 0.17 0.26 0.16 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.16 0.17 -0.13 0.20 -0.05 0.17 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.79** 0.26 1.00** 0.28 0.74** 0.27 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
1.75*** 0.45 1.10 0.63 0.43 0.62 
Probability 0.48 0.68 0.52 0.78 0.63 0.66 
Scientific 
method 
0.56 0.31 -0.65 0.58 -0.16 0.60 
Junk info 0.16 0.09     
Junk and info 
overload 
  0.03 0.34   
Information 
overload 
    0.32 0.30 
Adj. r2  0.09 0.27 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
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The results of the logistical regression (See Table 6.2) for Model 1 found 
a similar result with junk information not having a significant impact on the 
participants’ understanding of the causes of climate change. It also found the 
rejection of pseudoscience having a positive impact being a significant control 
variable at p<.01. Additional control variables in Model 1 found that basic 
knowledge of physical science having a positive impact, and their understanding 
of the scientific method having a negative impact were both significant at p<.05. 
In particular, the control variable that was significant at p<.001, was the 
understanding of the experimental method which had increased the score on 
model 1. Model 2 found no significant impact of the junk information and 
information overload treatment, but also found that the rejection of 
pseudoscience was a positive significant result at p<.01 to the participants’ 
scores for the causes of climate change. In addition, model 2 found that basic 
knowledge of physical science had a positive impact at p<.05. Finally, Model 3 
found that climate consensus material, in an environment of information 
competition, did not have a significant impact on the understanding of the causes 
of climate change. Instead, the rejection of pseudoscience was found to be a 
significant control variable, at the p<.01, impacting the score for the information 
overload treatment. The findings from all three models show that the experimental 
treatments did not have a significant impact upon the participants’ understanding 
of the causes of climate change, and instead shows that scientific literacy had a 
greater impact, with participants’ in model 1 able to reject incorrect scientific 
information.            
 The second dependent variable to be examined was the total count correct 
from six true or false climate change statements. The responses to the true or 
false statements about climate change had an interesting result (See Figure 6.2). 
Information overload had the largest result with a median score of 6 and the 
extreme low being a score of 4. In comparison both the other treatment groups 
and the control had a median score of 5 with the extreme low being a score of 3 
in both junk information and junk and overload information treatments. The 
control had one person scoring an extreme low of 0. This suggests that exposure 
to climate sceptic information negatively impacted the knowledge of climate 
science. This dependent variable tested whether they were able to reject climate 
sceptic arguments, such as the changes to the climate was due to natural causes, 
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or awareness of the consequences such as the melting of the ice caps. These 
found generally consistent responses with the majority of all participants aware 
that the ice caps were melting, but there was more variation in awareness of the 
scientific consensus (See Table 6.3). Those who received junk information were 
much more likely to be answering that there is disagreement surrounding climate 
science with 81.03% getting the question incorrect compared to 17.28% incorrect 
in the control group. This is not surprising considering examples of junk 
information provided in the media stimuli directly questioned the validity of climate 
science with articles such as WhoReallyKnows (2016) which directly claims that 
climate science is a hoax. However, this shows the worrying impact of junk 
information at undermining the perception of the climate consensus (see chapter 
2).  
Table 6-3: Example of results for two of the statements from climate change 
true false statements 
Statement Control Junk 
information 
Junk and 
information 
overload 
combined 
Information 
overload 
Correctly knew that 
climate change is 
causing the majority 
of glaciers and sea 
ice to melt around 
the world 
82.72% 88.97% 82.25% 91.35% 
Reject that scientists 
disagree about 
whether humans are 
causing the Earth’s 
climate to change 
82.72% 18.97% 37.23% 82.69% 
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Figure 6-2: True or False climate change statement results 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
Table 6-4: Logistic regression for participants’ score for true and false 
climate statements 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.42** 
0.13 
0.34* 0.13 
0.26* 0.13 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.09 
0.14 
0.08 0.15 
0.02 0.14 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.19 
0.22 
0.12 0.22 
0.05 0.21 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
0.54 
0.37 
-0.07 0.48 
0.05 0.49 
Probability 0.45 0.56 0.79 0.59 0.91 0.53 
Scientific 
method 
-0.29 
0.41 
-0.04 0.44 
0.09 0.47 
Junk info -0.22 0.26     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 
-0.06 
0.26 
 
 
Info overload     0.74** 0.24 
Adj. r2 0.09 0.13 0.10 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
  Model 1 found that junk information had a negative impact on the score, 
but this was not statistically significant (See table 6.4). Instead, the control 
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variable of the participants’ basic physical science knowledge was found to 
have positive and statistically significant impact on their score for true and false 
climate change statements at p<.01. Model 2 found that the junk information 
and information overload treatment had a slightly negative impact on the 
participant’s score, but this was not statistically significant. Instead, like the 
other two models, the control variable for basic physical science knowledge had 
a positive impact on their score for correct responses to the true and false 
climate change statements, and was statistically significant at p<.05. The 
logistic regressions for the climate change statements found in model 3, that the 
information overload media stimuli have a positive impact, was statistically 
significant at p<.01. In addition, the control variable for basic physical science 
knowledge was also found to have a positive impact on the score for true and 
false climate change statements. The findings from all three models show that 
basic knowledge of physical science had a greater impact on the participants’ 
knowledge of climate science than the media stimuli of the treatments.    
 The final dependent variable to examine for basic climate change 
knowledge, is whether the treatments impacted the basic knowledge of 
greenhouse gases (See Figure 6.3). The lowest scores for this variable were 
found in the control group with the extreme low being a score of 1. The median 
for the control and junk and information overload was a score of 6, while junk 
information and information overload had a median score of 5.  The range of 
correct answers varied between the control and the treatment groups, with the 
control having the lowest extreme low with two participants having a score of 1. 
These results suggest that the participants’ in all treatment groups and the control 
had a generally good knowledge of greenhouse gases.  
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Figure 6-3: Basic knowledge of Greenhouse gases 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
Table 6-5: Logistic regression for participant's score for greenhouse gases 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.92*** 0.17 0.95*** 0.20 0.93*** 0.19 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
0.26 0.20 -0.15 0.23 -0.11 0.20 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.60* 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.65* 0.32 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
-0.24 0.50 0.84 0.74 0.40 0.74 
Probability 0.16 0.77 0.66 0.91 0.79 0.79 
Scientific 
method 
-0.02 0.56 0.00 0.68 -0.08 0.71 
Junk info 0.50 0.35     
Junk and info 
overload 
  -0.03 0.40   
Info overload     -0.18 0.36 
Adj. r2 0.23 0.25 0.28 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
Model 1 (See table 6.5) showed that junk information did not undermine 
the participants’ knowledge of greenhouse gases it found that the control 
variables that had statistical significance was basic knowledge of physical 
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science at p<.001, and rejection of pseudoscience at p<.05. Both of these had a 
positive impact on the scores on the participants’ knowledge of greenhouse 
gases. Model 2 found that the junk information and information overload 
treatment did not have a statistically significant impact. This found that the basic 
knowledge of physical science was a key control variable that was statistically 
significant at p<.001 with a positive influence on the scores of the participants’ 
knowledge of greenhouse gases. Finally, model 3 found that the information 
overload treatment had no significant impact on the participants’ knowledge of 
greenhouse gases. There were two control variables that had a statistically 
significant impact on Model 3. First, basic knowledge of physical science was 
found to be significant at p<.001 that positively impacted the participants’ score. 
Second, the rejection of pseudoscience had a positive impact of their scores and 
was found to be statistically significant at p<.05. Overall, this dependent variable 
highlights the importance of basic physical science knowledge as a key factor on 
greenhouse gas knowledge regardless of treatments groups.        
 In summary, the basic knowledge of climate change appears to be much 
more influenced by the participants’ knowledge of basic physical science rather 
than the experimental treatments, with only Model 1 finding information overload 
to be significant in the true and false climate change statement score. Other 
control variables were shown to have significant impacts. Despite the lack of 
impact from the experimental treatments, this result has highlighted the 
importance of scientific literacy in improving the publics’ knowledge of climate 
change.   
 
6.2.2: Perception of risk 
 This section will examine whether the experimental treatments have 
influenced the participant’s perception of risk from climate change. There are four 
dependent variables being examined. First, examining whether the treatments 
have impacted the participant’s perception of the risk of climate change has on 
an individual level. Second, examining their perception of risk climate change 
poses to society. The third and fourth dependent variables examine whether there 
are differences in how they perceive risks to the UK from climate change 
compared to the perception of risk posed by climate change internationally.  
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 The perception of risk to the individual compared to the perceived risk of 
climate change to society, has some clear differences in the distribution of 
responses. There is a greatly reduced perception of risk to the individual in 
comparison to the perception of risk to society (See Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7). 
The perception of risk to the individual was lower in the junk information treatment 
group, with a median score of unlikely, compared to the control group which had 
a median score of likely. There was a larger range of responses to the risk posed 
by climate change to the individual. In comparison, the risk to society was seen 
as much greater, with all treatments having a smaller range of scores, but junk 
information had a median score of 4 compared to the other treatments and control 
that had a median score of 5.  
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Figure 6-4: Perception of risk from climate change to the individual 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
Table 6-6: Logistic regression for participants’ score for perception of risk 
to the individual from climate changes 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.30* 0.14 
 
0.16 
0.18 0.15 0.28* 0.14 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
0.13 -0.05 0.18 0.05 0.15 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
-0.37 0.24 -0.06 0.25 -0.21 0.24 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
-0.44 0.41 0.03 0.56 0.48 0.56 
Probability 0.55 0.63 0.58 0.69 0.29 0.60 
Scientific 
method 
0.33 0.46 0.07 0.51 -0.42 0.54 
Junk info -0.55 0.27     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 -0.05 0.30  
 
Info overload     0.43 0.27 
Adj. r2 0.2 -0.04 0.03 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
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Figure 6-5: Perception of the risk of climate change to society 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
 
Table 6-7: Logistic regression for participants’ score for perception of risk 
to society from climate change 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.22** 0.08 
0.09 
0.14 0.08 0.15* 0.07 
0.08 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.02 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.12 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
0.55* 0.22 0.02 0.28 -0.08 0.28 
Probability 0.92** 0.33 0.71* 0.34 0.59 0.30 
Scientific 
method 
-0.58* 0.24 -0.12 0.25 -0.04 0.27 
Junk info -0.49** 0.15     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
  0.15  
 
Info overload     0.26 0.14 
Adj. r2 0.09 0.16 0.25 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
 This dependent variable, measured the perception of risk posed by climate 
change to the individual level (See table 6.5). Model 1 showed that junk 
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information had a negative impact but was not statistically significant on the 
perception of risk to the individual. It also found that the only control variable that 
had a positive significant impact was the basic knowledge of physical science at 
p<.05. Model 2 found that the junk information and information overload treatment 
had a very slight impact on the score, but did not have statistical significance on 
the perception of risk to the individual. This also differs from Model 3 and Model 
1 as none of the control variables were significant. Model 3 shows that the 
information overload treatment did not have a significant impact on the perception 
of risk of climate change at the individual level. There was only one control 
variable that was significant at p<.05, and this showed that basic physical science 
knowledge increased the perception of risk. 
 This dependent variable examined the impact of the experimental 
treatments on the perception of the risk that climate change poses to society. 
Model 1 (see Table 6.6) shows that junk information undermines the perception 
of risk that climate change poses to society with a statistical significance at p<.01. 
There were three control variables that had a statistically significant positive 
impact on the score. The participants’ basic knowledge of physical science was 
found to be significant at p<.01. The understanding of probability was found to be 
significant at p<.01, and the understanding of the experimental method was 
significant at p<.05, both having a positive influence on the result. However, the 
understanding of the scientific method had a negative influence on the 
participants’ score and was statistically significant at p<.05. Model 2 found that 
the junk information and information overload treatment had no significant impact 
on the perception of risk to society posed by climate change. There was only one 
control variable that was statistically significant, with the understanding of 
probability having a positive impact on the perception of risk to society at p<.05. 
Model 3 found that the information overload treatment did not have a statistically 
significant impact. Only one control variable was found to be significant. This 
found that basic knowledge of physical science was significant at p<.05 with a 
positive effect on the score.          
 However, the impact of the treatment groups on the perception of risk to 
the UK and internationally, highlights an interesting difference where the 
participants viewed climate change as a greater risk to others (See Figure 6.6 
and Figure 6.7). The box plots show there was a clear perception in all treatment 
212 
 
groups that the risk that climate change posed was a greater risk internationally. 
The median score in the international risk of climate change found that the control 
and the treatment scored between 8 to 9 points out of 10 with only one outlier 
scoring less than 6. In contrast, the risk to the UK, received a wider array of scores 
in the control and the treatment groups. There was a median score of between 6 
to 7 points out of 10, with the range of responses varying considerably. For 
example, the control ranges from 3 to 10 points. This finding reflects the attitude 
that climate change is seen as an international issue rather than domestic (See 
chapter 3).    
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Figure 6-6: Risk of climate change internationally 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data. The results from for the risk of climate change 
internationally are from two questions; “Climate change is likely to cause severe food shortages 
in places like Africa and India” and “Extensive and long-lasting flooding caused by climate change 
is likely to take place in low-lying countries like Bangladesh and the Netherlands”. Participants 
were asked to respond on a scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree. These scores were 
combined, as they focused on international consequences of climate change.  
 
Table 6-8: Logistic regression for participants’ score for perception of risk 
that climate change poses internationally 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.20 0.13 
 
0.15 
0.10 0.14 0.16 0.13 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.15 -0.19 0.16 -0.16 0.14 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.25 0.22 0.59** 0.23 0.61** 0.22 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
0.24 0.38 0.97 0.51 0.66 0.52 
Probability 0.63 0.58 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.56 
Scientific 
method 
0.55 0.42 -0.36 0.46 -0.06 0.50 
Junk info 0.06 0.27     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 0.27 0.27   
Infor overload     -0.29 0.25 
Adj. r2 0.16 0.08 0.08 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
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Model 1 (See table 6.8) found that the junk information treatment did not 
have a significant impact. There were also no significant control variables. Model 
2 found that the junk information and information overload treatment was not 
significant. However, like Model 3, the rejection of pseudoscience was found to 
be significant at p<.01, and have a positive impact on the perception of risk 
climate change poses internationally. Model 3 found that information overload 
treatment did not have a significant impact on the perception of risk at the 
international level. The only control variable in Model 3 that was significant was 
the rejection of pseudoscience at p<.01, that was found to have a positive 
influence.          
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Figure 6-7: Risk of climate change to the UK 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data. The results for the risk to developing countries are from 
two questions; “Climate change is likely to cause severe food shortages in the UK” and “Extensive 
and long-lasting flooding caused by climate change is likely to take place in the UK”. Participants 
were asked to respond on a scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree. These scores were 
combined as they both measured the consequences to the UK. 
Table 6-9: Logistic regression for participants’ score for perception of risk 
that climate change poses to the UK 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.39* 0.18 
 
0.21 
0.35* 0.17 
 
0.28 0.16 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.08 -0.30 0.18 0.08 0.18 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
0.38 0.30 0.45 0.29 0.37 0.28 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
0.98 0.67 1.18 0.67 0.03 0.47 
Probability 0.46 0.82 0.99 0.72 0.42 0.72 
Scientific 
method 
-1.14 0.61 -1.00 0.64 -0.47 0.53 
Junk info -0.23 0.33     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 0.06 0.36   
Info overload     -0.36 0.32 
Adj. r2 0.08 0.02 0.05 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
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 Model 1 (see table 6.9) found that the junk information treatment had no 
significant impact. The control variables also had no statistical significance. 
Model 2 found that the junk information and information overload treatment had 
no significant impact. There was only one control variable found to be significant 
at p<.05, with basic knowledge of physical science having a positive impact on 
the score of the treatment group.  Model 3 found that the information overload 
treatment did not have a significant impact on the perception of risk to the UK. 
The only control variable that was found to be significant was the basic knowledge 
of physical science at p<.05 with a positive influence on the overall score. 
 Overall, junk information reduces the perception of risk to society from 
climate change. However, there was no significant change in how they viewed 
risk of climate change at an individual level, or how they perceived risk to the UK 
specifically or internationally. There was a perception that climate change was an 
external issue rather than an issue that will directly impact the participants, which 
reflects previous research (see chapter 3). The external view means they view 
there is a risk to society in general, but means that they believe they are not 
necessarily going to be directly affected. An interesting result from the models 
was a low adjusted R2 score on three of the four dependent risk variables with 
the exception of the risk posed to society. This suggests that additional factors 
not contained in the model influence the perception of risk. For example, 
ideological belief may be a factor at the individual level of perception of risk in 
comparison to the perceived risk to society (See Lakoff, 2010).    
 
6.2.3: Attitudes towards climate change mitigation 
The final dependent variables that this chapter will explore are the attitude 
to the mitigation of climate change. There are two dependent variables that 
measured whether the impact of the treatments influenced support for climate 
action. The first measured whether the participants supported action by the UK 
to reduce emissions or not due to climate change being an International issue. 
Second, this section examines whether the treatments have impacted whether 
the participants view climate change as too far away to be of concern.  
The first variable measured whether attitudes to the UK taking action to 
tackle climate change were impacted by the treatments. All the treatment groups 
and the control had a median score of 1 out of 5 to the statement that it is not 
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worth the UK taking action to combat climate change (See Figure 6.8). There was 
more variation in the control, junk information, and junk and information overload 
treatment with their extreme high score being 3 out of 5. There were a number of 
outliers. In particular, junk information treatment had one outlier scoring 4 points 
and another scoring 5, suggesting that there were some rejecting climate action.      
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Figure 6-8: Not worth Britain trying to combat climate change 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
Table 6-10: Logistic regression for participants’ score for support for UK 
action to deal with climate change 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
0.02 0.08 
 
 
0.09 
0.06 0.07 
 
 
0.09 0.08 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.10 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
-0.07 0.13 -0.08 0.12 -0.27 0.15 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
-0.65* 0.29 -0.57* 0.27 -0.38 0.25 
Probability -0.47 0.36 -0.60* 0.29 -0.34 0.38 
Scientific 
method 
1.03*** 0.26 0.94** 0.26 0.75** 0.28 
Junk info 0.37* 0.17     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 -0.02 0.16  
 
Info overload     -0.26 0.13 
Adj. r2 0.11 0.09 0.1 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
 Model 1 (See Table 6.10) found that junk information had a significant 
impact at p<.05, which had a positive influence on the score, meaning that they 
were more likely to accept that it is not worth Britain taking action to tackle 
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climate change. However, a larger impact was the control variable, which was 
the understanding of the scientific method being significant at p<.01. Model 2 
found the junk information and information overload treatment was not 
significant. Instead two control variables were found to be significant. The 
understanding of experiments was found to be significant at p<.05, and a good 
understanding increasing the attitude on the UK taking action to climate change. 
The second control variable in Model 2 that was significant, was the 
understanding of the scientific method, which was significant at p<.001. Model 3 
found no significant impact of the information overload treatment on the 
participants’ attitudes to climate action. Instead, the difference between the 
information overload and the control is explained by three control variables. 
Both the understanding of experiments and understanding of probability control 
variables were statistically significant at p<.05 and negatively impacted the 
score. The other control variable that had an impact, was the understanding of 
the scientific method, which was statistically significant at p<.01.             
 The second dependent variable examined, was whether the treatment 
groups impacted whether the participants perceived climate change mitigation as 
important or whether climate change was too far in the future to be a concern. 
The media score in all treatment groups and the control was ‘strongly disagree’ 
with the statement that climate change is too far in the future to worry about (See 
Figure 6.9). However, the junk information treatment had multiple outlier cases 
outside the range with scores in strongly agree and agree. This suggests climate 
sceptic material undermined some of the participants’ support for climate 
mitigation.  
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Figure 6-9: Climate change is too far in the future to worry about 
 
Note: Produced using the weighted data.  
Table 6-11: Logistic regression for participants’ score for perception that 
climate change is too far in the future to be a concern 
 Model 1 - Junk info Model 2 - Junk and 
Info overload 
Model 3 - Info 
Overload 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Basic Physical 
knowledge 
-0.04 0.10 
0.11 
-0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06 
Basic 
Biological 
Knowledge 
-0.09 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.07 
Rejection of 
pseudoscience 
-0.31 0.16 -0.12 0.12 -0.14 0.11 
Understanding 
Experimental 
method  
0.06 0.28 -0.51 0.27 -0.57* 0.25 
Probability 0.57 0.42 -0.28 0.33 -0.28 0.27 
Scientific 
method 
0.17 0.31 0.60* .245 0.63** 0.24 
Junk info 0.70*** 0.19     
Junk and info 
overload 
 
 -0.08 0.14   
Info overload     -0.22 0.12 
Adj. r2 0.05 0.11 0.02 
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01, and *** P < 0.001  
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Model 1 (See Table 6.11) found that junk information was significant at 
p<.001 on influencing attitudes to reject climate action. None of the control 
variables were found to be significant, meaning that junk information can have a 
serious impact on support for climate action. Model 2 found that the junk 
information and information overload treatment was not significant. Only one 
control variable was significant, with the understanding of the scientific method at 
p<.05, which suggest that this meant that the participants were able to reject such 
statements that attempts to undermine support for climate action. Model 3 found 
that the information overload treatment was not significant, but there were two 
control variables that were significant. The participants’ understanding of the 
experimental method, was significant at p<.05, and the other control variable was 
the understanding of the scientific method, which had a significance at p<.01. An 
interesting result from the models was a low adjusted r2 score suggesting that the 
perception of the need to take action was not inherently linked to scientific 
literacy. Potentially ideology could be a factor in motivating action (See Lakoff, 
2010).    
In summary, junk information has been shown to be significant in reducing 
the support for climate change mitigation. However, junk information in an 
information overload environment has no significant impact. There was also little 
impact of climate consensus information in an information overload treatment. 
This suggests that climate change information, both consensus and climate 
sceptic, have little impact when there is competition for the users attention.  
 
6.2: Summary:  
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that despite the generally high 
level of scientific literacy, there was also limited knowledge on climate change 
causes, which provides a barrier for changing behaviour (see chapter 3). The 
impact of the treatments on the dependent variables was mixed. The basic 
understanding of climate change was not impacted by the treatments, except for 
information overload stimuli being significant at positively predicting in the general 
knowledge of climate change, but apart from that no other treatment was 
significant. Instead, the key influence was found to be the control variable of basic 
knowledge of physical science.  
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Rather than impacting the understanding of climate change, the junk 
information treatment has been shown to undermine both perception of risk to 
society and support for climate action. In particular, Junk information had 
significant results to attitudes towards whether it was worth the UK aiming to 
combat climate change or if climate change was too far into the future to be a 
concern. However, the effect of junk information when in a situation of competition 
for the users’ attention, was non-existent, with no significance in any of the 
dependent variables. The impact of the stimuli of climate consensus material 
combine with information competition was also greatly diminished. These 
experimental findings suggest that junk information online is unlikely to mislead 
people, as they are unlikely to engage with climate change online, which reflects 
the findings of the focus groups (See chapter 5).  This poses significant barriers 
to climate change communication as users are filtering out climate change 
information online due to the number of other topics in competition for attention 
(See Chapters 2 and 3)    
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Chapter 7 - Discussion 
 
 The information society literature has been used to produce an analytical 
framework using the ‘dark side’ of the information society. The information society 
was visionary and there was the large scale increase of sharing and knowledge 
production. However, the light side was utopian and optimistic of the impact of 
information on society. The light side did not notice the negative consequences 
the dark side did, with both the potential spread of junk information (See chapter 
2) and information overload resulting in self-selection of information (see chapter 
3). The three aspects that emerge from the analytical framework of the dark side 
of the information society literature has enabled in depth analysis of the 
consequences for climate change communication online.  
 This chapter will firstly summarise the research question findings and 
whether the hypotheses have been supported. Second, I will compare my 
findings to previous knowledge and examine if my findings contrast with the 
established knowledge base or support it. The third section will evaluate the utility 
of the information society analytical framework and discuss where the visionaries 
of the light side went wrong. Finally, this chapter will discuss the changing trends 
in media consumptions. 
 
7.1: Summary of hypotheses 
 This section evaluates the findings from the experiments and there was 
mixed results on the hypotheses. Firstly, junk information had some interesting 
results. The participants had a generally good knowledge of climate science 
which was not impacted by the treatment which means that H1 can be rejected.   
H1. Contradictory information from the scientific consensus reduces young 
people’s understanding of climate science. 
However, there were consequences on perceptions of risk and support for 
climate action. The junk information treatment has reduced the perception of risk 
and was also found to be significant in reducing support for climate action so H2 
has some support.   
224 
 
H2. Climate sceptic material reduces young people’s perception of risk that 
climate change poses to society and undermines their support for climate 
mitigation. 
 In contrast junk the information overload treatment findings means that H3 
is partially supported but H4 is rejected: 
H3. Even with competition from differing topics in an information 
competitive environment the impact of climate change information on 
young peoples’ understanding of climate science will improve.  
H4. Despite the increased amount of information the perception of risk that 
climate change poses to society and support for climate mitigation will 
improve.    
 H3 is partially supported as climate science information even in an 
information competition environment was found to be statistically significant on 
the true and false statement questions about climate change. The other 
dependent variables measured had no significant results with control variables 
being found to be significant in the participants’ understanding of climate science. 
However, H4 can be rejected with the research finding no significance in any of 
the perception of risk or support for mitigation dependent variables suggesting 
the climate change information lacked impact on the participants when there were 
was competition for their attention.  
 A similar result can be seen in H5 and H6 with both being supported as 
junk information had no significant impact on any of the dependent variables 
when presented among over environmental issues:  
H5. This effect is reduced when presented alongside other topics 
competing for the young people’s attention. 
H6. Junk information in an information competition environment does not 
reduce young people’s perception of risk from climate change and does 
not undermine their support for climate mitigation. 
 This highlights that climate change is undermined when there is 
competition for the attention of users.   
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7.2: Findings 
The key finding from both the focus groups (see chapter 5) and the 
experimental analysis (see chapter 6) was the worrying behaviour to opt out of 
interacting with climate change online. The focus groups highlighted a self-
selection bias and many simply did not see climate change information online, 
but there were also barriers to them engaging with climate change. This was 
reflected in the focus groups that that online communication was seen as a form 
of entertainment (see chapter 5) with examples of the online sharing of material 
being shared online due to humour rather than being informative. Viral 
communication has the promise to reach large numbers cheaply and for dominant 
messages in politics to be challenged and subverted (See Cammaerts, 2007, 
Kien, 2013). While there is some environmental material that achieves viral 
success (see chapter 3), such as ‘A Cheesy Love Story – the Ad Doritos don’t 
want you to see’ (SumOfUs, 2015a), the focus groups reflected the failure of viral 
environmental content. The focus groups had a negative response to climate 
change information with many saying they simply did not see any online. This is 
due to the ever increasing amounts of information (See chapter 2) the Internet 
allows users access, which results in users developing strategies to reduce the 
diversity of information they receive (See Schumann, 2004).  
 In addition to information overload the junk information given to the 
participants has been shown to undermine their perception of risk. This reflects 
other research into the consequences of junk information on risk perception such 
as Kata (2012) who found public perception of risk from diseases was decreased 
and risk from vaccinations were increased by anti-vaccination material (see 
chapter 2). The reduction in the perception of risk is problematic as it undermines 
pressure for climate action (See chapter 3). However, basic understanding of 
climate science is important for the public to adequately process information 
about climate change.  
 The experiments have highlighted the risk of junk information on public 
perception of climate change. The Internet is problematic in this sense as anyone 
is able to produce online content. Climate sceptic material undermines the 
perception of risk and support for climate change mitigation. In particular, junk 
226 
 
information about climate change directly influences the perception of risk to 
society. This reflected previous research by Gavin (2009) and Sampei and 
Aoyagi-Usui (2009) which found that the public perceive climate change as an 
external risk and therefore, prioritised domestic issues such as healthcare and 
the economy.  
The information overload treatment group, which represented the 
information rich environment of the Internet, resulted in a decreased impact of 
climate sceptic material in undermining the participants’ perception of risk and 
attitudes towards climate mitigation. This suggests that junk information is not a 
particularly worrying aspect of Internet communication as the consequences are 
lesser than expected. While junk information could be engaged with there was 
little impact in an information overload environment. There is still a risk that junk 
information can be spread and has been shown to reduce the perception of risk 
and attitudes to mitigation, which means that it could be potentially damaging.  
 However, climate consensus information was also found to have little 
impact in the information overload treatment group. This may have been due to 
the generally high level of climate change concern and support for climate action, 
but it may also suggest a lack of engagement with climate change when there 
are other topics available. The latter is strongly inferred when both treatments for 
overload found little impact of climate change information both of the scientific 
consensus and climate sceptic on perception of risk and support for climate 
action. Therefore, information overload appears to be a significant impact on 
climate change communication online with users being simply able to opt out of 
coverage entirely.  
 This is a worrying result and highlights a barrier for communication of 
climate change. The Internet has the potential for the public to filter out climate 
change information as the user has become empowered and the sheer quantity 
of content results in filtering behaviour (see chapter 3). Climate change also 
struggles to gain attention online due the competition for user attention mainly 
being content shared for entertainment (see chapters 2 and 3). One positive 
aspect that this research has revealed is that the majority of young people in the 
experimental treatments view climate change as a significant risk to society and 
see the importance in political action to mitigate. Despite this perception being 
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embedded there will not be improvements in the understanding of climate science 
if there is no engagement with climate change coverage. It would have been 
interesting to run additional focus groups with those who took part in the 
experiments to see how they perceived this experience and how much the 
artificial environment of the experiment differed from their day to day experience 
with the Internet.  
 
7.3: The information society analytical framework 
The information society was conceptualised into a framework, but 
unfortunately the promises of the light side of the information society were too 
optimistic and failed to predict consequences of increased information sharing. 
The dark side of the information society has provided a key framework to facilitate 
an explanation of the difficulties of climate change communication online. The 
light side was inherently flawed as there was a belief that more information was 
inherently good. There was also the belief that increasing information being 
created would also beneficial. Unfortunately, the biological limitations of 
information processing (See chapter 3) have meant that information overload is 
a significant threat (See chapter 2). In addition, the creation of junk information, 
which also become harder to tackle in high information environments, that can 
mislead the public and reinforce previously held climate sceptic beliefs (See 
chapter 2).   
The Internet has been shown in previous research by Anderson (2009) to 
be the key way that people receive climate change information. The focus groups 
highlighted a lack of engagement with climate change and instead people used 
the Internet to engage with entertainment. The main finding for this research 
question was the significant disengagement with climate change online. Instead 
there was an active behaviour by some participants to filter out climate 
information. Attempts at communicating climate change virally through social 
media are also problematic while engagement with viral communication was 
normalised.  
Information overload poses a key problem with a lack of engagement with 
climate change information. This is potentially a broader issue for science 
communication in general as the public are more likely to come across science 
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in popular culture. Popular culture representations of science are generally 
misleading or promote myths for example Nisbet et al. (2002) highlight the X Files 
series for representing science as negative or not adequate to explain events. 
For example, an episode called ‘F. Emasculata’ represents scientists as immoral, 
while also playing into fears of the pharmaceutical industry, with the episode plot 
set in a prison where scientists from a pharmaceutical corporation are destroying 
evidence of the testing of a deadly contagion on the prison population (Bowman, 
1995).  
 Therefore, there is a concern that climate change understanding can be 
undermined by poor portrayals in entertainment and reducing scientific 
inaccuracy is important as the information rich environment potentially results in 
the public opting out of climate science information (see chapter 3). An example 
of climate change in popular culture can be seen in the film ‘The Day After 
Tomorrow’ which the plot focuses on rapid extreme weather events triggered by 
climate change causing large scale destruction (Emmerich, 2004). This was a 
concern highlighted by Leiserowitz (2004) that the extreme portrayal and 
representation of science might result in the public rejecting climate science 
altogether. Instead, Leiserowitz (2004) found that perception of risk was 
increased and encouraged viewers to change their behaviours. Despite the fact 
that risk perception increases due to the impact of the film, there was limited long-
term impact with surveys suggesting no change in the US publics’ attitudes to 
climate change (Leiserowitz, 2004). This is concluded by Leiserowitz (2004) that 
for information salience there requires repeated exposure.  
This lack of engagement was reflected when exploring the sharing of 
information with others online. This was explored using the following research 
questions:  
• Context: How do Internet users perceive their engagement with the 
Internet and connectivity?  
• Context: Do users receive and engage with information about climate 
change through their Internet and social media usage?  
• Context: Are there barriers to interacting with climate change information 
online? 
• Sharing: How do Internet users share information with others? 
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The development of web 2.0 resulted in the rise of social media where 
information is shared amongst networks of users. This has enabled the potential 
of viral sharing of climate change information with the sharing of climate memes. 
Internet memes have the potential to enable the communication of climate 
change to the public quickly and on a large scale. Environmental non-
governmental organisations [NGOs] are argued by Schafer (2012, p. 530) “… to 
be the champions of online climate communication” with them adopting digital 
campaigning to share climate change information, increase awareness, and raise 
campaign funds. However, there is a lack of engagement with climate change 
information online. 
The experiments have been used to explore the impact of the Internet on 
climate change communication. The experiments were used to examine the 
consequences of both junk information and information overload on participants’ 
understanding of climate change, their perception of risks, and their attitudes 
towards climate mitigation. The experiments found the treatments in particular 
impacted their perception of climate risk and support for climate action. This 
section will answer the following subsidiary research questions: 
Junk information: To what extent does information on climate change that 
contradicts the scientific consensus undermine public understanding of 
climate change?  
Information overload: Does the competition for the user’s attention reduce 
the effectiveness of climate change information?  
Information overload and junk information: Does information that 
contradicts the scientific consensus have less of an impact when there is 
competition for young people’s attention?    
The experiments have shown that junk information alone is problematic 
and can negatively impact perception of risk and support for mitigation in society. 
However, the information overload treatments reflect the findings from the focus 
groups with a lack of engagement with little significant differences between the 
information overload treatment groups and the control.  
The consequences of dark side of the information require further research, 
but this exploratory research does suggest that the dark side of the information 
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society has unfortunately become dominant and will continue to do so with the 
use of the Internet normalised across wider society. This poses new risks of junk 
information, but in particular, information overload poses a very significant threat 
to climate change information with the public being able to opt out of climate 
change coverage. This behaviour was shown in the experiments with youg 
people. However, further research is discussed in chapter 8 to see if these 
findings are generalizable to wider society and whether there are differences in 
cross national contexts.  
The analytical framework produced using the dark side of the information 
society is particularly useful for contextualising diverse Internet use for exploring 
climate change communication online. These three aspects overlap significantly, 
but exploring sharing in a controlled environment was not possible in this 
experimental design, but these did allow for measurement of the impact of junk 
information and in a limited capacity information overload. However, the focus on 
scientific literacy as the control variables in the model does not necessarily predict 
reactions to climate change information. For example, the low adjusted r2 scores 
on three of the perception of risk models and the attitudes to climate change being 
too far in the future to be a concern could be influenced by additional factors. This 
can include pre-existing ideological filtering of information posing a barrier to 
climate change communication  (See Lakoff, 2010). Therefore, there is the 
potential to improve the application of the analytical framework in future research 
with the additional of ideological control variable. In addition, the control variables 
in the regression models could have potentially benefited from measure pre-
existing attitudes to climate change, but if this was added it could have potentially 
changed the participant’s in the information overload treatments as they would 
have been aware of the focus on climate change.     
 
7.4: Changing media consumption 
In my research, I have found two key issues with communicating climate 
change using the Internet. Firstly, there is a risk of decreased engagement with 
young people opting out of climate change information. The key findings from the 
focus groups found that young people engage with online content for 
entertainment and were worried about potential backlash when engaging with 
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serious issues. Secondly, the level of understanding of climate science was also 
found to be very low. The exposure to junk information was found to undermine 
the perception of risk and decrease the participant’s views on climate change 
mitigation. However, this effect was greatly reduced in an information overload 
environment, which reflected the findings of the focus group, that there was a lack 
of engagement with climate change information. This is problematic as the 
Internet becomes increasingly important to receive information and news as 
people will simply filter out and opt out of climate change coverage which would 
undermine support for climate mitigation.    
As previously discussed in chapter 1 we have seen the decline of 
traditional media with newspapers in decline. However, the meta-medium that is 
the Internet is increasingly becoming dominant in our lives. This was reflected by 
a key finding from the focus groups was that the Internet was significant in all the 
participants’ lives. There was a feeling that they were always connected and often 
only noticed this when they lost access. The Internet was a key source for 
information and connections with other users with social media playing a key role. 
These results were expected considering previous studies Pew Research Center 
(n.d.) showing the rising social media use across society and Ofcom (2015) 
highlighting the number of hours people spend online averaging 20.5 hours a 
week with young people averaging 27.6 hours.  
• Context: How do Internet users perceive their engagement with the 
Internet and connectivity?  
 The focus groups found that the participants’ viewed their engagement 
with the Internet as constant. Some even went so far as to suggest they only 
noticed their dependency on the Internet when it was not available. The Internet 
was shown as significant in their lives, but not simply for accessing information, 
but for a wide range of social and entertainment reasons such as social media 
and online gaming (Ofcom, 2015). Therefore, the presumption of climate change 
engagement is questionable as the Internet enables access to climate change 
information, but also potentially distracts users.  
The Internet empowers users with more control over the content they 
receive online and potentially result in users to filtering out information that 
challenges their world views (See Garrett, 2009). Along with this filtering out of 
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climate change information viral communication also reflected the argument of 
Chesterman (2011) that survivability of Internet culture requires viral content to 
have variety and mutability. The focus group participants have shown a key 
motivation of young people to engage with viral content is not due to knowledge 
transfer but instead for entertainment purposes. 
Instead the participants gave examples that they had engaged with 
entertainment memes, such as ‘Grumpy Cat’, with engagement being driven by 
recreation rather than for education or information gathering purposes. There 
were some instances where viral content reached the participants despite the 
filtering of content with shocking material shared for entertainment such as ‘Shrek 
is Life, Shrek is Love’. FG1 had shared awareness of this shocking viral content, 
but a key reason this reached such a large audience was due to the entertainment 
of getting other people to react to it.  
 The risk of distracting can seriously undermine climate communication by 
simply getting the public to choose not to engage with climate change information 
or due to automated algorithms simply never showing them climate change or 
wider environmental information. The lack of engagement is also driven by the 
continued amount of information available online with video content on Youtube 
increasing by one hundred hours every minute (Youtube, n.d.-b). In this situation 
junk information itself is not the largest problem as actually getting users to 
engage with climate change is becoming harder.   
 Unfortunately, this has meant that attempts at viral communication of 
climate change are not engaged with due to the personalisation of the Internet 
experience. This means that attempts at viral sharing climate change 
communication will reach those already interested in climate change while 
information competition persists due to the information rich environment. 
Therefore, those reached through the use of viral communication were 
predominately already interested in climate change. Those who were not already 
interested are unlikely to be reached unless the content was shocking enough or 
entertaining to get their attention. Still a problem with media is that we do not 
know the impact on the end user so something shocking or shared for 
entertainment may not significantly educate or inform the user.  
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 Successful viral communication requires engagement with an audience 
online to share the content to a wider audience and without this engagement 
climate change struggles to become widely shared. The difficulties SumofUs 
(n.d.) faced highlight the issue for getting environmental content shared. Even if 
content manages to reach a wide enough audience to achieve a viral reach, such 
as the ‘Advert Doritos Don’t want you to See’ by SumOfUs (2015a), there is still 
the problem that the content will not survive long within Internet culture. This is 
why MLP memes have been so successful. In the case of the SumOfUs (2015a) 
as there is the initial viral success, but declines relatively quickly as it is a single 
video so it lacks variety and it is also not easily mutable. This contrasts with other 
content such as Shrek is Life Shrek is Love by Sykotic (2014) had a wider reach 
due to wide range of reaction videos that came from the initial viral video providing 
both variety and mutability of the meme.   
These previous examples are mapped onto the model of successful viral 
content previously discussed in chapter 3 (See Figure 7.1) which highlights the 
problem faced with attempts at communicating climate change virally. Climate 
change messages fails to reach enough people to get the momentum required 
for viral sharing and instead only generally reach networks of environmental 
activists who are already engaged with the subject. This means that 
environmental content declines quickly and instead distracting memes that simply 
seek to entertain the user are much more successful at becoming viral. This 
highlights the problem the produce viral climate change content that will survive 
in Internet culture to have long term impact rather than rapidly fading.  
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Figure 7-1: Model of sharing illustrated with examples 
 
 
In addition, the focus groups highlighted that there were additional barriers 
to getting young people to engage with climate change due to a fear of backlash 
if the participants took part in climate change discussions. The lack of 
engagement was further intensified with the Internet not being seen as a serious 
place to engage with discussions online. Therefore, the Internet poses a key 
challenge with getting young people (and possibly the general public) to engage 
with climate change with the ease of being to opt out of coverage meaning that 
the chance of content become viral is lessened and the social media is instead 
dominated by viral content for entertainment.   
   
7.5: Overall summary 
The findings of this research suggest the Internet is problematic for the 
communication of climate change. The personalised Internet experience means 
that it is easy for users to simply opt out of climate change coverage. However, 
the focus groups highlighted three potential barriers for climate change 
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information to achieve large scale sharing. Firstly, there was disengagement with 
climate change generally with participants filtering out climate science 
information. Secondly, there was a lack of trust surrounding shared content. 
Finally, there was a fear that sharing climate change material may result in a 
backlash from other users online. Even with the fear of backlash there was the 
additional issue that young people simply viewed the Internet as a place for 
entertainment and has limited interest in engaging with serious issues. The fear 
of backlash just motivates users to opt out of coverage of significant issues as 
they do not feel that engagement with the issue is of their interest and concerns 
about their own safety. 
 The opportunity to share information virally, while being a cheap method 
of reaching a large audience, is flawed for climate communication. Viral 
communication is generally shared for entertainment purposes and the speed of 
Internet culture requires content that can easy be mutated to continue long-term 
viral success. Even then there are significant barriers to developing young 
peoples’ online engagement with climate communication as online discussions 
were seen as a waste of time in comparison to face-to-face discussions. At the 
same time the quality of online discussions were seen as very low with other 
users posting jokes or derailing discussions of serious issues in particular with 
the result of a lack of engagement due to fear of online harassment or simply 
wasting their time. 
 The lack of sharing of climate change information and the lack of 
engagement with information about climate science is deeply disturbing. The 
Internet has become central in young people’s lives with connectivity constantly 
expected. However, this is being used to opt out of climate change coverage and 
other serious issues in society.  Finding an approach to encourage the sharing of 
climate change information online is important, but there are additional barriers 
to engagement with the Internet in generally being seen as a waste of time to 
discuss serious issues online and the fear of backlash from other users.  
Therefore, the Internet has had significant impacts on the effectiveness of 
climate change communication. Junk information being widely shared is a 
potential risk to undermining public reactions to climate change, but more 
important are the consequences of information overload. The ability of users to 
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opt out of climate change coverage is the major problem posed, as by opting out 
they do not develop their understanding of climate science and this undermines 
public pressure for climate action.   
237 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
My research has found there are very concerning key issues with online 
communication of climate change. This thesis has made a distinctive contribution 
to the field by developing the information society theory into an analytical 
framework. This has built on an interdisciplinary range of subjects engaging with 
information processing, science communication, and media theory. The research 
has expanded beyond media trends and discourse analysis to examine the 
consequences of the meta media of the Internet on communication of climate 
change and how it has shaped reactions to climate science.   
In particular, the dark side of the information society has provided an 
analytical framework to explore the impact of the Internet on climate change 
communication. While theorists such as Bell (1973) and Masuda (1980) had 
overly optimistic views with predictions of the light side of the information society 
it is important to note that their work was visionary. The sharing of information 
and increased freedom of access to information has occurred with increased 
knowledge creation (See chapter 2), rather than producing collective intelligence 
(See Masuda, 1985) and collective processing, we have instead witnessed the 
biological limits to information processing which has resulted in information 
overload with consequences of disengagement with climate change as users 
filter out information (See chapter 3), while it has also become potentially easier 
to mislead the public with junk information (See chapter 2). This chapter will first 
examine the findings of this research on key aspects, sharing, junk information 
and information overload, of the dark side of the information society. This will be 
followed by an examination of the implications of this study and how we can seek 
to improve climate change communication online with recommendations for 
future research. 
  
8.1: Sharing 
The focus groups reflected the impact of the Internet on the participants’ 
day to day lives. However, the key finding from the focus groups is that the 
Internet poses significant barriers to engagement with and sharing of climate 
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change information. A core barrier is a lack of interest or the view that the topic 
is depressing. This results in users spending their time looking at other topics 
rather than engaging with climate science. This poses an even greater problem 
with the personalisation of the Internet providing a major barrier for climate 
science communication. The lack of interest undermines the potential use of the 
Internet to spread climate change information virally as the public are much more 
likely to ignore it rather than share it on social media. Instead the focus groups 
highlighted that they shared online content for entertainment rather than for 
communication of serious issues in society. These findings generally corroborate 
research on information processing (chapter 3) and online sharing of information 
(chapter 2). There were some additional findings with examples of online sharing 
being driven by shock humour and viral content being seen as a form of 
entertainment rather than information sharing (See chapter 5). This is problematic 
for environmental organisations trying to communicate global issues through the 
platform. Even if content is virally successful it is unclear whether there is a 
significant impact on the audience (See chapter 3). 
Alongside the use of the Internet for entertainment, there were a number 
of additional barriers to communicating climate change online found in the focus 
groups that further undermined engagement with climate change online. In 
particular, there were three barriers to public engagement and sharing of climate 
change information. Firstly, there was a perception that the Internet was not a 
serious place for discussion. This was due to online discussions being seen as 
having a lack of impact or at worst being a waste of time in comparison to face to 
face discussions. Secondly, the focus groups also highlighted a perception that 
virally shared information was untrustworthy. Finally, engagement is further 
undermined by a fear of negative backlash and the potential of online 
harassment. There was a perception that this risk was less or unlikely to occur 
when discussing hobbies or entertainment in comparison with issues that they 
considered serious societal issues. All of these factors potentially significantly 
limit them seeing and sharing of climate change information online.   
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8.2: Junk information and information overload 
Even if users engage with climate science, there is a risk that they can be 
misled by junk information. The Internet poses a problem with the fact that anyone 
can create content. In addition to this, there is the chance that incorrect 
information can be virally successful and attempting to contest successful viral 
material is a challenge. Climate sceptic information can mislead the public and 
reduce their perception of the risk from climate change while also making the 
public feel uncertain about climate science as it appears that the science is still 
debated. This is even more potentially problematic as the publics’ understanding 
of climate science has been shown as low (See Bord et al., 2000, Pidgeon, 2012). 
In contrast, the findings from this research found that young people had a good 
understanding of climate science.  
However, the risk posed by climate sceptic material was reflected in the 
experimental results that found the junk information treatment reduced the 
perception of risk and support for climate change mitigation. The level of 
understanding between the treatment groups was unaffected by the media stimuli 
and shaped instead by scientific literacy. The impact that junk information had 
was only present when there was no competition for the user’s attention. Instead 
there was no significant impact on the perception of risk posed or support for 
climate change mitigation when there was competition for the user’s attention 
when given a choice of environmental information.  
The experimental design for information overload used three 
environmental science issues with climate change being in competition with 
genetically modified organisms and pesticides. Unfortunately the Excel sheets 
could not record what was clicked on and the open question at the end of the 
experiment asking the participants' what they looked at and why resulted in 
useless answers of “what interested me”. This gave the participants choice 
between three environmental issues to focus on, but the Internet poses a greater 
challenge as climate change is in competition for attention from a vast array of 
topics and entertainment such as cat (See chapter 2) or MLP memes (See 
chapter 3). The impact of junk information in an information overload treatment 
did not have an impact and was found to not be significant. However, there was 
no significant finding with climate consensus treatment when there was 
information competition suggesting that when given other choices they simply did 
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not engage with the material to make any significant impact to their perceptions 
or understanding. This highlights the need for further research as the 
simplification of the Internet experience means that the Internet holds nearly 
unlimited distractions.  
These results from the experimental treatments reflect the findings from 
the focus groups which have shown a lack of engagement with climate change 
information. This is a serious issue for public communication of climate change 
and creating political pressure for mitigation. In addition this is problematic for the 
public to build understanding of the issue of climate change it requires 
engagement and time to build the frames necessary (See Lakoff, 2010). This is 
completely undermined if people are simply opting out of climate change 
coverage. 
The findings of the experiment are even more concerning given that the 
information overload is only very simplistic version of the experience of the 
Internet. The Internet gives access to a massive and ever growing range of topics 
and content which is accessible whenever a user wants. This is problematic as 
we can only focus on a limited number of issues at any one time (See Dunaway 
et al., 2010). Therefore, the Internet, while providing us new opportunities to 
communicate climate change with the public, has also made this process 
increasingly difficult and is a significant barrier to getting engagement with climate 
science or support for climate action.  
 The information society which we live in has offered us new approaches 
to climate change communication with social media and viral sharing of content. 
However, both the focus groups and experiments have found disengagement 
with climate change as a major issue facing the communication of climate 
science. This is compounded by the perception of viral content as untrustworthy 
and for entertainment online. This suggests that viral attempts to communicate 
climate change will have limited success or simply fail to gain a viral reach. Even 
then we face the problem that the public filter out climate change content. This 
means that the Internet has both provided easy access to climate science, but at 
the same time created significant barriers to encouraging public understanding 
and for creating support for climate action. 
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8.3: Implications of the findings:  
 The implications of these findings are deeply concerning. They highlight 
that rather than the optimistic predictions of the light side of the information 
society we instead have the consequences of the dark side to contend with. The 
major problem facing communicating climate change to the public is information 
overload resulting in people filtering out climate change information (See chapter 
2). This is due to biological limitations on information processing (See chapter 3). 
However, the consequences of users being able to choose which information they 
engage with means that simply opt out of climate change coverage. 
 While the experiment produced a simplistic replication of the Internet 
experience, the findings are particularly worrying that information overload is a 
significant issue in communicating climate change. In the real world, there would 
be an even greater array of distractions from climate change which makes this 
finding even more worrying. The use of students can cause debates in 
generalisability, but the findings were also an unsettling result when the focus of 
students was done because young people are early adopters of social media 
(See chapter 1). This means as the Internet becomes increasingly normalised 
within society, there is the risk that communicating climate change to the general 
public will become increasingly more difficult as more people simply opt out of 
coverage.  
 The findings also suggest that junk information is not as problematic as 
presumed by previous research which has primarily focused on climate sceptic 
coverage and discourses (See Nerlich, 2010, Oreskes and Conway, 2010, 
Painter and Gavin, 2016). Climate sceptic information was simply not engaged 
with or ignored with no significant impact on the reactions of the participants. 
However, climate consensus was also found to have no significant impact in the 
information overload treatment. Therefore, this research differs significantly 
from previous research that has been concerned about climate sceptic material 
online as instead the Internet poses the more significant problem of even 
getting the message to the wider public in the first place, whether it is sceptical 
about climate change or not.     
 This leaves us with the problem of how do we improve climate change 
communication online. There have been examples of successful environmental 
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messages shared online, but these have failed to survive for a long time in the 
fast-moving online environment. Instead, information overload means that 
climate change messages need to be designed to be emotive and entertaining 
yet mutable so they survive longer (a key factor to the success of MLP memes 
discussed in chapter 3). This could be explored in greater detail and using a larger 
sample but due to the limitations of the PhD, with both limited budget and limited 
time, made recruiting additional participants problematic.  
 
8.4: Future research 
These findings suggest that there are three key areas to explore in future 
research. Firstly, the generalisability of the findings needs to be tested with further 
research looking at a wider range of ages. Secondly, how we can seek to improve 
climate change communication online and whether we can improve the spread 
of environmental messages through viral content production. Finally, the potential 
cultural differences between the UK and other countries when it comes to Internet 
use and climate change engagement.  
The first area for further research would be the expansion of research to 
compare young people (18-25) to other age groups. The exploratory nature of 
this research meant that the focus was on young people due to them being early 
adopters (see chapter 1). While Internet use in other age groups has caught up 
the personalisation of the Internet experience means that there may be significant 
differences in types of use and the potential impact of junk information could be 
greater on older age groups or differences in how reliable the Internet is viewed 
as a source of information. This can be explored through experiments examining 
whether climate sceptic material or in right wing newspapers has greater impact 
on differing age groups or whether there is a difference between young and older 
participants in trust of information sources. Additional experimental research 
would be interesting to carry out to examine whether videos have a larger impact 
on participants’ reactions to climate change information. This would be important 
to examine as videos are shared just as easily as blogs and news articles. 
Therefore, it would be important to examine whether they have a reduced impact 
in an information overload environment. 
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Secondly, this means that there are areas for future research to examine 
how to improve climate change communication in an information overload 
environment. Research to explore how climate change information is transferred 
through social networks would be valuable. Network analysis would enable 
exploration of whether climate change information simply only reaches 
environmentalists or if there is wider audiences receiving climate change 
information. Network analysis can also allow for the analysis of the success and 
longevity of climate change memes. This analysis approach would also allow 
examination of the size and organisation of climate sceptic networks on social 
media and also examine whether they have the ability to influence the general 
public or if these networks simply reinforce climate sceptic beliefs in those who 
already hold them. In particular, Twitter would be a good case study to focus on 
as users do not receive an experience controlled by an algorithm, but instead 
everything is self-selected by the user (See chapter 3). This would enable 
exploration of climate change communities and content analysis of what makes 
a successful Tweet with a climate message or whether they fail to reach a wider 
audience.     
 Additionally, it would be useful to explore the motivations of those who 
produce viral content and whether they significantly differ from those trying to 
communicate climate change virally. This could also evaluate whether there is a 
difference in reception and online engagement, potentially exploring whether 
there are online behaviours that could be encouraged to benefit the spread of 
climate change content online. There is a potential for a qualitative study with 
digital campaigners for key environmental NGOs and those who make popular 
viral content, for example from the Brony subculture (See chapter 3), which would 
enable examination of differing motivations, perceptions, and attitudes to content 
creation. Information overload poses a serious difficulty in effective online 
communication of climate change and finding a method to create successful viral 
content online is important to avoid people filtering out climate science entirely. It 
is important to find ways to present accurate climate science information in an 
entertaining way and to motivate the public to mutate the content to continue its 
spread.     
 Finally, there is also the potential to examine whether there are cultural 
differences. For example there is the potential to compare countries which 
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support the climate consensus, such as Germany, and those where climate 
change is seen as much more controversial, such as the United States. This 
form of comparative exploration would allow to explore whether cultural 
differences in both attitudes and Internet use impact climate reactions.   
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Appendix A: Example focus group consent form 
 
The gathering of information on climate change and usage of the Internet  
Purpose 
You are being asked to participate in a focus group that seeks to gather 
information over the use of the Internet to gather information on topics. In 
particular, this research is aiming to gain an awareness of how you gather 
information on climate change and your wider usage of the Internet such as 
activity in online communities.    
Results from the focus groups will be used in my PhD thesis to inform the 
academic debate about climate change communication and maybe used in 
other academic publications.  
Procedure 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to take part in a focus group of 
four to six participants lasting approximately an hour. Participants are invited to 
express their views and discuss how they engage with the Internet to find 
information on topics such as climate change. The focus group will be recorded 
on a Dictaphone.  
Risks 
There are no risks to you for participation in this study.   
Anonymity 
Any information you give will be strictly anonymous.  Your name and any other 
identifying or personal information will not be used.  Data will be stored securely 
and anonymised.   
Costs 
There will not be any cost to you beyond the time and effort that is required in 
taking part in the focus group.  
Right to Refuse or Withdraw 
Participation is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may change your 
mind at any time and withdraw from the study.  Your refusal to participate will 
not affect you in any way.  During the focus group, you may decline to answer 
any questions.   
Questions 
If you have any questions then please contact myself, Phillip Passmore at: 
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Email: psp205@exeter.ac.uk  
If you have any concerns and wish to contact someone else at the University of 
Exeter please email my PhD supervisor Dr Clare Saunders at 
C.Saunders@exeter.ac.uk or telephone 01326 259466. 
Consent Statement 
I agree to take part in this research and am aware that I am free to withdraw at 
any point.  I understand that the information I provide will be treated in 
confidence by the researcher and that my identity will remain anonymous in the 
publication of any findings.  
Consent: TICK HERE:   
 
Please indicate if you would like to see copies of research reports that use data 
collected in these focus groups. These will be provided via email.    TICK 
HERE:   
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from the collected experimental 
data.  
Name:          
 
Email:           
 
Signature:           
 
Date:            
 
Researcher: Phillip Passmore 
Signature of researcher          
Two copies will be signed with a copy provided for the participant.   
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Appendix B: Example experiment consent form 
Impact of the internet upon public understanding of science  
 
Purpose 
You are being asked to participate in a research experiment. This research is 
aiming to gain an awareness of the impact of the Internet upon public 
understanding of science. 
Results from the experiment will be used in my PhD thesis and possibly used in 
academic publications.   
 
Procedure 
If you decide to participate you will be asked to take part with a group of 
participants where an experiment will be carried out which will take around 30 
minutes of your time. This experiment requires you to complete a scientific 
literacy test (results are completely anonymous and recorded as group 
average), and a series of survey questions. Instructions will be given before the 
experiment begins. 
 
Risks 
There are no risks to you for participation in this study.   
 
Anonymity 
Any information you give will be strictly anonymous.  You name or any other 
identifying characteristics will not be used. Data will be stored securely and 
anonymised.    
 
Costs 
There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort that is required in taking part 
in the experiment.  
 
Right to Refuse or Withdraw 
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Participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate you may 
change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study.  Your refusal to 
participate will not affect you in any way.   
Questions 
If you have any questions then please contact myself at: 
Email: psp205@exeter.ac.uk  
If you have any concerns and wish to contact someone else at the University of 
Exeter please email my PhD supervisor Dr Clare Saunders at 
C.Saunders@exeter.ac.uk  
Consent Statement 
I agree to take part in this research and am aware that I am free to withdraw at 
any point.  I understand that the information I provide will be treated in 
confidence by the researchers and that my identity will be protected in the 
publication of any findings.  
Consent: TICK HERE:   
Please indicate if you would like to see copies of research reports that use data 
collected in these experiments. These will be provided via email.    TICK 
HERE:   
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from the collected experimental 
data.  
Name:          
Email:           
 
Signature:            
Date:             
Researcher: Phillip Passmore 
Signature of researcher           
Two copies will be signed with a copy provided to the participant.   
283 
 
Appendix C: Stage One Focus group Interview plan 
Research Question:  
How do Internet users engage with climate science and policy debates 
surrounding anthropogenic climate change?  
 
Do users select information that fits into their pre-conceived ideas?  
Where do users engage with climate change debates?  
Do users receive information about climate change through social media? 
 
Start of interview:  
[Participant consent forms handed out and collected when signed]  
 
Introduction  
Thank you for spending your time to help my research. This focus group will 
seek to gain an awareness of how you gather information of climate change and 
your usage of the Internet to engage with current events. The focus groups will 
be used to inform my research examining the impact of the Internet upon public 
understanding of climate change.  
The discussion should take no longer than an hour of your time.  
There are no right or wrong answers with differing points of view. Please be 
respectful to each other.  
My role as the focus group facilitator is to guide the discussion and prompt for 
more information. 
To start can we go round in the circle introducing ourselves.   
 
Questions:  
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To begin how do you use the Internet in your day to day lives?  
Why do you use the Internet? 
What do you use the Internet for? 
When do you use the Internet? 
Potential follow up questions:  
Do you consider yourself a participant in on an online community?  [Do you 
regularly contribute to online forums; to blogs; to Youtube discussions; etc.] 
How do you use social media? For example to gain information about specific 
interests, for entertainment, to stay in touch with friends?   
 
Gauge levels of interest in climate change 
 
Gauge levels of understanding about climate change; what do they believe 
about climate change. How do they react to information that challenges what 
they believe? 
 
Do you see climate change information and discussions online?  Which online 
sources do you see climate change information? 
Do you actively seek information on climate change, or do you come across 
climate change content when browsing the Internet? 
What proportion of what you see online is on climate change? 
Prompt: For example do you see environmental memes? (Examples in 
Appendix A will be printed in colour on A4 paper and shown to participants at 
this point)  
Do you engage with climate change information or participate in climate change 
discussions?  
Read 
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Share 
Discuss 
Sign online petitions 
 
Take in some memes (one warmists, one from sceptics) how would you react to 
this if you saw it online? Appendix B  
 
Closing statement:  
Thank you for your time for helping with this research. A summary of the 
research findings will be provided if ticked on the consent form. 
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Hand out 1: Example of an environmental meme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
287 
 
Hand out 2: Examples of competing climate change memes -Warmist meme 
and climate sceptic meme 
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Appendix D: Phase Two Focus Group Interview plan 
 
Research Question:  
How do Internet users engage with climate science and policy debates 
surrounding anthropogenic climate change?  
 
• Do users select information that fits into their pre-conceived ideas?  
• Where do users engage with climate change debates?  
• Do users receive information about climate change through social media? 
 
Start of interview:  
[Participant consent forms handed out and collected when signed]  
 
Introduction  
Thank you for spending your time to help my research. This focus group will 
seek to gain an awareness of how you gather information of climate change and 
your usage of the Internet to engage with current events. The focus groups will 
be used to inform my research examining the impact of the Internet upon public 
understanding of climate change.  
The discussion should take no longer than an hour of your time.  
There are no right or wrong answers with differing points of view. Please be 
respectful to each other.  
My role as the focus group facilitator is to guide the discussion and prompt for 
more information. 
To start can we go round in the circle introducing ourselves?   
 
Questions:  
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To begin how do you use the Internet in your day-to-day lives?  
Why do you use the Internet? 
What do you use the Internet for? 
When do you use the Internet? 
Do you read newspapers or watch television news? 
 
Do you use social media?  
How do you use social media? 
Do you use it to connect to friends and family? 
Do you access information through social media? 
 
Are you a participant in online community? [Do you regularly contribute to online 
forums; to blogs; to Youtube discussions; etc.] 
Do you receive information through online communities?  
What motivates you to engage with online communities?  
 
Do you trust information you see online?  
Do you engage with online discussions?  
Do you engage in online political discussions?  
Do you engage with debates surrounding science and technology? 
 
Do you see memes in your general Internet usage? [Show Appendix A example 
of a meme] 
Do you share memes? 
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Do you see them as a way of communicating issues or topics?  
 
 
Gauge levels of interest in climate change 
Are you aware of any current or recent stories about climate change in the 
media? 
Do you care about climate change? Why, why not?  
Do you believe that human greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for 
climate change? 
Do you see climate change information and discussions online?  Which online 
sources do you see climate change information? 
What proportion of what you see online is on climate change? 
 
Gauge levels of understanding about climate change; what do they believe 
about climate change. How do they react to information that challenges what 
they believe? 
Do you actively seek information on climate change, or do you come across 
climate change content when browsing the Internet? 
 
Do you engage with climate change information or participate in climate change 
discussions?  
Read 
Share 
Discuss 
Sign online petitions 
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Do you see climate change focused memes (prompt of appendix C of one 
warmist meme and one meme from sceptics)  
How would you react to this if you saw it online?  
 
 
Closing statement:  
Thank you for your time for helping with this research. A summary of the 
research findings will be provided if ticked on the consent form. 
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Hand out 1:  Meme example 
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Hand out 2: Example of an environmental meme 
 
Hand out 3: Warmist meme and climate sceptic meme 
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Appendix E: Online survey 
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Appendix F: Experiment coding  
 
Physical science:  
Question True False Don’t 
Know 
The center of the Earth is very hot (True or False). 1 0 0 
The continents have been moving their location for millions 
of years and will continue to move (True or False). 
1 0 0 
Lasers work by focusing sound waves (True or False). 0 1 0 
All radioactivity is manmade (True or False) 0 1 0 
Electrons are smaller than atoms. (True or False) 1 0 0 
 
Question The Earth 
goes round the 
Sun 
The Sun 
goes round 
the Sun 
Don’t Know 
Does the Earth go round the sun, or does 
the sun go around the Earth? 
1 0 0 
Scores from these questions are combined to give a basic physical science knowledge score 
ranging from 0 to 6.   
 
 
Biological science: 
Question True False Don’t Know 
It is the father's gene that decides whether the baby 
is a boy or a girl. (True or False) 
1 0 0 
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria (True or 
False) 
0 1 0 
Human beings, as we know them today, developed 
from earlier species of animal (True or False) 
1 0 0 
 
 
Question Yes No Don’t Know 
 A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup 
means that they’ve got one in four chances of having 
a child with an inherited illness. (1) Does this mean 
that if their first child has the illness, the next three 
will not?  
0 1 0 
(2) Does this mean that each of the couple’s children 
will have the same risk of suffering from the illness? 
1 0 0 
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Question Scientist 1 Scientist 2 Don’t know 
Two scientists want to know if a certain drug 
is effective against high blood pressure. The 
first scientist wants to give the drug to 1,000 
people with high blood pressure and see how 
many of them experience lower blood 
pressure levels. The second scientist wants 
to give the drug to 500 people with high blood 
pressure and not give the drug to another 500 
people with high blood pressure, and see how 
many in both groups experience lower blood 
pressure levels. Which is the better way to 
test this drug? (Scientist 1 or scientist 2?) 
0 1 0 
 
Open question Shows some understanding 
of the use of control groups 
for comparison 
Does not show 
understanding for the need of 
comparison or simply puts 
does not know. 
Why is it better to test the 
drug this way?  
1 0 
Scores from these questions are combined to give a basic knowledge of biological science 
score ranging from 0 to 7.  
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Scientific methods: 
Understands statistics: 
Question Yes No Don’t Know 
 A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup 
means that they’ve got one in four chances of having 
a child with an inherited illness. (1) Does this mean 
that if their first child has the illness, the next three 
will not?  
0 1 0 
(2) Does this mean that each of the couple’s children 
will have the same risk of suffering from the illness? 
1 0 0 
If both of these are answered correctly then a score of 1 is given to the understanding statistics 
variable if scoring 1 or 0 then a score of 0 is given to the variable.  
Understands experiments: 
Question Scientist 1 Scientist 2 Don’t know 
Two scientists want to know if a certain drug 
is effective against high blood pressure. The 
first scientist wants to give the drug to 1,000 
people with high blood pressure and see how 
many of them experience lower blood 
pressure levels. The second scientist wants 
to give the drug to 500 people with high blood 
pressure and not give the drug to another 500 
people with high blood pressure, and see how 
many in both groups experience lower blood 
pressure levels. Which is the better way to 
test this drug? (Scientist 1 or scientist 2?) 
0 1 0 
 
Open question Shows some understanding 
of the use of control groups 
for comparison 
Does not show 
understanding for the need of 
comparison or simply puts 
does not know. 
Why is it better to test the 
drug this way?  
1 0 
If both of these are answered correctly then a score of 1 is given to the understanding 
experiments if scoring 1 or 0 then a score of 0 is given to the variable.  
Understands the scientific method: 
Question Clear 
understanding 
A 
general 
sense 
Little 
understanding 
Don’t 
know 
When you read news stories, 
you see certain sets of words 
and terms. We are interested 
in how many people 
recognize certain kinds of 
terms. First, some articles 
refer to the results of a 
scientific study. When you 
read or hear the term 
1 1 0 0 
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scientific study, do you have 
a clear understanding of 
what it means, a general 
sense of what it means, or 
little understanding of what it 
means? 
 
Open question Some awareness of 
experimental methods, 
knowledge creation, or 
scientific process 
Does not demonstrate 
understanding or put ‘Don’t 
Know’ 
In your own words, could you 
tell me what it means to 
study something 
scientifically?  
1 0 
 
Open question Shows some understanding 
of the use of control groups 
for comparison 
Does not show 
understanding for the need of 
comparison or simply puts 
does not know. 
Why is it better to test the 
drug this way?  
1 0 
For a participant to be classified as understanding the scientific method they needed to have 
been classified as understanding statistics and also getting at least one of the open questions 
correct. If both this criteria was achieved the participant was given a score of 1 if both open 
questions were incorrect and they were not classified as understanding statistics they would be 
given a score of 0.   
Rejects pseudoscience:  
Question Very 
Scientific 
Somewhat 
scientific 
Not 
Scientific 
at all 
Don’t Know 
Would you say that astrology is 
very scientific, sort of scientific, 
or not at all scientific? 
0 0 1 0 
The rejection of pseudoscience is measured based on whether they recognised that astrology 
was not scientific. If they rejected astrology they were considered able to reject pseudoscience.  
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Basic knowledge of climate change  
Question Statements Major Minor Not a 
cause 
Don’t 
know  
Regardless of 
whether you 
know much 
about Climate 
change, please 
indicate whether 
you think each 
of the following 
is a major or 
primary cause 
of Climate 
change, a minor 
or secondary 
cause, or not a 
cause at all. 
Pollution/emissions from 
business and industry 
1 0 0 0 
Use of aerosol spray cans 0 0 1 0 
Use of chemicals to 
destroy insect pests 
0 0 1 0 
People driving their cars 1 0 0 0 
Use of coal and oil by 
utilities or electric 
companies 
1 0 0 0 
Depletion of ozone in the 
upper atmosphere 
0 0 1 0 
Destruction of tropical 
forests 
1 0 0 0 
Nuclear power generation 0 0 1 0 
People heating and 
cooling their homes 
1 0 0 0 
 
Question Statements True False Don’t 
know 
Are the 
following 
statements 
about climate 
change true 
or false? 
Human activity is a significant cause of 
climate change 
1 0 0 
Climate naturally varies over time so we 
should not worry 
0 1 0 
Climate change is causing the majority of 
glaciers and sea ice to melt around the 
world 
1 0 0 
The hole in the ozone layer causes global 
warming 
0 1 0 
There is nothing we can do about climate 
change. It’s already too late.  
0 1 0 
Scientists disagree about whether humans 
are causing the Earth’s climate to change 
0 1 0 
Global warming is a good thing, because it 
will rid us of frigid winters and make plants 
grow more quickly 
0 1 0 
The following 
gases are 
greenhouse 
gases (True 
or False) 
Argon 0 1 0 
Water Vapour 1 0 0 
Methane 1 0 0 
Nitrogen 0 1 0 
Carbon Dioxide 1 0 0 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)  1 0 0 
Oxygen 0 1 0 
Nitrous Oxide 0 1 0 
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Perception of Risk: 
Question Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
In your judgement, how likely 
are you, sometime during your 
life to experience serious 
threats to your health or 
overall well-being as a result 
of each of the following 
Climate change 5 4 3 2 1 
In your judgement, how likely 
is it that each of the following 
will have extremely harmful, 
long-term impacts on our 
society? 
Climate change 5 4 3 2 1 
Do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements: 
“Extensive and long-lasting flooding caused by climate 
change is likely to take place in low-lying countries like 
Bangladesh or the Netherlands.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
“Extensive and long-lasting flooding caused by climate 
change is likely to take place in the UK.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
“Climate change is likely to cause severe food 
shortages in places like Africa and India.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
“Climate change is likely to cause severe food 
shortages in the UK.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
“People in the UK will be affected by climate change in 
the next 30 years.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
“People in the UK will be affected by climate change in 
the next 200 years.” 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Attitudes to climate change mitigation: 
Question Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
In your Do you 
agree or 
disagree with 
the following 
statements: 
It's not worth Britain 
trying to combat 
climate change, 
because other 
countries will just 
cancel out what we 
do 
5 4 3 2 1 
The effects of 
climate change are 
too far in the future 
to really worry me 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 
